VZCZCXRO5460
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHC #6396/01 3160131
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O P 120124Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5267
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0169
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 116396 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
GENENVA FOR CD DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CDG MCAP NASA PARM PREL RS TSPA UNPUOS
SUBJECT: NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE 
SECURITY DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 54933 
     ¶B. B) MOSCOW 1474 
     ¶C. C) 05 STATE 89792 
     ¶D. D) 07 MOSCOW 1002 
     ¶E. E) UNVIEVIENNA324 
     ¶F. F) STATE 58525 
 
STATE 00116396  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  See paragraph 7 below. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: A U.S. non-paper dated May 28, 2009, was 
transmitted to Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inviting 
Russia to discuss the February 10, 2009, Iridium-Cosmos 
collision, and expressing the United States' interest in 
resuming the pursuit of bilateral talks on transparency and 
confidence-building measures (TCBMs) with Russia.  In an 
aide-memoire from Russia dated September 29, 2009, Russia 
responded positively to the U.S. non-paper, and expressed its 
desire to resume dialogues between Russian and U.S. experts 
on space-related issues.  Russia subsequently proposed a 
meeting on November 14, 2009, in Geneva.  Washington would 
like to counter-propose to conduct two half-day meetings on 
January 20-21, 2010, in Paris.  This would allow both the 
U.S. and Russia sufficient time for preparations.  Washington 
would also like to propose the addition of several items to 
the proposed agenda, as well as to request responses in 
advance of the meeting to the questions posed by the USG 
during the June 8, 2009, meeting on the margins of the UN 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On June 2, 2009, the Russian MFA 
Department for Security and Disarmament (DVBR) responded 
positively to the U.S. non-paper dated May 28, 2009, which 
invited Russia to discuss the February 10, 2009, collision of 
an Iridium communications satellite and an inoperable Russian 
military spacecraft (Ref A).  The U.S. non-paper also noted 
interest in resuming the pursuit of bilateral U.S.-Russia 
pragmatic and voluntary transparency and confidence-building 
measures (TCBMs) (Ref B).  Previous U.S.-Russian dialogues on 
space security issues were held in Washington, D.C., in April 
2005 and in Paris in January 2007 (Refs C and D). 
 
¶4. (SBU) During a June 8 meeting in Vienna on the margins of 
the annual meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (COPUOS), Brigadier General Susan Helms, 
Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Strategic 
Command, briefed the Russian COPUOS delegation on the 
collision and led a discussion on the opportunity for 
bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia on 
space TCBMs (Ref E).  At that time, the U.S. handed over a 
list of questions for consideration by the Russian Federation 
(found in paragraph 7 of Ref F).  At the end of this meeting, 
Russia suggested the need for a specialized experts meeting 
on the topic. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The U.S. received an aide-memoire from Russia dated 
September 29, 2009, expressing its desire to resume the 
dialogue between Russian and U.S. experts on space-related 
issues (paragraph 11).  This aide-memoire also proposed 
several agenda items for the dialogue.  Since receiving this 
aide-memoire, a Russian embassy official relayed Moscow's 
proposal that a dialogue take place on November 14, 2009, in 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. non-paper (paragraph 8) provides a 
counter-proposal to their November 14 date and venue that 
will allow the USG sufficient time for preparations.  It is 
important that this dialogue take place before the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee meeting of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, scheduled during February 8-19, 
2010, so that the U.S. and Russia have the opportunity to 
coordinate positions prior to the discussion of the COPUOS 
agenda item on the "Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space 
 
STATE 00116396  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
Activities."  The U.S. interagency delegation for the space 
security dialogue will include representatives from NASA, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, United States Strategic Command, and the Department of 
State.  END BACKGROUND. 
 
¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy is requested to pass the 
U.S. non-paper (contained in paragraph 8 below) and draft 
agenda (contained in paragraph 9) to appropriate host 
government officials at the MFA and to provide copies to the 
Ministry of Defense and the Russian Space Agency (Roskosmos). 
 Embassy may draw upon and handover the contingency talking 
points in paragraph 10 and is asked to report its delivery 
and any GoR reaction at the time of delivery.  END ACTION 
REQUEST. 
 
¶8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER: 
 
Non-Paper 
November 11, 2009 
 
The United States is pleased to respond to the Russian 
Federation's Aide-Memoire of September 29, 2009, proposing a 
meeting between U.S. and Russian experts on space-related 
issues, and Moscow's subsequent proposal for a November 14 
meeting in Geneva relayed by the Russian Federation's Embassy 
in Washington, D.C. 
 
