VZCZCXRO7434
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYD #0971/01 3171429
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131429Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0450
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YAOUNDE 000971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS, USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 
TAGS: CM EAID ECON FR KCOR MAS PGOV PHUM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO CAMEROON 
 
REF: A. YAOUNDE 724 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 769 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet E. Garvey for reasons 1.4 (d) and (e) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Cameroonian President Paul Biya, who 
recently celebrated his 27th year in office, has delivered 
little in the way of democratization, good governance, 
economic reforms, or investments in people - all key USG 
goals.  The government here values its relationship with the 
United States but has not moved substantially in areas that 
we care about, with the exception of cooperation on maritime 
security.  As it heads into a critical pre-election period, 
Cameroon has a number of the ingredients of a failing state, 
with the potential for conflict that could undermine regional 
stability.  This calls for an adjustment in our approach, 
building on existing tools and Mission Strategic goals but 
leaning more on Washington engagement, cooperation with the 
French and other allies, and a sharper-edged message.  Our 
primary goal should be to encourage preparations for a 
peaceful transition to a more democratic, better governed 
post-Biya period.  End summary. 
 
Biya Completes 27 Years 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On November 6, Paul Biya celebrated 27 years as 
President of Cameroon; when added to his time as former 
President Ahidjo's Prime Minister, Biya has been at the helm 
of government for 32 years (since 1977).  As detailed ref A, 
Cameroon has a number of the elements of a failing state and 
Biya had little to trumpet at last week's anniversary.  He 
marked the occasion with a first-ever letter to the 
Cameroonian people in which he extolled Cameroonians to feel 
better about themselves but talked only in general terms 
about his goals (septel). 
 
¶3.  (C)  Biya's 27th year in office was not without some 
accomplishments.  Cameroonian officials frequently argue that 
the country's ethnic, linguistic, and regional divisions 
require slow movement on many fronts; they highlight 
stability and unity as among Biya's biggest achievements. 
2009 was a more stable year than riot-torn 2008.  Relations 
with Nigeria are at a high and Biya is beginning to play a 
more statesmanlike role in the Central African region.  There 
is more security in Bakassi, thanks largely to the Rapid 
Intervention Battalion (BIR).  Biya urged his Cabinet to 
fight inertia and, in a minor Cabinet shuffle in June, he 
changed his Prime Minister and ousted his venal Defense 
Minister.   Since then, the government seems more focused on 
moving forward with large infrastructure projects, including 
several new roads and the Kribi port.  Biya has also 
continued with his anti-corruption campaign "Operation 
Epervier (Operation Sparrowhawk), arresting a string of 
officials on corruption charges. 
 
¶4.  (C)  On the other hand, Biya enters his 28th year with 
diminished legitimacy.  His recent letter to the people and 
an orchestrated campaign drumbeat from within the ruling 
Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) party are strong 
signals that Biya will run again in the scheduled 2011 
presidential election.  Biya seems increasingly isolated and 
has fended off criticism of the fact that he spends 
significant time overseas, including on expensive vacations. 
His 2008 decision to pack the new Electoral Commission 
(ELECAM) with senior party stalwarts undermined democratic 
development and raises a big question mark about the 
legitimacy of the upcoming election.  Economic forecasts 
continue to be gloomy, with GDP growth predictions for 2009 
of about 2% (below 3% population growth), although senior 
officials hope that a global economic pickup and new 
infrastructure investments will spur more buoyant growth by 
the third quarter of 2010.  The government has made little 
progress on governance and its 2009 Millennium Challenge 
Corporation scorecard reads about the same as last year - 
that is to say, Cameroon fails on 13 of 17 MCC indicators. 
 
