VZCZCXRO4772
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHQU
DE RUEHVC #0261/01 3141720
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101720Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL VANCOUVER
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5342
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER 7942

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 VANCOUVER 000261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS ASEC KFRD CPAS CMGT CA
SUBJECT: CALGARY AND VANCOUVER FRAUD SUMMARY 
 
REF: 08 STATE 074840 
 
VANCOUVER 00000261  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY. There are no significant fraud incidents to 
report for this period.  Note that this report is on behalf of 
Calgary and Vancouver.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) COUNTRY CONDITIONS. Vancouver and Calgary are low-fraud 
posts. Malafide travelers find it less difficult to attempt 
entry across the vast land border than apply for a visa. 
Vancouver, Canada's third largest city, is one of the most 
affluent and culturally diverse cities in North America. Recent 
immigrants from Asian countries including India, China, the 
Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan have flocked to the city in the 
past decade.  In fact, a third of the city is of Chinese origin 
and Vancouver International Airport services daily flights from 
many Asian capitals.  Eastern Europeans and Russians have also 
moved to Vancouver recently in significant numbers. Blaine, 
Washington, the closest land border, is a mere thirty minutes by 
car from downtown. 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) Recent economic development and population growth have 
led to a skyrocketing real estate market and major ethnic 
diversity. The migration from abroad has also brought in 
criminal elements and Vancouver is becoming home to an 
increasing number of ethnic gangs. Vancouver has the highest 
density per square mile in the entire country. Foreign 
immigration remains the principal growth factor, reflected in 
the fact that less than half of all residents in the Vancouver 
area speak English at home. The application process for Canadian 
documents, including passports and local birth certificates, is 
fairly well-controlled. Post has not seen cases of fake Canadian 
permanent resident card, which has similar security features to 
the U.S. legal permanent resident card. However, local 
authorities recently acknowledged that counterfeiting is 
becoming a major problem in the province and post has seen cases 
of individuals obtaining British Columbia identification cards 
when they were not entitled to them. 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) NIV FRAUD. Vancouver and Calgary detected fraud most 
notably in the H1B category. 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) Although visitor visa (B1/B2) fraud appears less 
organized and less complicated, there continues to be incidences 
where applicants try to cover up prior orders of removal or 
unlawful presence in the U.S. They do so by changing names or 
other identifying information after leaving the U.S. and 
entering Canada either as immigrants or asylum claimants. 
Usually, these applicants have only recently arrived in Canada 
to seek legal status after residing unlawfully in the U.S. for 
years. They will also present brand-new passports to hide their 
previous travel. If IAFIS and IDENT do not catch these 
applicants, their American regional accent or 
better-than-average English will reveal that they have been 
residing in the U.S. for a long time. 
 
 
 
¶6. (U) Since Calgary and Vancouver rarely see first-time H1B 
applicants who are not landed immigrants in Canada, there are 
usually no concerns about an applicant's skill or experience. 
That being said, during this reporting period Vancouver 
witnessed a string of Turkish applicants applying for first-time 
H1B visas. In most of the cases, their education was from Turkey 
and the applicants had come to apply in Vancouver directly from 
the U.S., where they had been most often been studying ESL. 
While the H1B petitions were for teaching positions at charter 
schools in the United States, most applicants had no prior 
teaching experience and the schools were listed as related to 
Fethullah Gulen. Post was in contact with FPMs in Turkey for 
guidance in how to proceed with those cases. 
 
 
 
¶7. (U) Most H1B fraud in Vancouver occurs when applicants come 
to renew their H1B visas and the consular officers discover that 
they are actually doing something other than working for their 
Petitioner, or they have not been paid what they should and we 
discover that they are being "benched". Vancouver has seen fewer 
fraudulent H1B cases in this reporting period. One possible 
reason for this is that post significantly reduced U.S.-based 
renewal appointments during the summer because of staffing 
shortages. Another reason is that Vancouver has been reviewing 
 
VANCOUVER 00000261  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
H1B cases much more closely since last year. By monitoring H1B 
bulletin boards and chat rooms last year, Vancouver realized 
that it was being targeted as an "easier" post in which to 
apply. By requesting additional documentation, such as earnings 
and leave documents, monthly bank statements, and pay records of 
applicants that had not earned the correct year-to-date 
salaries, this belief appears to have been dispelled. 
 
