VZCZCXRO9519
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHVT #0498/01 3201912
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161912Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2414
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0685
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0125
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VALLETTA 000498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/SEMEP 
DEPT ALSO FOR D, P, EUR AND NEA 
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSA JONES, ROSS, SHERWOOD-RANDALL, KUMAR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2019 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS MT
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SYG 
URGES "COMPLEMENTARY STRATEGY" FOR U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
PLAN INITIATIVES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas Kmiec, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY.  U.S. Ambassador to Malta Douglas Kmiec met 
November 12 with Mr. Sergio Piazzi, Secretary General of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), at 
Piazzi's request.  Piazzi urged U.S. support for and 
participation in PAM's planned February meeting in Malta on 
the Jerusalem issue as a "complementary strategy" in support 
of the Quartet Roadmap and U.S. Special Envoy George 
Mitchell's efforts.  Piazzi offered examples of where "Track 
Two" discussions brokered by PAM might be fruitful, including 
on the issue of settlements.  In a call to PolOff November 
14, Piazzi reiterated his request and advised that Deputy 
Palestinian National Council Speaker Tayseer Qubaa also 
supported this approach.  On a related topic, with regard to 
upcoming Palestinian Authority elections, Piazzi reported 
Qubaa's belief that PA President Mahmoud Abbas would remain 
in office following elections, that an election postponement 
was not desired but likely, and that Fatah would retain the 
PA Presidency regardless of who its candidate was.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On November 12, U.S. Ambassador to Malta Douglas 
Kmiec (along with DCM and PolOff) met with Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) Secretary General Sergio 
Piazzi, who has held his current position since April 2007. 
Piazzi's reason for seeking the meeting was to discuss 
developments in the Middle East, meetings that PAM has had 
with parliamentary representatives from the region, PAM's 
recent trip to Washington, DC, and discussions there, and to 
encourage the U.S. to participate selectively in 
PAM-organized meetings as part of a "complementary strategy" 
in support of the Quartet Roadmap and U.S. Special Envoy 
Mitchell's efforts.  Piazzi sees PAM as a potential venue for 
"Track Two" diplomacy which could be used to explore 
potential solutions to problems where direct talks would be 
premature or counterproductive, and he sees the February 
meeting on Jerusalem as an opportunity for the USG to support 
such Track Two initiatives. 
 
¶3.  (S) Piazzi expressed a clear understanding of the 
exclusivity of the Quartet's position as mediator in the 
MEPP, but suggested that PAM could play a "complementary" 
role by facilitating discussion of issues which were not ripe 
for Quartet review.  As one example of such a topic, Piazzi 
raised the issue of Israeli settlements and Arab recognition 
of Israel.  He offered his opinion - based on his contacts 
with PAM Arab delegates and others in the Arab leadership - 
that many Arab governments would be ready to recognize 
"tomorrow," but that some sort of a freeze on settlements was 
needed to allow them to satisfy internal political demands 
and public opinion.  Noting that the amount of land on which 
Israeli settlements are situated is relatively small in 
absolute terms, Piazzi suggested that there was some Arab 
willingness to negotiate land swaps - of plots with 
comparable water resources, access, arability, etc. - in 
order to arrive at an acceptable definition of a "freeze" and 
fix a new border.  This was an issue of such emotional 
explosiveness, however, that it likely could not be resolved 
solely within the Quartet framework.  PAM could provide its 
good offices in a "Track Two" scenario to bring together 
influential parties from both sides who could develop a 
consensus within their own countries for the general outline 
of what such a swap would look like before it was brought to 
the Quartet for discussion. 
 
¶4.  (C) According to Piazzi, PAM would be a productive and 
successful venue for such discussions because it enjoys the 
support of both Israeli and Arab/Palestinian 
parliamentarians, can count on high-level attendance from 
both sides, and has been successful in brokering such talks 
in the past.  He cited the example of recent discussions on 
the Cyprus issue and special task forces PAM has established 
to support the last point.  Piazzi stated that PAM has Arab 
(and in particular, Syrian) confidence as an honest broker 
for discussions of issues related to the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP).  With respect to Israeli participation, he 
noted the presence at PAM meetings of current Arab 
Likud/Kadima party MP and former Deputy Knesset speaker 
Majalli Wahabi.  Per Piazzi, Wahabi's presence at PAM 
 
VALLETTA 00000498  002 OF 002 
 
 
meetings has been accepted by Arab delegations and has not 
prompted walk-outs, even by hard-line states such as Libya 
and Syria.  Israeli parliamentarians have also indicated to 
PAM that they will be participating in the February meeting 
on Jerusalem in Malta.  Prior high-level PAM participants 
have included Turkish PM Erdogan during discussions on 
Cyprus, and Egypt has reportedly suggested that President 
Hosni Mubarak would be willing to attend or meet on the 
margins of a PAM meeting if circumstances warranted.  Piazzi 
also reported he had received some U.S. support for this 
approach, from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (MD), U.S. 
Representatives Robert Wexler (FL) and Darrell Issa (CA), and 
from NSC staffers. 
 
¶5.  (S) On related matters, Piazzi indicated he had been told 
by Arab delegates that the current Israeli position on East 
Jerusalem was unacceptable to both Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority, because it would split any Palestinian state into 
two parts, making it unsustainable.  He also indicated that 
his Egyptian, Palestinian and Syrian interlocutors had 
expressed "disappointed" at recent statements by Secretary 
Clinton, but that President Obama had "fundamentally changed 
the perception and sentiment of Arab States toward the U.S." 
by his remarks in Cairo and other action.  Piazzi urged that 
the U.S. should take advantage of that shift to urge bold 
action now, as the impact was likely to fade with time. 
 
¶6.  (S) Following up in a call to PolOff on November 14, 
Piazzi advised that he had phoned Deputy Palestinian National 
Council Speaker Tayseer Qubaa, who offered his support to 
PAM's approach.  Qubaa also emphasized the importance of not 
interfering with the Quartet process, but viewed PAM's 
"complementary" mechanism as an opportunity to reinvigorate 
the MEPP and get the parties to "commit to stand by what they 
have already agreed to."  With regard to upcoming Palestinian 
Authority elections, Piazzi reported Qubaa's belief that PA 
President Mahmoud Abbas would remain in office following 
elections, that an election postponement was not desired but 
was likely, and that Fatah would retain the PA Presidency 
regardless of who its candidate ultimately was. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador advised Piazzi that Post would pass his 
suggestions to Washington, and urged him to continue to avoid 
any action which would be seen as injecting PAM into Quartet 
discussions.  If U.S. participation in PAM's February Malta 
conference is contemplated, post is prepared to assist. 
 
¶8.  (S) COMMENT: (S) Ambassador has had several conversations 
with the Palestinian Ambassador to Malta and with Suha Arafat 
(widow of Yassir Arafat). Increasingly, these conversations 
indicate a sense of loss of confidence in President Obama,s 
ability to carry out the spirit of the Cairo speech.  Both 
Palestinian sources are "distressed" that the President does 
not seem to have personally committed to the peace process, 
for both conclude that had he done so, he would have secured 
by now some tangible improvement in the situation in the 
Gaza, especially with the onset of winter and the reported 
continued Israeli interdiction of basic foodstuffs and 
building materials. These Palestinian sources are also less 
optimistic with respect to the continued role of a moderate 
voice like Abbas, or according to Arafat, Salam Fayad.  These 
Palestinian sources expressed strong support for the PAM 
conference as a complement to the Quartet process, and in 
addition, both would favor greater UN involvement, especially 
as it relates to the rebuilding of basic infrastructure in 
Gaza supported by UN relief funding. 
KMIEC