VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0322/01 3100859
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060859Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3097
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6538
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2634
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3820
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3467
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND INL; 
TREASURY FOR MICHAEL HIRSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019 
TAGS: PGOV EFIN SNAR MG
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY, TRANSPARENCY AND MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Dan Rakove, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Mongolia's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
lacks the capacity to combat money laundering effectively. 
The staff of four must assemble, analyze, and maintain the 
FIU database of transaction reports as well as ensure 
compliance among financial institutions.  Interagency 
cooperation remains poor, as the FIU--three years old this 
month --commands little respect from other justice or law 
enforcement agencies.  Few are the number of predicate 
offenses in the criminal code to which the crime of money 
laundering can be applied.  Most strikingly, corruption, 
bribery and tax evasion are not included despite the 
prevalence of these crimes.  To date, the FIU has documented 
no money laundering, although suspicions are plentiful, 
particularly in the mining and banking sectors.  Russian 
interests have reportedly lobbied against any increased 
financial transparency or regulation.  The threat of money 
laundering will likely grow with the financial inflows tied 
with the massive Oyu Tolgoi mining project and other mineral 
investments.  END SUMMARY. 
------------- 
Vulnerability 
------------- 
¶2. (U) Mongolia is a predominantly cash economy with a large 
informal sector.  There is a significant underground banking 
sector as well, largely to service the hundreds of thousands 
of overseas workers sending remittances to Mongolia.  The 
formal commercial banking sector is highly fractured, divided 
among 16 institutions (including one in conservatorship). 
Together these factors make Mongolia highly vulnerable to 
money laundering.  The limiting factor has been the country's 
meager $5 billion GDP. 
¶3. (C) Suspicions abound but there is little concrete 
evidence of money laundering.  What is certain is that the 
economy is set to expand rapidly with the conclusion of the 
massive Oyu Tolgoi contract with Western firms to mine copper 
and gold in the South Gobi and the impending negotiation of 
several other mineral resources.  As the scale of the economy 
in turn increases, so too will the potential for money 
laundering.  Given the poor  legal framework in place, 
Mongolia is a tempting ground for organized crime. 
¶4. (C) Currently, much of Mongolia's gold ) subject to a 
high windfall profits tax ) is smuggled into China.  As a 
result, producers devise alternate ways to repatriate the 
un-taxed profits.  Amounts remain unclear, but contacts 
suggest that four to six metric tons of gold are smuggled 
annually to evade the windfall profits tax (scheduled to 
sunset in 2011).  This would potentially create some $140 
million to $210 million for smugglers to repatriate. 
------------------------------------------- 
Financial Reporting Standards and Practices 
------------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) U.S. Treasury specialist for East Asia Michael Hirson 
and poloff met with Tumurbat, head of the FIU on September 
¶29.  Tumurbat stated that his four staff are unable to 
collect thoroughly and analyze Cash Transaction Reports (CTR) 
and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) while insuring 
financial institution compliance with the Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) statute.  CTRs are filed by financial 
institutions for each transaction exceeding MNT 2 million 
(approximately $1,500).  The Asian Development Bank 
criticized this threshold as being set too high, and fail to 
capture the large flows of funds.  The number of CTRs and 
STRs seem too few; the FIU received 150,000 CTRs a year. Only 
60 STRs were filed with the FIU from February 2008 through 
September 2009.  More troubling, STRs are not required for 
any type of non-cash transaction. 
¶6. (C) Cooperation by banks seems to be improving.  Larger 
banks were noted as reliably providing intelligence in accord 
with AML guidelines.  Nonetheless, the compliance officer 
turnover is rapid; employees reportedly move on within three 
to six months.  Inexperienced compliance officers often fail 
to report transactions qualifying of FIU notification.  When 
banks fail to cooperate out of either ignorance of 
regulations or alternatively out of negligence, the FIU is 
empowered to send rectification letters, apply penalties, and 
ultimately submit the institution to the Central Bank for 
license revocation. 
¶7. (C) Non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) process an 
estimated 20 percent of all transactions.  However, none had 
submitted any CTRs or STRs to date.  NBFIs include credit 
institutions, insurance brokers and securities dealers.  NGOs 
do not submit reports to the FIU either. 
----------------------------------------- 
Interagency and International Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) The Mongolian Customs General Administration (MCGA) 
and other law enforcement agencies all nominally report to 
the FIU through the General Intelligence Agency-administered 
National Coordination Council.  Nonetheless, Tumurbat 
reported receiving little in useful intelligence from these 
agencies.  Statutory requirements of law enforcement are 
unclear, and officers still lack basic knowledge of AML.  Top 
officials, including Police Colonel Enkhtur, Head of the 
State Investigation Department, told us  October 29 that 
criminal groups are not engaging in money laundering. 
Director of the Enforcement and Intelligence Division at the 
MCGA Dovchinsuren echoed these remarks on October 30 in 
relation to inflows of non-Mongolian funds.  The only 
suspicion he voiced was in regard to investments in the 
mining and banking sectors from Russia and China.  New mining 
and mining related contracts will likely multiply in the near 
future, following the successful negotiations surrounding the 
massive Oyu Tolgoi mine. 
