VZCZCXRO5979
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHLN #0132/01 3060924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020924Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2864
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1768
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 0694
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0685
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0016
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3233

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ST PETERSBURG 000132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CA/VO/KCC; RSO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC RS
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - ST. PETERSBURG 
 
REF: 08 STATE 102952; 09 ST PETERSBURG 43 
 
¶A.  Country Conditions: Economic growth in St. Petersburg has 
slowed markedly over the past year.  The average salary for St. 
Petersburg's population of 4.5 million is still about double the 
nationwide average of about $5,000 a year.  Salaries 
nevertheless lag behind those in Moscow, and have fallen by 
about 5% since summer 2008 in the local currency, and by over a 
third in dollars when the substantial ruble devaluation of the 
past year is taken into account. Economic indices, including 
income, cost of living, and jobless rates, vary from region to 
region in Northwest Russia, though members of ethnic minorities 
in particular tend to be underemployed while the elderly are 
most vulnerable to broad inflationary pressures.   As evidenced 
from this and previous reports, the level of visa fraud in St 
Petersburg is considered moderate.. 
 
¶B.  NIV FRAUD:   The worldwide economic crisis and ruble 
devaluation have not spared Northwest Russia, and though over 90 
percent of NIV applicants are issuable, post has witnessed an 
increase in the number of mala fide applicants seeking admission 
to and employment in the US.  Even among otherwise legitimate 
vacation travelers, many Russians still consider it necessary to 
bolster their NIV applications with fabricated documents, 
trumped-up employment letters, and inflated salary claims.  In 
addition, post has encountered an increasing number of 
petition-based applications for work at non-existent companies 
in the U.S. 
 
Apart from the above-mentioned types of fraud, Post's FPU has 
uncovered a sophisticated visa facilitating ring in Kaliningrad. 
 Investigation reveals so far that this ring may have begun its 
activity as far back as 2004.  The ring includes an inviter on 
the American side, and a facilitator in Kaliningrad, both of 
whom we have been able to identify by name and appearance. 
Applicants have admitted to paying the Kaliningrad facilitator 
up to 2,000 Euros for an invitation and package of supporting 
documents.  We will continue to monitor the activities of both 
the broker and facilitator, and work with ARSO-I to root out any 
illegal activity on the U.S. side. 
 
B1/B2 
 
St. Petersburg's FPU continues to see people affected by the 
crisis who attempt to use the B1/B2 visa to move to the US in 
search of work.  Following up on poison pen letters, we 
uncovered a plot by an applicant seeking work as a plumber in 
Florida. 
 
FPU monitors the activities of local visa facilitating agencies 
that try to deploy new methods for helping their clients receive 
visas.  One applicant hid the fact that she had a US LPR fianci, 
and she admitted that a known visa facilitating agency rehearsed 
a scenario with her, prior to the interview, coaching her on how 
she should act and what she should say.  After she was caught 
making several contradictory statements, she admitted her ruse. 
Also, a notarial company in the Consulate's neighborhood 
unwittingly informed our FSN-I that they provide advice to visa 
applicants, telling them to claim a high salary, "the higher the 
better," in order to improve their chances of issuance.  Thus, 
several female applicants provided legitimate documents but 
claimed much higher salaries than they received in reality. 
 
Other variations on the same theme include the following: one 
applicant provided a job letter from a company she had left a 
year prior; another applicant who truly did work for a large, 
famous company in St. Petersburg claimed her purpose of travel 
as business, but instead intended to go live with a male friend. 
 
 
J1 
 
During this year's Summer Work and Travel season, FPU paid 
particular attention to Rospersonal, an SWT agency new to our 
area.  Initially, we discovered that the agency was providing 
its students with job offers through Alliance Abroad Group at US 
companies that no longer existed.  Further investigation 
revealed that they were also selling fake university IDs and 
student record books for clients who were not bona fide students 
but nevertheless were looking for a way to go to the U.S. 
 
Another agency, NewWorkCity, remains of concern to the Consulate 
after excessive appeals for unqualified applicants in previous 
years.  This year, although NewWorkCity recruited only a few 
students for SWT, several proved to be less than prudent 
selections.  One applicant, for example, when questioned about 
why she was not attending university, admitted that she works in 
St. Petersburg at an erotic services salon. 
 
 
ST PETERSB 00000132  002 OF 002 
 
 
We also continued to encounter more "garden variety" SWT fraud. 
Final year students, or those who graduated recently and 
pretended to be students, would bring us fake university 
certificates claiming they were in their third or fourth year of 
study. 
 
Some students continued to bring fake job offers from U.S. 
employers, even though the Consulate does not require a job 
offer at the interview.  Others provided letters from existing 
jobs where they were accepted, but would add a fake signature, 
presumably from the U.S. employer, believing only a fully 
"complete" job offer letter would make the case stronger. 
 
 
H/L fraud 
 
FPU continues to review questionable H and L petitions, often in 
collaboration with post's ARSO-I.  There are three petitions 
currently under review, and three petitions were sent to KCC 
with revocation requests during the reporting period.  In most 
cases, post has discovered that the supposed petitioning 
business does not exist and is not doing business as claimed in 
the petition. 
 
 
¶C.  IV FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶E.  ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD:  No ACS or U.S. passport fraud 
encountered during this reporting period. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING: N/A 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD:  N/A 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST 
TRAVEL:   Post encountered one visa applicant with a P3A2 entry 
in CLASS.  Subsequent investigation revealed his organized crime 
ties, as well as allegations of murder and extortion.  The 
applicant was refused 3A2.  Post also found one applicant 
ineligible under 6E when FPU confirmed a prior P6E Minsk hit. 
This applicant collaborated with a friend in the U.S. to commit 
fraud in order to assist her brother in obtaining a J1 Summer 
Work and Travel visa, including coaching the U.S. citizen on how 
to lie on the brother's behalf. 
 
¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  ARSO-I investigations have 
concentrated on several H, L, and J-1 Summer Work and Travel 
cases.  The number of fraudulent H and L visa applications has 
remained the same over the previous period.  Most of these 
investigations lead to revocations but no criminal convictions. 
A current J-1 Summer Work and Travel (SWT) investigation 
identified a document vendor who sells university documents.  A 
second J-1 SWT case appears to involve an insurance fraud scheme 
to defraud the private insurance which students are required to 
purchase.  ARSO-I and Consular FPU cooperated on an 
investigation of a Russian entertainer who used his employment 
to obtain an A referral for his daughter, resulting in a 6E 
finding for the entertainer; the same man also appeared in 
Facial Recognition under a false identity for a pending DV 
application. 
 
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY:  N/A 
 
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  FPU conducted 
two training sessions with document inspection officials at 
Kaliningrad's international airport.  The sessions, on 
identifying impostors and on detecting counterfeit documents, 
were attended by all 9 members of the airport's inspection team. 
 As a follow-up, we shared the carrier liaison guide with them, 
and we hope to develop closer collaboration with this part of 
our consular district. 
 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: N/A 
 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING:  The Fraud Prevention Unit has one 
Consular Officer, one Fraud Prevention FSN, and one ARSO/I.  The 
FP FSO and FSN attended a regional Fraud Prevention conference 
in Kyiv in April 2009.  The FP FSO attended the Fraud Prevention 
for Managers training course at FSI in April 2008, and the FP 
FSN last attended a fraud training program at FSI in April 2006. 
GWALTNEY