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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 001118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV ELAB KDEM PHUM HO US CI OAS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY SOLIS VISITS HONDURAS TO INAUGURATE 
ACCORD VERIFICATION COMMISSION 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR HUGO LLORENS FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The inauguration of the Verification 
Commission to monitor Honduras's political accord took place 
on November 3 during a two-day visit by its two international 
commissioners, Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and former 
President of Chile Ricardo Lagos.  The visit took place under 
the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). 
In an intensive series of meetings with President Manuel 
"Mel" Zelaya, de facto leader Roberto Micheletti, senior 
members of Congress, electoral tribunal members, presidential 
candidates, and others, Secretary Solis, President Lagos, OAS 
facilitators, and the Ambassador made progress toward the 
next step in the accords, implementation of a government of 
national unity.  The issue of the restoration of President 
Zelaya, which Congress is to decide on under the accord, 
remained a significant stumbling block.  President Zelaya and 
his representative on the commission insisted that the 
accords require his return to power.  However, installation 
of a government of national unity would create significant 
momentum toward resolution of this issue.  The Verification 
Commission did a tremendous job under difficult circumstances 
and under pressure to produce forward momentum on very short 
notice.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and former President 
of Chile Ricardo Lagos, the two international members of the 
Verification Commission of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose 
Agreement, visited Tegucigalpa November 3-4 to attend the 
inauguration of the commission and to create momentum for 
implementation of the next step, creation of a government of 
national unity.  The two Honduran commission members are 
Arturo Corrales, representing the de facto government, and 
Honduran Ambassador to the United NationsJorge Arturo Reina, 
representing President Zelaya.  On the U.S. side, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly, the 
Ambassador, and Deputy Undersecretary of Labor Sandra Polaski 
also participated in the discussions.  Representing the OAS 
were Political Affairs Director Victor Rico; Jose Octavio 
Borbon, Argentina's former Ambassador to the United States; 
and former Chilean government minister Enrique Correa. 
Following the departure of Secretary Solis and President 
Lagos, Borbon and Correa stayed in Tegucigalpa to continue 
the commission's efforts to ensure implementation of the 
accord. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Ambassador Solis and President Lagos began their 
mission on November 3 with a briefing by OAS representatives 
and Ambassador Llorens.  The first working meeting of the 
commission as a whole followed.  The official inauguration of 
the commission took place that afternoon, followed by a 
meeting with President Zelaya at the Brazilian Embassy and a 
dinner for presidential candidates at the Ambassador's 
residence, which former President Carlos Flores also 
attended.  On November 4, the commission members met with 
representatives of the Supreme Electoral Commission, senior 
members of Congress, and de facto President Micheletti. 
After another internal meeting, the commission held a 
pre-departure press conference. 
 
Initial Briefing 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  The Ambassador and OAS representatives briefed 
Secretary Solis and President Lagos on the situation, 
including the decision by the leadership of Congress to remit 
the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accords to other institutions to 
seek further guidance.  They discussed a letter sent by 
regime Minister to the Presidency Pineda Ponce to President 
Zelaya asking for names for the creation of a Government of 
National Unity.  President Lagos and several of the OAS staff 
members (including Ambassador Borbon and Victor Rico) 
expressed the view that this letter represented an attempt by 
Micheletti to control the process.  Honduran representatives 
Arturo Corrales and Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina joined the 
meeting later to review the situation and discuss objectives. 
 
Inaugural Ceremony 
------------------ 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  The inaugural ceremony took place on November 3 at 
the Marriott Hotel, the site of the commission's discussions, 
with a large press contingent and several hundred supporters 
of President Zelaya and Micheletti.  President Lagos and 
Secretary Solis conveyed a very positive message of hope and 
reconciliation and expectation that the Accord be rigorously 
implemented and that the calendar of implementation be 
strictly adhered to.  For the Micheletti side, Arturo 
Corrales was measured and prudent.  Unfortunately, Zelaya 
representative Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina gave a tough, 
divisive speech criticizing the coup and coup supporters, 
earning wild applause from the Zelaya side and stony silence 
from the Micheletti contingent.  The Ambassador later told 
Ambassador Reina that his statement had not been constructive 
and created a divisive tone at a crucial moment. 
 