The United States is pleased that the Russian Federation has 
expressed a willingness to resume this important dialogue. 
As Russia's Aide-Memoire notes, it - and for that matter, the 
United States - will require adequate time for careful 
preparation and to ensure participation by appropriate 
experts.  Therefore, the United States would counter-propose 
to hold two half-day meetings on January 20-21, 2010, in 
Paris, France.  We propose that the United States host the 
first half-day of discussions on January 20 at the U.S. 
Embassy, and that Russia host the second half-day on January 
21 at its Embassy. 
 
The United States has reviewed Russia's proposed agenda items 
and generally agrees with its proposals, but with the 
addition of three new agenda items.  First, the United States 
believes it is important for each of us to exchange 
perspectives regarding the challenges to our shared national 
security interests in a congested, complex, and potentially 
contested space domain.  Second, the United States proposes 
an agenda item to explore the continuity of our respective 
positions on the "long term sustainability of outer space 
activities," to be discussed at the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space in February 2010.  Third, the United States 
proposes an agenda item to discuss opportunities for expanded 
U.S.-Russian space cooperation related to problems regarding 
cross-cutting/multi-agency issues such as additional measures 
to enhance spaceflight safety. 
 
To ensure the most complete review of the agenda, the United 
States believes this meeting should include appropriate 
interagency government experts, including experts from our 
respective military space forces as well as from civilian 
space agencies. 
 
In order to facilitate our space security dialogue, the 
United States would appreciate receiving in advance of the 
meeting Russia's answers to our questions (attached at Annex 
B to the U.S.-proposed agenda) posed on June 8, 2009, during 
our bilateral discussions in Vienna on the margins of the UN 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), in 
which Brigadier General Susan Helms, Director of Plans and 
Policy, J-5, United States Strategic Command, briefed the 
Russian COPUOS delegation on the Iridium-Cosmos collision and 
led a discussion on the opportunity for bilateral cooperation 
between the United States and Russia on space transparency 
and confidence-building measures. 
 
As we prepare for this prospective meeting, the United States 
 
STATE 00116396  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
believes it would be useful for us to take without delay two 
pragmatic steps to enhance spaceflight safety. 
 
The first step is the identification of specific points of 
contact for transmitting and receiving timely exchanges of 
satellite collision hazard warnings through the direct 
communication between our two governments.  When a country's 
satellite and a space object (e.g., debris) are projected to 
pass each other within a distance of one kilometer or less in 
low earth orbit or five kilometers or less in geostationary 
orbit, the U.S. Government attempts to so notify either the 
governmental or commercial satellite operator(s) to ensure 
flight safety.  As the time of the closest conjunction nears, 
more analysis is accomplished to see if the distance of 
closest approach has changed due to orbital dynamics effects, 
for example, gravitational forces.  The U.S. Government will 
provide updates as they become available. 
 
In this regard, the United States wishes to inform Russia 
that the U.S. Government Point of Contact for exchanges of 
collision hazard warnings is the Mission Commander of the 
U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center 
(JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.  The JSpOC 
Mission Commander can be contacted at: 
 
Telefax:  1 (805) 605-3507 
Email: JSpOCSSAConjunctionAssessment@vandenberg.af.m il 
Telephone:  1 (805) 605-3514 
 
The United States requests similar contact information for 
the Russian government's Point of Contact. 
 
As a second pragmatic step, the United States proposes that 
familiarization visits by U.S. and Russian military space 
operators should proceed as soon as possible in accordance 
with the strategic framework for military-to-military 
engagement established between the Chairman of the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Russian Armed Forces on July 6, 2009.  The United States 
believes that the highest priority should be given to 
scheduling reciprocal visits by satellite movement control 
specialists.  The U.S. point of contact for these visits is: 
 
USSTRATCOM/J5, Plans and Policy 
Telephone:   1 (402) 232-6603 
Telefax:   1 (402) 294-1035 
 
The United States looks forward to receiving Moscow's 
response to our proposed dates and venue for resuming this 
timely dialogue and welcomes Russia's thoughts on the 
U.S.-proposed agenda. 
 
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER. 
 