 
 
¶8. (U) Calgary has worked aggressively in the last reporting 
period to identify possible H1-B fraud based on the information 
that was promulgated by Toronto in 09 Toronto 000193. Using the 
tools provided, Calgary has looked more effectively at possible 
"benching" of applicants and has been able to better respond to 
adverse PIMS reports prepared by Kentucky Consular Center's 
(KCC) FPU.  In these cases we have not developed any clear-cut 
instances of fraud, but have been able to ask additional 
questions to resolve inconsistencies and have hopefully avoided 
visa shopping within the mission and applicants coming to 
Calgary expecting a less thorough review of the applications. 
Both Calgary and Vancouver have found the PIMS reports in the 
new version of NIV very helpful in adjudicating this type of 
visa. 
 
 
 
¶9. (U) Vancouver sees occasional fraud in treaty investor and 
trader visa categories. Sometimes the fraud involves the 
concealment of criminal ineligibilities that are usually 
revealed in secondary inspection at the border when a CBP 
officer accesses the applicant's Canadian criminal record. Other 
times, it appears that the applicant is filing for an E visa so 
that their children can attend school in the U.S. These 
applicants tend to be recently naturalized Canadian citizens who 
are looking to start small businesses in the U.S. while their 
children attend high school or college there. They are generally 
refused for not meeting the marginality requirement. Post has 
seen E applicants who were former asylum seekers in the U.S. who 
buy a small business in the U.S. upon becoming a Canadian 
citizen after three years of permanent residency in Canada. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) Vancouver continues to monitor international student 
applicants for possible fraud. Post conducted a validation study 
in the last year for Mexicans who are on student status in 
Canada. The results of the study seem to indicate that these 
students tend to abide by the terms of their B1/B2 visas. 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) IV FRAUD. Vancouver does not process immigrant visas but 
does accept "clearly approvable" I-130 petitions. Post processes 
K visas for applicants who are resident in the consular 
district. K-visa applications are generally good with a few 
immigration-purposes only cases. 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) DV FRAUD. Calgary and Vancouver do not process DV visas. 
 
 
 
¶13. (U) ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD. As border controls strengthen 
and visa applicants are more rigorously screened, post believes 
attempted ACS and passport fraud will increase. One ACS fraud 
scenario involves the creation of a false identity. 
Historically, Canada has been a haven to Americans wishing to 
escape US authorities. Consequently, the ACS Unit encounters 
several people each year with outstanding warrants in the United 
States. A new passport requirement for alien residents in Canada 
means American fugitives, as well as others seeking to cut ties 
with the U.S., may try to assume false identities and obtains 
U.S. passports at the Consulate. 
 
 
 
¶14. (U) In most of Calgary's ACS fraud cases, they have worked 
directly with the appropriate domestic FPMs and CA to help 
resolve questions. In fact, most potential cases have proven to 
be fairly easily resolved.  As an example, Calgary has had 
several cases where applicants have denied having any previous 
lost or stolen passports or even any previously issued 
passports, but name checks revealed these claims to be 
incorrect.  Similarly, many of Calgary's fraud cases dealt with 
suspicions about possibly questionable birth certificates.  In 
all of these cases, the birth certificates were satisfactorily 
verified. 
 
VANCOUVER 00000261  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
 
¶15. (U) One of the more complicated cases Calgary has been 
working on involves a potential false claim of paternity that 
came to light when three children from the same mother and 
father applied for passports.  Although Consular Reports of 
Birth Abroad had already been issued to all of the children a 
year earlier, the facial characteristics of the children seemed 
to point out the father of the first born son might have been 
different.  The father through whom the children derived their 
citizenship is African-American, and the mother is not.  Through 
coordination with our contacts in the vital records department 
who issued the original local birth certificate of the first 
child, we discovered that he was originally registered with a 
different last name and no father listed, and then nine years 
later, had the birth certificate changed to list the father and 
a different last name.  The family now all lives in the U.S., 
and we are working with the Department to determine next steps. 
 
 
 
16 (U) Vancouver was contacted last year by an American citizen 
resident on Vancouver Island who wished to renew her passport 
from 1999, the first ever issued to her, because she could not 
find out about what happened to her mail-in renewal in the 
United States. Post discovered that there is a fraud-hold on her 
case because the ID and social security number of the applicant 
is reported as matching a woman who died in the 1970's. In 
addition, the applicant purporting to be the American citizen 
helped her daughter to get her first American passport in 2000. 
Post finally persuaded the applicant to apply in person and had 
her into the Consulate General this reporting period. The fraud 
unit, in conjunction with DS and RSO, had the applicant 
fingerprinted and the results sent the results to DS in the 
Seattle Passport Agency for processing. Post is waiting to hear 
results in order to determine if she might have sought refuge in 
Canada from U.S. law enforcement. 
 