¶9. (U) Mongolia is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units as well as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG).  The FIU draws upon lists of individuals 
provided by the Bank of Mongolia, the U.S. Treasury Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, and the UN. In addition, the FIU 
holds MOUs regarding information sharing with counterpart 
units in Afghanistan, China, Russia and Turkey.  They have 
sent requests to other nations for similar arrangements.  The 
FIU consults with the APG and the Asian Development Bank on 
money laundering issues, and currently receives funding on 
these issues only from the World Bank.  The Treasury 
Department's Office of Technical Assistance previously sent a 
team to provide training to and enhance coordination among 
law enforcement, judges and the FIU.  Tumurbat himself is a 
Colorado University graduate who participated in the 
International Visitor Program in April 2008. 
------------------------------------- 
Interest Groups and Legal Limitations 
------------------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) In the September meeting, Tumurbat expressed 
optimism that his staff would increase from four to seven by 
year's end, and that the AML statutory power would be 
strengthened.  However, in a November 4 discussion he told us 
that actually only one more analyst would be hired.  As of 
now, the Criminal Code contains only five predicate offenses 
or crimes in the context of which money laundering charges 
can be filed: trafficking in drugs, people or illegal arms, 
as well as counterfeiting currency and terrorist financing. 
Of these, trafficking in persons and drugs reflect recent, 
documented threats.  Even in the case where such crimes are 
committed, however, the FIU lacks authority in the Criminal 
Code to freeze or confiscate assets.  The Civil Code is more 
comprehensive, making predicate offenses of all (these quote 
marks need to be corrected before transmission.) "less grave, 
grave and exceptionally grave offences."  The only exception 
to this sweeping statement in the Civil Code is for tax 
evasion. 
¶11. (SBU) Gaps in the criminal and civil codes reflect the 
interests of the powerful.  Tax evasion is widespread, and to 
include it as a predicate offense in the civil code would 
threaten many wealthy Mongolians.  Political considerations 
likely resulted in its removal.  Mongolia's criminal code is 
inadequate to tackle the problem.  Tumurbat reported that the 
FIU had submitted to legislators the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime/IMF Model Legislation on Money Laundering and Financing 
of Terrorism with 20 predicate offenses.  Twenty offenses 
entered lawmakers' deliberations; five left.  Predicate 
offenses such as the following vanished in the process: 
participation in organized crime, corruption and bribery, 
fraud, insider trading, and market manipulation. 
¶12. (SBU) All of these exemptions are particularly 
problematic given the lack of banking transparency 
facilitates corruption and bribery.  Both of these 
improprieties occur with frequency, particularly among public 
officials and politicians.  Adding FIU support to the 
Independent Authority Against Corruption poses a significant 
threat to the beneficiaries and providers of kickbacks.  Both 
the FIU and IAAC are professionally run, and if allied, could 
pose a distinct threat to politics as usual.  Aside from 
corruption, tax evasion, fraud, insider trading and market 
manipulation, are all white collar crimes of the wealthy and 
influential.  Legislators to date have in turn been reluctant 
to touch these issues.  The omission of a predicate offense 
for organized crime may hinder law enforcement efforts in 
combating these emergent networks. 
---------------------------- 
Russia Lobbies for Murkiness 
---------------------------- 
¶13. (C) Perhaps more ominously, MFAT Americas Director 
Odonjil informed us on October 15 that Russia is lobbying in 
strong opposition to financial transparency measures. 
Tumurbat reported that of the 16 commercial banks, eight or 
nine are heavily invested in by state funds and oligarchs of 
their northern neighbor.  Knowledge of the genuine beneficial 
owner of banks is often unclear.  As a result, the FIU will 
have difficulty in tracing controlling persons behind 
companies reported as a party to suspect transactions. 
Foreign depositor identity is similarly opaque due to narrow 
Know Your Customer laws.  Russian state and private investors 
are unlikely to welcome FIU analysts examining their 
transactions in connection with an expanded set of predicate 
offenses. 
-------------- 
Reform Efforts 
-------------- 
¶14. (SBU) The government was given notice by the Asia/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering  that its criminal code was 
deficient in relation to anti-money laundering provisions. 
In response, the FIU submitted an amended AML law to the 
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs for review.  Tumurbat 
reported on November 4 that the Ministry had approved of the 
draft law.  The revision is reportedly in line with 
international standards.  The State Great Khural in turn 
placed "central bank reform" on its docket for the fall term. 
 Tumurbat is confident AML reform will be considered before 
the end of the year along with other provisions touching on 
the Central Bank.  Given the significant special interests 
involved, the enactment of an AML component is uncertain. 
Tumurbat estimated the likelihood of passage at 60 percent. 
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Comment 
------- 
¶15. (C) The question of money laundering is as much a 
question of financial transparency as it is one of democracy. 
 It was only one year ago that legislators narrowed the 
definition of money laundering in defiance of international 
standards.  Tumurbat attributed this regression to a "lack of 
awareness" among parliamentarians.  Equally possible is that 
a concert of opposition forces undermined the legislation to 
prolong business as usual through tax evasion or politics as 
usual through corruption and bribery.  Given the interests 
arrayed in opposition, upcoming deliberations are not then 
simply a matter of creating an effective AML regime to combat 
crime.  Rather, what is at stake is whether legislators will 
push for transparency and conformity with international 
standards, or whether they will prioritize their own 
re-elections and pocketbooks. 
HILL