¶9. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED AGENDA: 
 
PROPOSED AGENDA FOR U.S.-RUSSIA SPACE SECURITY DIALOGUE 
 
DAY ONE (U.S. Host): 
 
¶1.  Introductions 
 
¶2.  U.S. and Russian perspectives on challenges - including 
threats - to shared national security interests in outer space 
 
¶3.  Russian and U.S. views regarding the use of outer space 
in support of national security interests 
 
¶4.  Approaches to ensuring the safety of outer space 
activities 
 
a. Russia's responses to U.S. questions provided on June 8, 
2009 (Annex A) 
 
b. U.S. and Russian perspectives on the "long term 
sustainability of outer space activities," an agenda item of 
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee 
 
STATE 00116396  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
 
¶5.  Opportunities for expanded U.S.-Russian space cooperation 
related to problems regarding cross-cutting/multi-agency 
issues 
a. U.S. and Russian views on additional measures to enhance 
spaceflight safety 
b. Other matters 
 
DAY TWO (Russia Host): 
 
¶6. Russia's proposals for transparency and 
confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space (Annex B) 
a. Russian proposals 
b. U.S. perspectives 
c. Options for implementation of mutually-agreed TCBMs on a 
bilateral basis 
 
¶7. Discussions on outer space TCBM matters in the UN General 
Assembly's First Committee 
a. Review of past attempts to co-sponsor a TCBM Resolution in 
the 62nd and 63rd sessions of the General Assembly 
b. The opportunity for U.S.-Russian collaboration at the 65th 
session of the General Assembly 
 
¶8. Russian and U.S. perspectives regarding the European 
Union's draft "Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" 
 
Annex A: Questions provided to the Russian Federation by the 
United States on June 8, 2009 
 
a.  What space surveillance and space situational awareness 
capabilities does Russia currently operate/utilize? 
 
b.  What are Russia's future plans for its space situational 
awareness capabilities? 
 
c.  Your March 5, 2009, non-paper mentioned the importance of 
transparency and confidence-building measures in space 
activities, such as the sharing of data related to orbital 
parameters of space vehicles.  To promote spaceflight safety, 
the U.S. already shares orbital parameters freely on the 
space-track.org website to 37,000 registered users from 110 
nations. 
i. Does Russia intend to share data in a similar manner or 
only bilaterally? 
ii. Does Russia intend to share information on all satellites 
or only collision debris data? 
iii. What data would Russia be willing to share (two-line 
element sets, maneuver plans, debris field data, pre-launch 
parameters, etc.)? 
 
d.  Your non-paper also stated that Russia would like 
"consultations regarding ambiguous situations of concern for 
spacefaring nations." 
i. What types of concerns would be considered in this 
category?  Would these situations include emergency 
notification of a potential conjunction, loss of control of a 
satellite that is drifting, or orbital debris information? 
ii. How would Russia like to bring such ambiguous situations 
to the attention of spacefaring nations?  Through what 
channels (e.g., UN, diplomatic, military-to-military 
channels)? 
 
e.  The U.S. intends to monitor and assess potential 
collisions for all 800 maneuverable satellites against all 
other satellites, looking for possible conjunctions.  Would 
Russia like to be notified of any possible conjunctions with 
your satellites that we predict?  Through what channels 
(e.g., UN, diplomatic, military-to-military channels)? 
 
f.  Since all spacefaring nations are concerned with 
preventing more collisions in space, do you agree that we 
should focus most closely on this topic area at the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space?  Do you also agree that 
other multilateral fora (e.g., Conference on Disarmament, UN 
General Assembly First Committee) are the most appropriate 
 
STATE 00116396  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
venues for substantive discussions on other transparency and 
confidence-building measures that could help ensure 
predictability, enhance stability, and reduce the likelihood 
of misunderstanding in the conduct of space activities? 
 
g.  The U.S. and Russia are the most capable nations at 
tracking space objects and are in the best position to 
predict conjunctions that could have significant impact on 
all users of space.  What is Russia doing to predict possible 
conjunctions?  Does it intend to notify owner/operators of 
possible conjunctions? 
 
h.  Is Russia willing to engage in bilateral discussions, 
military-to-military technical information exchanges, and/or 
visits regarding space data sharing? 
 
Annex B: Russia's proposals for Transparency and Confidence 
Building Measures for Outer Space Activities - as noted in 
Paragraph 10 of Russia's July 13, 2009, submission to the UN 
Secretary General. (UN General Assembly document 
A/64/138/Add.1 of September 19, 2009) 
 
(a) Exchange of information on: 
(i)   The main directions of States' outer space policy; 
(ii)  Major outer space research and use programs; 
(iii) Orbital parameters of outer space objects; 
(iv) Foreseeable dangerous situations in space; 
 
(b) Familiarization visits: 
(i)  Expert visits, including visits to space launch sites, 
flight command and control centers and other facilities of 
outer space infrastructure; 
(ii)  Invitation of observers to launches of spacecraft; 
(iii) Demonstrations of rocket and space technologies; 
 
