VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1729 3291900
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251854Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO IMMEDIATE 0000
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 121729 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM PINR PREL CA XS
SUBJECT: TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE REMOVAL OF 
HELIUM-3 STORED AT ONTARIO POWER GENERATION 
 
REF: A. A. TORONTO 000186 
     ¶B. B. STATE 082558 
     ¶C. C. TORONTO 000173 
     ¶D. D. STATE 078415 
     ¶E. E. TORONTO 000163 AND REFERENCES THEREIN 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for Embassy Ottawa. Please 
see paragraph 3. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Ontario Power Generation (OPG) has 
expressed interest in working with DOE on helium-3 (He-3) 
supply, stipulating that the United States would remove and 
retain ownership of all residual tritium containers stored at 
OPG.  Technical discussions held in Toronto on 19 October 
2009 between a U.S. team and OPG representatives provided 
each side with the information necessary to understand the 
effort required to remove the  residual tritium storage units 
from the OPG facility in Darlington, Ontario, Canada, to the 
DOE Savannah River Site.  Major issues uncovered include: (1) 
lack of certified overpacks for shipment; (2) cross border 
transport; (3) need for the Canadian team to develop clear 
guidance on tritium monitoring requirements and (4) possible 
compensation for residual tritium. With this information, 
both sides will be better able to develop a workplan and 
associated costs designed to determine the feasibility of 
this effort. The team also toured the Darlington Tritium 
Recovery Facility.  A separate detailed technical report is 
being drafted by the Savannah River team.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to monitor OPG's 
interaction with the GOC on tritium exporting requirements as 
referenced in paragraph 11. 
 
¶4. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Helium-3 (He-3) is a tritium decay 
product used for neutron detection, cryogenics, medical, oil 
and gas exploration, and other applications.  After the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, the U.S. government began 
to significantly increase its nuclear detection capabilities 
both at home and around the world.  This resulted in a 
corresponding increase in demand for He-3 that far exceeds 
available U.S. supply.  As a result, the USG has embarked on 
a three-pronged approach to address the issue:  (1) reduce 
demand through reprioritizing programmatic requirements, (2) 
foster the introduction of alternative technologies not 
dependent upon He-3, and (3) increase available supply.  This 
third area includes discussions with entities that have 
available supplies of He-3, such as countries that use heavy 
water reactors that produce tritium.  Ontario Power 
Generation (OPG) maintains the largest fleet of such reactors 
in the world and has been storing tritium since the late 
1980's.  It is anticipated t 
hat they may have as much as 60,000 liters of He-3 that could 
be readily harvested. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) DARLINGTON TRITIUM REMOVAL FACILITY: On October 19, 
2009, representatives from DOE/NNSA, DHS, and ConGen Toronto 
met with OPG at the OPG Darlington, Ontario, Canada, reactor 
and tritium separation and storage facility.  Darlington is 
the location of the Darlington Tritium Removal Facility 
(DTRF), where all OPG heavy water plants send their heavy 
water for detritiation.  DTRF is the largest civilian tritium 
removal facility in the world, capable of processing 10 
million grams of heavy water per day.  The storage facility 
for the separated tritium is also located on the Darlington 
plant site. Separation of tritium at DTRF has been on-going 
since late 1989.  U.S. representatives included:  Joe Glaser, 
NA-4; Nanette Founds, NA-122.3; Orvis Taylor, NA-261; Greg 
Slovik, DHS/DNDO; Paul Cloessner and Jim Klein, Savannah 
River Site, and Lee MacTaggart, ConGen Toronto.  OPG 
representatives included:  Mario Cornacchia, Director, 
Commercial Services; Lloyd Mathias, Product Manager, Isotope 
Sales; Alfred Mo, Prod 
uct Manager, Isotope Sales; Bob Rankin, Manager DTRF; and 
Pauline Witke, Manager, Radioactive Material Transport. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) OPG PERSPECTIVE: From the outset of the meeting, Mr. 
Cornacchia stated that OPG has been contacted by "over a 
dozen parties worldwide" interested in purchasing OPG's He-3. 
 We understand that these Parties propose to harvest the He-3 
in-situ, i.e., at the OPG storage facility located in the 
Darlington plant site, thus leaving OPG to continue storing 
the residual tritium, and requiring OPG to eventually address 
disposition of the containers.  Mr. Rankin also confided that 
he has proposed to his management that He-3 be harvested by 
his staff in the DTRF facility.  To date, OPG management has 
been cool to this idea. 
 
¶7. (SBU) OPG PERSPECTIVE CONT'D: In REF E, OPG expressed 
interest in working with DOE on He-3 supply, stipulating that 
the U.S. would remove and retain ownership of all He-3 
containers stored at OPG.  Since He-3 supply is not a core 
OPG business function, OPG views their role as supportive, 
with DOE leading the effort and requesting actions from OPG. 
 
¶8. (SBU) ISSUES DISCUSSED: This technical discussion provided 
each side with the information necessary to understand the 
effort required to remove the residual tritium storage units 
from the OPG facility in Darlington, Ontario, Canada, to the 
DOE Savannah River Site.  Major issues covered include: (1) 
lack of certified overpacks for shipment; (2) currently 
available overpacks can only hold one storage unit, (3) cross 
border transport; (4) need to develop a clear path forward on 
tritium accountability requirements; and (5) possible 
compensation for residual tritium. 
 
¶9. (SBU) OVERPACKS: There are very few certified overpacks 
available for transporting the storage units from OPG to the 
Savannah River Site.  US certified containers can only store 
one storage unit.  The Canadian unit (of which there is at 
most one available) can store up to six, but is currently 
only approved to carry one.  Fabrication time is estimated to 
be 18-24 months. 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) TRANSPORT: There are no escort requirements for 
transporting the storage containers through Canada.  The U.S. 
team needs to confirm escort requirements within the US and 
trans-border handoff. 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) MONITORING: OPG was not certain about monitoring 
requirements that Canada might impose on the residual tritium 
embedded in the storage containers.  OPG stated they need 
guidance from the Canadian Government, since the answer to 
the issue concerns GOC Policy. 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) RESIDUAL TRITIUM COMPENSATION: Mr. Cornacchia also 
made the point that sale of tritium is part of OPG business. 
He stated his preference that, should there become a larger 
market for residual tritium, some arrangement be made for 
cost-sharing sales of the residual tritium stored in the 
storage units.  While not a near term issue, the USG needs to 
be aware of that possibility. 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) NEXT STEPS AND U.S. ACTION ITEMS: 
-  Draft a technical report of the meeting and tour of DTRF 
-  The US team needs to confirm escort requirements within 
the US and trans-border handoff. 
-  Complete the Statement of Work and formal Request for 
Proposal 
-  As part of the negotiations, OPG will need us to sign a 
non-disclosure agreement 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Department thanks Post for their assistance. 
For further information, please contact Joseph Glaser, 
DOE/NNSA, Office for Counterterrorism, 202-586-2648, 
joseph.glaser@nnsa.doe.gov. 
CLINTON