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R 100328Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8911
INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
CIA WASHDC 0232
DIA WASHDC 0181
NSC WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0127

C O N F I D E N T I A L SHENYANG 000200 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5 YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: PGOV CH PMIL ROK
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ROK POLMIN SUNGNAM LIM: FRUSTRATIONS 
IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
Classified By: Consul General Stephen Wickman, Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) ROK Political Minister Lim Sungnam, a relative 
newcomer in Beijing (two months, overlapping by his account 
somewhat awkwardly with his predecessor), dropped by Shenyang 
briefly on November 9 before jetting off to Harbin as part of 
a Northeast familiarization tour.  Lim asked the Consul 
General whether he had heard anything from local experts on 
North Korea issues.  The CG said experts here tend to talk 
among themselves about such issues and suggested Lim visit 
Yanji and Yanbian Prefecture to see the Sino-Korean 
experience firsthand. Lim said he was also traveling there 
later in the week. 
 
¶2. (C) Lim's meetings with scholars at the Liaoning Academy 
of Social Sciences (interestingly not with LASS Director and 
Chinese media darling Lu Chao) produced what he thought were 
interesting insights. First, the analysts he talked to see 
stability in the Korean peninsula continuing under almost any 
scenario. Secondly, the same said scholars speak of 
unification of the two Koreas in a positive light, as if it 
is a real possibility at some point. Lim offered the caveat 
the he does put too much stock in the value of Chinese 
intellectual opinion on the subject. 
 
¶3. (C) Lim said he sees two opposing schools at work in 
Chinese government views on the Korean Peninsula--the burden 
school and the buffer school.  The burden school sees the 
DPRK as nothing but a burden to the Chinese. The view is 
espoused by younger members of the Chinese Communist Party 
and forward-leaning intellectuals.  The buffer school of 
thought, which sees the DPRK in a more conventional light as 
a buffer zone between China and the United States, is 
espoused by elder members of the Party leadership.  Lim sees 
both schools of thought at work in the behavior of the 
Chinese he deals with:  they talk to ROKG reps in terms of 
the burden school but they tend to act in accordance with the 
buffer school. 
 
¶4. (C) Lim believes the DPRK will never give up its nuclear 
weapons now that they have successfully tested them twice, so 
he thinks the best thing to do is to act to prevent 1) a 
third nuclear test of nuclear capability; 2) proliferation of 
any DPRK nuclear capabilities; and/or 3) a major increase in 
DPRK stockpiles that could destabilize the region.  Lim is 
personally quite pessimistic about the Six-Party Talks 
achieving its stated goals but thinks it is an important 
forum, in which all parties could agree to exchange ideas and 
keep in regular working-level contact.  Some ten years down 
the line, Lim opined, it could form the basis for a new 
Northeast Asia security cooperation architecture. 
 
¶5. (C) When asked about his assessment of the level of 
bilateral cooperation he sees from the Chinese, Lim was most 
negative.  The Chinese perception is that the current 
leadership in the ROK wants to cut China out of the 
negotiations and diplomatic process on the Korean peninsula, 
so the authorities punish the ROK by being less responsive to 
ROK Embassy contact requests and other inquiries than in the 
past.  In response to a number of requests on important 
issues, for example, the requests to turn over the aged POW 
defectors recently in the South Korean news, "we are getting 
a much colder reception from the Chinese," Lim said.  He 
blamed this partly on mistaken perceptions and partly on what 
he termed the "Commercialist Characteristics of Chinese 
Diplomacy."  Lim described this as a propensity to link 
everything, engaging in tit for tat on even wholly unrelated 
issues.  Lim says this works at all levels of their sometimes 
difficult bilateral relationship. 
 
WICKMAN