The U.S. A Valued Partner 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The United States celebrated 50 years of diplomatic 
relations with Cameroon in 2007.  Cameroonians admire the 
U.S. and the government values its relationship with the 
United States, especially our military-military cooperation, 
and sees us as a counterbalance to France and China. 
President Biya met President Bush at the White House in 2003 
and supported us on the Iraq war when Cameroon was a Security 
Council member.  The GRC greatly appreciates our support for 
the Greentree process which led to the handover of the 
 
YAOUNDE 00000971  002 OF 005 
 
 
Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria - perhaps Biya's biggest 
perceived success in recent years. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Over the past month, the Foreign Ministry has 
stepped up overtures to us, seeking a regular bilateral 
dialogue and supporting us with an abstention in the 
Goldstone Report.  The Director for North America at the 
Foreign Ministry recently reassured Pol/Econ Chief that "You 
are one of our top partners - if you don't know it, you 
should."  The GRC has repeatedly hinted at a desire for 
senior USG visitors (top of their wish list, not 
surprisingly, is a POTUS visit). 
 
Active Broad-Gauge Engagement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Our top Mission Strategic Plan priorities are:  to 
strengthen democracy and good governance; to foster economic 
prosperity and development; to collaborate on security and 
international issues; and to invest in people.  Within these 
goals, our main activities are: 
 
-- Democracy Building:  We deploy a wide range of activities 
to encourage democratic development, including a broad array 
of Public Diplomacy programs.  We were the most outspoken 
foreign mission in opposing the 2008 constitutional change to 
eliminate presidential term limits and the subsequent 
creation of ELECAM.  The Ambassador and her predecessor have 
been at the forefront of diplomats in speaking out against 
corruption and electoral fraud.  In the past year, we 
sponsored a Human Rights Day roundtable and a series of 
democracy showcase events, and organized programs to 
highlight the 2008 U.S. presidential election.  We engage the 
government actively on anti-corruption efforts, including 
helping identify overseas deposits of ill-gotten money. 
 
-- Economic Advocacy:  We regularly engage the government on 
investment climate and budget transparency issues.  We 
actively support U.S. companies and EXIM Bank, OPIC, USDA, 
and the US Trade Development Agency, which are all engaged 
here.  The U.S. is Cameroon's largest foreign investor (in 
terms of dollars) and one of its largest trading partners. 
Cameroonian exports to the U.S. doubled between 2007 and 
2008, to $614 million. 
 
-- Mil-Mil Engagement:  One of the strongest components of 
our bilateral relationship is our military-military 
relationship.  This includes various ongoing FMF cases valued 
at about $1 million, humanitarian assistance, and 
increasingly strong engagement on maritime security, 
especially with the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR).  For 
the past year, Cameroon has offered to deploy up to 800 
troops for UN/AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur. 
 
-- Investing in People:  We have one of the largest and 
oldest Peace Corps programs in the world (currently with 
about 125 Volunteers), focused on education, health and small 
business development.  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in Cameroon has been active in countering 
HIV/AIDS.  Other bilateral assistance totaling about $30 
million, in single and multi-year funds, includes the US 
Department of Agriculture's Food for Progress programs 
(focused on food security), and small funds to support 
refugees, democracy and human rights, Self Help projects, and 
environmental activities.  USAID closed its office in 
Cameroon in 1994 (largely a reaction to the stolen 1992 
election) but retains about $1.5 million in programming here, 
primarily focused on the health sector, and managed out of 
its regional office in Accra.  Public diplomacy is a major 
tool for the mission to promote development assistance and 
new partnerships. 
 
What Have We Gotten For It? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  We have had years of polite conversations with the 
GRC and attestations of friendship.  In return, we have 
gotten  a certain degree of cooperation on many fronts and a 
certain level of reciprocated good will.  However, it is 
difficult to say we have substantially moved the ball on the 
things that matter most to us.  Our public statements on 
elections, amending the constitution, corruption and ELECAM 
gained us popular support but did not visibly impact GRC 
decision-making.  Biya has done little to open up his 
authoritarian regime or smooth the way for a post-Biya 
democratic transition.  While the media has become freer in 
the past decade and there is a high level of religious 
freedom, Cameroon has never had a free and fair election, its 
democratic institutions (parliament, judiciary, electoral 
 
