VZCZCXRO7949
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0732/01 3381307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041307Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5570
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0035
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000732 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ECON ETRD IV
SUBJECT: IVOIRIAN COTTON SECTOR HANGING BY A THREAD 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 716 
 
¶1. Summary.  Poor management and world market factors, along 
with the seven-year military-political crisis, have resulted 
in a 63 percent reduction in Ivoirian cotton production since 
the late 1990s. Cotton is grown almost entirely in the Forces 
Nouvelles (FN)-controlled north, but the sector is still 
characterized by substantial government intervention, despite 
privatization of much of the state cotton company several 
years ago. There are some signs of improvement in areas where 
the private sector has been able to restore farmer 
confidence.  Additional improvement could take place if the 
GOCI streamlines the structures that govern the sector and 
provides better seed varieties and more micro-credit.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE OF SECTOR 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. During the colonial period, officials introduced cotton in 
the north in an attempt to reduce economic disparities with 
the more developed south.  Cotton remains concentrated in the 
region north of Bouake, where the climate is more amenable to 
the crop.  The cotton growing season is from May through 
November; ginning activity peaks in November and December. 
 
¶3. Since the early days of Ivoirian cotton production, the 
government has had significant involvement:  CIDT, the state 
cotton company, provided farmers fertilizer (the most costly 
input), insecticide, herbicide, and seeds.  After the 
harvest, CIDT bought cotton from the farmers, deducting the 
cost of the inputs it had provided.  CIDT also made road 
improvements and carried out social projects in the 
cotton-growing region. 
 
¶4. In 1998, at the recommendation of the World Bank, the GOCI 
sold many of CIDT's assets to private companies; CIDT kept 
only two gins.  The GOCI assigned each company a zone in 
which it could operate and required each farmer to deal only 
with the company in his zone. 
 
--------------------- 
DECLINE OF THE SECTOR 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. Not long after it entered the market, one of the private 
companies, LCCI, began to experience financial difficulties. 
Eventually, it stopped providing inputs to farmers, who were 
still legally prohibited from selling their product to other 
firms.  As its situation further deteriorated, LCCI could no 
longer afford to pay farmers.  In 2006, LCCI filed for 
bankruptcy.  But the firm's problems had a negative financial 
and psychological impact on many farmers and convinced them 
to stop growing cotton. 
 
¶6. By the time of LCCI's failure, the Ivoirian cotton sector 
had already been in decline for almost 20 years, beginning 
with a decrease in demand associated with the worldwide 
recession of the early 1980s.  The situation has worsened 
over the past ten years as a result of several factors.  The 
world price of cotton from 1989 to 1998 averaged USD 1,642 
per metric ton; but from 1999 to 2008, it averaged only USD 
1,282 per metric ton (a decrease of 22 percent). 
Additionally, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar (the 
currency in which cotton sales are denominated) vis-a-vis the 
CFA (which is pegged to the euro) and increasing competition 
from China have had a negative impact. 
 
¶7. The political/economic crisis that began in 2002 has hurt 
the cotton sector in much the same way it has affected other 
sectors concentrated in northern Cote d'Ivoire (reftel).  As 
a result of violent conflict in the region, Filiature et 
Tissage de Gonfreville (FTG), a privately owned cotton 
spinning and weaving company located in Bouake, closed from 
September 2002 to February 2003, causing a loss of both 
domestic and international customers.  The absence of customs 
enforcement, another result of the crisis, has allowed the 
entry of smuggled cotton goods and counterfeit textiles 
tariff-free.  Additionally, because of the fragility of the 
political climate, companies in the cotton-growing region 
have found banks unwilling to lend them money. 
Transportation costs have increased as a result of inadequate 
road maintenance and numerous FN barricades on the highways. 
 
-------------------------- 
CURRENT SIZE OF THE SECTOR 
-------------------------- 
 
ABIDJAN 00000732  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. For the three growing seasons ending in 2001-2002, Cote 
d'Ivoire produced an average of 361,868 metric tons of cotton 
per year.  For the following four growing seasons, ending in 
2006-2007, the country produced on average 291,827 metric 
tons per year, a decline of 19 percent.  For the 2006-2007 
and 2007-2008 growing seasons, production averaged only 
132,676 metric tons per year, a decrease of 63 percent from 
the 1999-2002 level.  As of November 2009, USDA projected 
world cotton production of 102.74 million 480-pound bales, or 
49.3 billion pounds, for the current season.  Thus, Cote 
d'Ivoire's average annual cotton production over the past two 
seasons has averaged only about 0.6 percent of world 
production. 
 
¶9. Today, approximately 150,000 farmers grow cotton in Cote 
d'Ivoire.  Most farms are 3-4 hectares (roughly 5-7 acres), 
and most are worked by hand, without draft animals.  Average 
national production last year was 859 kilos per hectare, 
which, somewhat surprisingly, is quite close to the USDA 
projection of U.S. production of 870 kilos per hectare for 
the current season.  There are currently six cotton-ginning 
companies in Cote d'Ivoire:  COIC, Ivoire Coton, Dopa, CIDT, 
Sicosa, and SECO (a subsidiary of OLAM, an Indian 
agricultural firm that purchased an LCCI gin in 
Ouangolodougou in 2008). 
 