Meeting with President Zelaya 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Secretary Solis and President Lagos's November 3 
meeting with President Zelaya took place at the heavily 
guarded Brazilian Embassy, where President Zelaya took refuge 
upon his September 21 return to Honduras.  P/DAS Kelly, 
Deputy Undersecretary Polaski, the Ambassador, and OAS 
Representative Victor Rico also attended.  In addition to 
Ambassador Reina, President Zelaya was accompanied by 
advisors including Rasel Tome, Juan Carlos Reina (Arturo 
Reina's son), and Father Andres Tamayo.  President Zelaya 
took a hard-line and backward-looking position, arguing that 
the agreement required his restitution and that if Congress 
denied his legitimate right to the Presidency then he and 
many Hondurans and international community members would not 
recognize the elections.  He said that he had been flexible 
in negotiating the accords, making significant concessions, 
including an agreement not to press for a fourth ballot box 
and to accept a government of national reconciliation.  He 
urged the commission to press for implementation of the 
provision on restitution in the accord (article 5), which he 
asserted was closely linked to the article on a government of 
national reconciliation (article 1).  Only the legitimate 
President could run the government of national unity, he said. 
 
¶7.  (C)  President Zelaya asserted that, if he were not 
restored, some political parties and many individual 
Hondurans would reject the elections and 50 of the 300 
Liberal Party mayoral candidates would withdraw.  He added 
that the resistance (i.e. the pro-restoration movement, which 
has held daily demonstrations and promoted an electoral 
boycott) has become a powerful force in Honduran society.  He 
defended his human rights records, saying that, unlike the de 
facto regime, he had not shut down media outlets.  He 
asserted that, under the de facto regime, 3,000 people have 
been detained (most for less than 24 hours), people have been 
beaten, and the military has used excessive force. 
 
¶8.  (C)  President Lagos urged President Zelaya to look 
forward, particularly toward the creation of a government of 
national unity.  He said he believed that, once this 
government was created, Micheletti would resign and the 
Minister of Governance, as the senior minister, would play an 
important transitional role until the Congress decided on 
restitution.  He added that President Zelaya's ability to 
leave the Brazilian Embassy was an important issue to 
address.  Secretary Solis said the commission would focus on 
keeping both sides working hard to take concrete steps to 
implement the accord.  She said that she understood that this 
was a difficult process and told Zelaya that the fact that 
the President had sent her here represented their commitment 
to resolve the crisis. 
 
Dinner with Presidential Candidates 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Ambassador hosted a dinner for the four 
Verification Commission members with five of the six 
presidential candidates (all except Carlos H. Reyes), along 
with former president Carlos Flores and OAS representative 
Victor Rico.  Statements by the five reflected how the 
 
candidates have evolved to become a group that, despite their 
political differences, was in strong support of the accord. 
Cesar Ham, of the leftist Democratic Unification Party, spoke 
of how the accord gave the country an opportunity to restore 
democracy, while Bernard Martinez, of the right-leaning 
Innovation and Unity Party (PINU), spoke of the need for 
Honduras to move forward.  The two main candidates, Porfirio 
"Pepe" Lobo of the National Party and Elvin Santos of the 
Liberal Party, pledged their strong support for the accord's 
implementation.  Flores wrapped up the dinner, talking about 
how Zelaya's antics had pushed the Honduran political system 
to the breaking point.  Referring to the June 28 coup, Flores 
said that, while he had rejected it and was the &wrong 
prescription to the malady,8 it was a reality and Honduran 
politicians had to work together to restore constitutional 
order.  Secretary Solis and President Lagos thanked the 
candidates for their efforts and urged them to continue to 
press forward, reminding them that they represented the 
political future of the country. 
 
Meeting with Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  On November 4, the commission met with the 
three-member Supreme Electoral Tribunal: David Matamorros, 
Enrique Ortez Sequeira, and Saul Escobar.  The three 
officials provided the Commissioners with an in-depth look at 
preparations for the November 29 general elections.  The 
Hondurans made a credible presentation of their considerable 
effort to organize the process in an efficient and 
transparent manner.  They discussed a number of innovative 
monitoring procedures that are being implemented, many 
launched by international donors including USAID.  The 
magistrates expressed the hope that the international 
official community would send observers to support their 
process.  They also expect to have a large number of domestic 
observers.  Secretary Solis and President Lagos noted that 
the elections were a key element to the solution to the 
crisis.  They briefed the Hondurans on the Verification 
Commission's efforts to implement the accords and stressed 
that the extent of progress on implementation would have a 
significant impact on the level of international support for 
the elections. 
 
Meeting with National Congress Leaders 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  The Commissioners met with representatives of the 
Congressional leadership, led by Congress vice president 
Ramon Velasquez.  Velasquez told the Commissioners that 
Congress had requested opinions on the possible restoration 
of President Zelaya from the Public Ministry (roughly 
equivalent to a ministry of justice), National Ombudsman, and 
Supreme Court.  He said that his understanding of the legal 
process for transfer of power would be for Micheletti to 
swear in the government of national unity and resign, 
followed by a vote by Congress on the restitution issue. 
 