 
 
¶17. (U) Lost and stolen passports are numerous. Statistics are 
difficult to compile, as many lost/stolen passports are either 
not reported or are returned to authorities other than the 
Consulate. Post estimates that perhaps 1,000 U.S. passports were 
lost or stolen during 2006. As full implementation of the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) goes into effect in 
2009, requiring a passport or other WHTI compliant travel 
document for entering the United States by land or sea, this 
number will rise, as more Americans will carry passports. 
Vancouver has a particular problem regarding stolen passports. 
In 2006, it had the second-highest property theft rate of any 
urban area in North America. 
 
 
 
¶18. (U) The historically open US-Canadian border often makes 
documenting physical presence in the United States difficult, if 
not impossible. Neither side of the border stamps entries in US 
passports. Proof of physical presence is, of course, required 
for transmitting citizenship to Canadian-born children. Within 
the past year, post has detected several individuals fabricating 
physical presence claims in order to meet the time requirements. 
Some applicants apply years after being refused an initial time, 
submitting different data and hoping for a different ruling. For 
this reason, posts very rarely accept affidavits as proof of 
physical presence. 
 
 
 
¶19. (U) Canadian authorities go to great lengths to conceal 
adoptions on official records to protect individual privacy. 
Biological parent information on birth documents is routinely 
replaced with the details of the adopting parents with no 
evidence that a change ever took place. This makes concealing 
adoptions for the purposes of claiming derivative citizenship 
fairly easy. Post must scrutinize birth documents very carefully 
and always ask to see the "long" birth form, when available. 
 
 
 
¶20. (U) ADOPTION FRAUD. No fraud to report. 
 
 
 
¶21. (U) DNA TESTING.  No DNA testing this reporting period. 
 
 
 
 
VANCOUVER 00000261  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶22. (U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD. No fraud to report. 
 
 
 
¶23. (U) COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRY AUTHORITIES. Post enjoys a 
good working relationship with authorities from all levels of 
the host government. They are generally accessible and 
responsive to consular needs. 
 
 
 
¶24. (U) AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. Given Vancouver's proximity 
to the U.S. border, there are significant concerns that foreign 
nationals view the region as a transit center for ultimate 
illegal entry into the United States. Vancouver is concerned 
about the increase in B1 visa applicants who wish to drive 
trucks into the U.S. Many of the applicants are Indian and come 
into Canada on a work permit for another line of work, such as 
construction, and subsequently take truck driver training 
classes and get commercial drivers licenses. The majority of 
truck driver applicants have never worked in this field before, 
have poor English skills, and provide employment letters that 
indicate that their jobs are contingent upon receipt of a U.S. 
visa. Post has become more interested in these cases after 
hearing about the arrest of an Indian national truck driver 
(Canadian landed immigrant), Amrit Pal Singh Narwal, at the 
U.S./Canada border in September 2009 for attempting to enter 
Canada with 144 kilos of cocaine. Post is now sending such 
applicants for a subsequent interview with our Fraud 
Investigator who runs searches on the Canadian trucking 
companies and contacts employers. By and large the businesses 
are small and run out homes operating as a dispatch center for a 
handful of trucks. The business phones are generally cell phones 
and the owners are sometimes related to the applicants. It is 
noteworthy to mention that there appears to be a growing 
friction between Eastern European truck drivers that dominate 
the Ontario and Eastern Canadian market and the influx of Indian 
truck drivers who are predominantly in Western Canada. 
 
 
 
¶25. (U) Calgary is currently working with the Department on 
reported incidents of internet scammers who are using apparently 
photo-shopped American passports as proof of their identity to 
would-be targets. While these documents do not appear to have 
been used for travel (and most likely only exist in digital 
form), they have been sent to people with whom they have 
developed contacts with over the internet.  After building the 
relationship, the scammer will then ask for money and send the 
passport image as proof of who they are.  In the two most recent 
cases, it appears that the scammers have used the same 
background template for the passport, and digitally substituted 
different pictures and biographic data.  Afraid that something 
might be amiss, the potential victims have sent the passport 
images to the Consulate for verification. 
 
 
 
¶26. (U) Posts routinely refers cases to CBSA whenever applicants 
reveal information during a visa interview that indicates they 
committed fraud against Canadian immigration authorities. 
Similarly, CBSA counterparts refer cases to post whenever they 
believe the individual has committed fraud against U.S. 
authorities. 
 
 
 
¶27. (U) STAFFING AND TRAINING. Vancouver and Calgary have 
part-time Fraud Prevention Managers (FPM) who are also NIV line 
officers. Calgary has a locally engaged staff member who serves 
as Fraud Prevention Manager Assistant and Vancouver hired a 
full-time fraud prevention investigator last year. The current 
investigator started work in Vancouver in February 2009. 
HILL