¶10. Although there is complete vertical integration in some 
firms, such as UNINORD (the parent company of Dopa and 
FTG), which buys cotton from farmers and ultimately sells 
shirts, sheets, and other cotton products in the retail 
market, Cote d'Ivoire exports approximately 90 percent of its 
ginned cotton--primarily to Europe and Asia--with no further 
transformation.  Ivoirian firms export most of their finished 
textiles to other African countries and to Europe.  It is 
unlikely that the Ivoirian cotton sector would benefit 
substantially from AGOA, were it to become eligible for the 
program in the future. 
 
------------------------------- 
CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE SECTOR 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. While the GOCI has altered the structure of the sector 
over time, the basic system remains entrenched:  private 
cotton companies and scaled-down, state-owned CIDT provide 
inputs, including technical assistance, to farmers and buy 
cotton from them, deducting the cost of the inputs.  The GOCI 
abolished the zone system in 2005, but farmers generally 
cannot afford to sell their cotton to gins located far from 
their farms.  Most farmers belong to cooperatives, which 
gather cotton from the various farms to make transportation 
more efficient. 
 
¶12. Each May the GOCI sets the price that gins must pay 
farmers based on international prices from the previous 
season's harvest.  For the 2008-2009 season, the official 
GOCI price for top-grade cotton is CFA 185 (USD 0.42) per 
kilo (compared to approximately USD 1.32 per kilo for U.S. 
farmers).  OLAM/SECO, reports that input costs are almost CFA 
150 (USD 0.34) per kilo.  Thus, Ivoirian farmers are clearing 
only about USD 0.08 per kilo. 
 
¶13. The GOCI also dictates the price that gins charge farmers 
for fertilizers.  Through the 2005-2006 season the GOCI 
provided a subsidy for fertilizer, allowing the ginners to 
pay the farmers more for their cotton.  For the 2006-2007 and 
2007-2008 seasons, in the absence of GOCI subsidies, the 
Islamic Development Bank provided fertilizer subsidies. 
Neither the GOCI nor the Islamic Development Bank has 
announced a fertilizer subsidy for this season. 
 
¶14. While cotton is the primary cash crop of north-central 
Cote d'Ivoire, most cotton farmers grow equal proportions of 
cotton and corn.  Additional crops grown by cotton farmers 
include rice, millet, sorghum, peanuts, and yams.  Farmers 
use the ginner-provided inputs for these food crops as well. 
Thus, failure to provide inputs or to subsidize them has an 
effect on food supplies as well as cotton. 
 
¶15. Like many other businesses operating in northern Cote 
d'Ivoire, cotton companies currently pay taxes to the GOCI as 
well as unofficial taxes to the FN (reftel).  Ginners pay a 
levy to the Autorite de Regulation du Coton et de l'Anacarde 
(ARECA) and another levy to Audit Controle et Expertise 
(ACE), a state agency responsible for quality control and 
weighing cotton.  Additionally, they pay a fee to the Comite 
de Suivie des Filieres Coton et Anacarde (CSCA), an 
 
ABIDJAN 00000732  003 OF 003 
 
 
organization set up by the FN, and to an association of 
cotton companies, known as the Association 
Inter-professionelle de la Filiere Coton (Inter-coton). 
 
---------------- 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
---------------- 
 
¶16. It is difficult to see how the Ivoirian cotton sector, 
with its extremely limited capital and government-dominated 
set-up, can remain competitive today.  The low cost of labor 
is the saving grace of the sector.  Cotton executives say the 
high degree of manual labor provides gins with much cleaner 
cotton than the cotton picked by machine, thus reducing 
ginning costs. 
 
¶17. There are some encouraging signs for the sector. 
OLAM/SECO has made significant progress at its gin in 
Ouangolodougou.  Of the 35,000 hectares of potential cotton 
farms near the OLAM/SECO gin, only 8,000 were in production 
in the 2007-2008 season.  This season, 17,000 hectares are in 
production.  OLAM/SECO ginned 5,500 tons of cotton last year 
and expects to gin substantially more this year.  Gin 
managers believe restoration of farmers' confidence that the 
company will provide inputs and technical assistance combined 
with OLAM/SECO's guarantee of payment have had a highly 
positive effect in the region. 
 
¶18. Streamlining the GOCI structures that are involved (as is 
under consideration in the cocoa sector) and eliminating FN 
levies would benefit the sector.  Cotton experts say 
additional research to develop better seed varieties is 
another key to increasing output.  Increasing the 
availability of oxen or other draft animals, and more 
veterinarians to care for them would further boost output. 
Micro-credit to allow farmers to purchase work animals, 
better quality plows, or even tractors would significantly 
help the sector as well. 
NESBITT