(c) Notification of: 
(i)   Planned spacecraft launches; 
(ii)  Scheduled spacecraft maneuvers which could result in 
dangerous proximity to spacecraft of other States; 
(iii) The beginning of descent from orbit of unguided space 
objects and the predicted impact areas on Earth; 
(iv) The return from orbit into the atmosphere of a guided 
spacecraft; 
(v)  The return of a spacecraft with a nuclear source of 
power on board, in the case of malfunction and danger of 
radioactive materials descending to Earth; 
 
(d) Consultations: 
(i)   To clarify the information provided on outer space 
research and use programs; 
(ii)  On ambiguous situations, as well as on other issues of 
concern; 
(iii) To discuss the implementation of agreed transparency 
and confidence building measures in outer space activities; 
 
(e) Thematic workshops on various outer space research and 
use issues, organized on a bilateral or multilateral basis, 
with the participation of scientists, diplomats, military and 
technical experts. 
 
END TEXT OF PROPOSED AGENDA. 
 
¶10. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS: 
 
-- The U.S. regrets that it is unable to accept Russia's 
proposal for a meeting on November 14, 2009, in Geneva.  A 
meeting in late January would allow for better preparation 
and ensure the participation of appropriate U.S. experts. 
 
-- In addition, a meeting late January would enable our 
delegations to explore the continuity of our respective 
positions on the "long term sustainability of outer space 
activities," prior to the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, which convenes on February 9, 2010. 
 
-- U.S. participants in the proposed meeting would include 
 
STATE 00116396  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
experts from the U.S. Department of State (including the 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the 
Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science), the U.S. 
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States 
Strategic Command, and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 
 
-- The U.S. delegation would be headed by Mr. Frank Rose, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Policy and 
Verification Operations. 
 
END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS. 
 
¶11. (SBU) BEGIN RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE: 
 
AIDE-MEMOIRE 
Moscow 
September 29, 2009 
 
The Russian side has carefully studied the ideas and 
proposals contained in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of May 28, 2009 
(received from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on June 2, 2009), 
as well as those set forth at the meeting of Russian and U.S. 
experts in Vienna on June 8, 2009. 
 
We agree with the U.S. side that the intensive development of 
outer space activities is outstripping the development of the 
infrastructure for monitoring near-Earth orbits. As a result, 
the technical resources that countries have at their disposal 
do not allow them to continuously follow all launched 
spacecraft and to predict the occurrence of hazardous 
situations in outer space, including potential collisions of 
satellites with fragments of space junk or with each other. 
Such situations are particularly dangerous for manned space 
flights, especially for the International Space Station. The 
collision that occurred between Russian and U.S. satellites 
on February 10, 2009, is a serious warning of the possibility 
that such incidents could happen in the future. We agree that 
lessons must be learned from this, and we reaffirm our 
willingness to resume the dialogue between Russian and U.S. 
experts on space-related issues. 
 
Apart from the issues set forth in the U.S. Aide-Memoire of 
May 28, 2009, we would consider it useful to discuss the 
following subjects at the meeting of experts; 
¶1. The two sides' views regarding the use of outer space; 
¶2. The two sides' conceptual approaches to ensuring the 
safety of outer space activities; 
¶3. transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in 
outer space; 
¶4. Russian proposals for TCBMs presented in the report of the 
UN Secretary General (UN General Assembly document A/62/114 
of August 3, 2007); 
¶5. the new Russian proposal for TCBMs - international 
exchange of information on predicted hazardous situations in 
outer space; the conditions required for its implementation; 
¶6. interaction between Russia and the U.S. on TCBM-related 
matters at sessions of the UN General Assembly; 
¶7. the possibility and advisability of drafting a UN document 
on TCBMs based on our countries' proposals; 
¶8. Russian and U.S. approaches to the EU's proposal for 
developing a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. 
 
At present we are studying the U.S. side's questions 
regarding a possible exchange of information on the situation 
in outer space, which were conveyed to us in Vienna during 
the fifty-second (2009) session of the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We have in mind a discussion of 
these matters in the course of further contacts. 
 
The Russian side hopes for the U.S. side's constructive 
response to these ideas and, as a first step, proposes 
setting a tentative timeframe, a possible agenda, and a place 
to hold a new meeting of Russian and U.S. experts. We would 
like to receive the U.S. side's proposals concerning this 
matter, taking into account the time required for careful 
preparation of a meeting. 
 
STATE 00116396  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
END RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE. 
 
¶12. (U) The Department thanks the Embassy for their 
assistance. Please slug responses for ISN/MDSP-RBuenneke, 
OES/SAT-DTurner, and EUR/PRA-MHardiman. 
CLINTON