YAOUNDE 00000971  003 OF 005 
 
 
commission etc.) are politically controlled from the center, 
and opposition and civil society elements have been weakened 
and co-opted. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Cameroon does poorly on scorecards from the World 
Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International and other 
organizations, with rankings steadily slipping.  Its economy 
is limping along, with little industry, little agricultural 
diversification, and little economic vision.  Many social 
indicators have worsened.  Corruption is endemic and 
government decision-making is sclerotic.  Cameroon has 
supported us on some UN and other international issues, but 
it tends to abstain on UN votes important to us, with a 22% 
voting coincidence with the United States on overall votes 
and 0% on important votes in 2008, according to the 
Department's "Voting Practices in the United Nations" report. 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  As detailed in ref A, Cameroon's drift threatens 
its longer term stability and our national interests here - 
within Cameroon but also within the region.  Cameroon's 
Douala port, road connections, oil refinery (which produces 
almost all of Cameroon and Chad's refined petroleum), $4.5 
billion Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, abundant agricultural 
production, and large economy (the largest GDP in Central 
Africa) are critical to the economic health of its neighbors. 
 As the longest serving leader in the region, Biya has some 
influence over neighboring heads of state, although he has 
traditionally shied away from regional activism.  We have a 
regional strategic interest in strengthening Cameroon's 
longer term stability - which requires us to adjust our 
engagement. 
 
Our Seven-Point Approach 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C)  It is time, we believe, to be more direct with Biya 
and the GRC.  We outline the following seven-point approach: 
 
-- Get Senior Washington Engagement:  We believe senior 
Washington engagement (preferably Assistant Secretary level 
or higher) with Biya and senior GRC officials could be 
productive.  Such discussions should note our growing 
frustration with developments in Cameroon, highlighting the 
need to improve governance, ensure greater legitimacy for 
ELECAM, hold free and fair elections in 2011, and prepare for 
transition to a post-Biya period.  We should tell the 
government privately that we can only support them as 
friendly partners up to a point -- we cannot sacrifice our 
support of fundamental U.S. principles in the process.  We 
will tell them we want to be on the right side of history, 
and that increasingly, the current regime appears to be on 
the wrong side. 
 
-- Engage with a Sharper Edge:  We will seek renewed 
opportunities to highlight our Self Help programs, Peace 
Corps and other activities, framing them in terms of our 
support for the Cameroonian people.  We will continue to put 
our mil-mil activities in the context of regional security 
and the interests of the Cameroonian people.  At the same 
time, however, in line with senior Washington engagement, we 
will stress to the GRC privately and in public forums our 
desire to see the current paradigm in Cameroon change.  We 
will explain to the GRC our internal tripwires, including 
tripwires we will develop for responding to political and 
security developments, and how the unfolding events of the 
next few years could impact our relationship.  At the same 
time, we should continue to reinforce our message that 
Cameroonians need to take more responsibility for their own 
future. 
 
-- Develop Political Tripwires:  As noted above, we plan to 
map out a series of political and security tripwires to guide 
our more sharply focused engagement over the coming few 
years.  Key markers will be whether ELECAM becomes a more 
credible electoral institution by mid-2010; whether the GRC 
publishes its 2005 census; whether the human rights and media 
freedom situations change significantly; whether there is 
progress in fighting corruption (including implementation of 
Article 66 of the constitution which requires government 
officials to disclose their personal assets); whether the 
security forces are deployed to suppress dissent; whether the 
President creates a Senate, as required by the constitution; 
and - looking down the road - whether the 2011 election is 
free and fair. 
 
-- Work More Closely with Allies: The "8 6" group of 
like-minded Ambassadors is a useful forum for coordination on 
the ground.  The outgoing European Union Ambassador this week 
 
YAOUNDE 00000971  004 OF 005 
 
 
publicly blasted Cameroon for its poor record on democracy 
and governance.  We have sensed, however, a greater 
reluctance on the part of some partners like the British and 
Dutch - who have been outspoken and activist in the past - to 
hold Cameroon to a high standard of governance and speak out 
about problems.  We will work to mobilize a more united 
multinational approach to Cameroon.  Per ref B, France has 
considerable influence with the Biya regime but has been 
reluctant to criticize the regime.  We would encourage an 
effort in Washington and Paris to convince France to 
cooperate with us more closely on anti-corruption and 
democracy promotion in a country like Cameroon, where 
France's long term interests may be jeopardized by the 
animosity generated by closely aligning with a regime like 
Biya's. 
 