¶12.  (C)  The representative of the PINU party asserted to 
the Commissioners that there is no possibility of President 
Zelaya being restored before the elections.  After the 
elections, he said, the President-elect will be a major 
political force, especially if he wins with a large majority. 
 In addition, people will be less afraid of President Zelaya 
after the election.  The President-elect will be in a 
position to ask for restitution, perhaps for as brief a 
period as a few weeks.  Minority Leader Satisfecho "Fito" 
Irias of the National Party said that Congress supports the 
agreement and will immediately come into session to consider 
the restitution issue once Congress receives the opinions. 
Asked whether it is important for Congress to vote on 
restitution before the November 29 elections, President Lagos 
replied, "Absolutely."  It is in Honduras's best interest, he 
continued, to have a unity government in place prior to the 
elections.  Secretary Solis stressed the importance of the 
responsibility Congress has been given, noting that, as a 
former member of Congress herself, she understands the 
complexity of the legislative process.  She said that the 
United States is not telling Congress how to decide, but 
 
Congress must deliberate in a serious manner.  President 
Lagos pressed for adherence to the November 5 deadline for 
appointment of a government of national unity. 
 
Meeting with Micheletti 
----------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  At their meeting with de facto leader Micheletti, 
which P/DAS Kelly, Undersecretary Polaski, the Ambassador, 
and OAS representatives also attended, Secretary Solis and 
President Lagos said that they wanted to help with the 
process of installing a government of national unity. 
Micheletti responded that he fully supported the negotiation 
and implementation of the accord in a manner consistent with 
Honduran law.  He reiterated several times his offer to 
resign if that would be helpful to resolve the crisis, but 
said that President Zelaya would also have to resign.  A 
prominent Honduran would then assume the presidency. 
President Lagos told Micheletti that the creation of the 
national unity government would mean that Micheletti's 
mission was done and that he would be required to resign. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Micheletti said that he had reached out to 
President Zelaya and other political leaders in suggesting 
names for the government of national unity.  He indicated 
that he would like two of his cabinet ministers to stay: 
Minister of Security Jorge Alberto Rodas Gamero, who had been 
Zelaya,s minister of security, and Minister of Defense 
Adolfo Leonil Sevilla, the former deputy minister who served 
very briefly as minister under Zelaya after the resignation 
of the previous minister over issues related to the fourth 
ballot box.  Micheletti disputed the assertion made by 
President Zelaya and his allies that the creation of a 
government of national unity would require Zelaya's 
restoration as president.  Noting that she was in Honduras at 
the request of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, 
Secretary Solis said that she looked forward to monitoring 
the implementation of the accord. 
 
¶15.  (C)  De facto Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras 
told the commission members that sanctions against Honduras 
have hurt not only Honduras itself but the rest of Central 
America.  The closing of the border hurt trade flows and the 
situation as a whole has damaged business confidence. 
Investment is down not only in Honduras but in the rest of 
the region.  Lopez Contreras noted that the European Union 
had suspended its trade negotiations with Central America 
because of the situation in Honduras. 
 
Press Conference 
---------------- 
 
¶16.  (U)  At a press conference immediately prior to their 
departure, Secretary Solis and President Lagos both 
emphasized the importance of maintaining forward momentum on 
the implementation of the Accords and stressed that 
Micheletti's resignation would have to be part of the 
installation of a government of national unity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  The Verification Commission did a tremendous job 
under difficult circumstances and under intense time 
pressure.  The most significant achievement was the 
inauguration of the commission in accordance with the 
timetable set out in the accord.  The commissioners were able 
to meet with all the relevant players, including Micheletti, 
who initially seemed reluctant to meet.  In their two public 
events, Secretary Solis and President Lagos were able to 
convey a message of U.S., international, and inter-American 
commitment to help in resolving the crisis and convey hope 
that the accord represented an agreed and peaceful way 
forward.  Following the departure of the international 
commissioners, Ambassador Borbon and Correa continue to work 
under OAS auspices to press for the installation of a 
government of national unity on behalf of the commission. 
The Ambassador and Embassy staff remained engaged with the 
commission's efforts throughout the day on November 5, 
 
keeping the parties talking and continuing to press for the 
prompt installation of a government of national unity.  While 
significant challenges remain, the inauguration of the 
commission was an important and promising step forward.  End 
comment. 
 
¶18.  (U)  Secretary Solis was not able to clear on this cable 
before her departure. 
LLORENS