-- Strengthen our Assistance Tools:  Our assistance efforts 
are piecemeal and have little visibility.  Post has put 
together an assistance matrix to better track the various 
pots of USG funding here but our ability to leverage these 
into influence is hampered by a systemic lack of coordination 
and staffing.  A Foreign Ministry contact recently complained 
to Pol/Econ Chief "you never ask us what we want, you just 
offer us things."  He has a point.  Our overall assistance 
engagement process- from DOD, USDA, USAID, Peace Corps, Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and others - insufficiently consults 
post and the GRC on priorities and design.  From post's 
vantage point, the MSP and F processes have not brought about 
this discipline, limiting our ability to use our resources, 
even in countries like Cameroon where the funding levels are 
modest.  Part of the problem is staffing.  We manage a large 
USDA program with no USDA staff.  DAO manages sizable 
humanitarian assistance without adequate staff to track it. 
We have not seen the USAID regional model work well, 
especially since there is no USAID Central Africa. 
 
-- Innovate On Other Tools:  Post has used the 212 (f) visa 
ineligibility as a powerful way to impact efforts to combat 
corruption.  We would welcome other visa tools - such as 
ineligibilities for electoral fraud and Internet scammers - 
to reinforce our core interests.  We would also like to see 
new ideas on supporting AGOA.  Cameroon is a major economy 
with some sophisticated exporters eager to take more 
advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
Yet we seem to have the same discussions every year with the 
GRC and private sector about the country's inability to 
effectively take advantage of AGOA.  We hope to establish a 
USAID-supported AGOA Resource Center in Cameroon and will 
look for ways this Center can engage creatively to boost 
AGOA.  In other areas where we support and engage the GRC - 
such as health, agriculture, and security - we should focus 
our efforts on good governance.  So much of progress in these 
areas depends on the governance component.  We also see scope 
to get more demanding on GRC responsiveness to USG training 
opportunities.  The USG offers free security training under 
ILEA and a range of military offerings, free US Patent and 
Trademark training, free training trips to strengthen 
fisheries and anti-corruption efforts, and other training 
options that support mutual goals.  Yet we have great 
difficulty getting the GRC to provide the required clearances 
and names.  We plan to demarche the government at senior 
levels about this difficulty in getting cooperation for 
training and then start denying training options that become 
too difficult to implement. 
 
-- Add a Political Officer:  For the past two MSPs, post has 
requested the return of a political officer position.  This 
position remains key to our ability to effectively implement 
the above goals.  An additional political officer would help 
our Pol/Econ section strengthen assistance coordination, 
engage more actively with allies, boost Public Diplomacy and 
interventions focused on democracy and good governance, 
better engage civil society and political parties, and 
increase reporting during the run-up to elections and an 
eventual post-Biya period. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  We have a limited ability to impact developments in 
Cameroon.  Biya is set in his ways after almost three decades 
as president.  He and his entourage are polite listeners but 
are fundamentally conservative and preservationist. 
Nonetheless, the approach outlined above is, in our view, our 
best road map for impacting the critical next few years for 
Cameroon.  Biya will listen to us more if Washington engages 
(through phone calls, meetings, visits etc.) at a senior 
level, especially if in tandem with France.  He wants 
international legitimacy, especially from our two countries. 
 
YAOUNDE 00000971  005 OF 005 
 
 
A more bold and at times confrontational style could 
undermine GRC good will to some degree.  However, 
Cameroonians have become used to our forward leaning, at 
times outspoken, diplomacy and will adjust to a tougher 
approach on some issues which, if carefully managed, will 
better serve our interests here. 
GARVEY