VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1867/01 3290907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250907Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6337
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 5358
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2029 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV ECON SOCI KN CH KS JP
 
SUBJECT: TOP JAPANESE PYONGYANG-WATCHER ON SINO-DPRK TIES 
 
REF: SEOUL 1672 
 
Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Fresh from detailed discussions with longtime Chinese 
and North Korean contacts in Beijing, noted Japanese 
DPRK-watcher Professor Hajime Izumi told us that Premier 
Wen's October trip to Pyongyang had restored China's 
influence with the DPRK and put Beijing's relationship with 
the North back on track.  Wen's "3-5-8" aid package of food, 
heavy fuel oil, and high-quality coal had done the trick, 
Izumi claimed, adding that China does not want rapid progress 
in the Six-Party Talks.  Izumi asserted Beijing was in a 
holding pattern in dealing with the ROK on major political 
issues until 2012, when a new administration and OPCON 
transfer would make Seoul a more promising target of 
opportunity.  Izumi claimed that the PLA does not believe the 
North's nuclear threat could spark a regional arms race and 
had concluded the threat of Japanese remilitarization was 
near non-existent.  End Summary. 
 
Wen's Visit "Fixed China's DPRK Problem"... 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Hajime Izumi, Director of the Center for Korean 
Studies at Shizuoka University, told poloffs on November 20 
that China was confident that Premier Wen Jiabao's October 
2009 Pyongyang trip was a "turning point" in dealing with the 
DPRK.  Izumi, who had just concluded meetings in Beijing with 
longtime official PRC and DPRK interlocutors, noted that 
China's relations with Pyongyang had soured after the North's 
unannounced missile launch in April and nuclear test in May. 
China's subsequent support for the UNSC Presidential 
Statement condemning the test had further complicated 
relations that Izumi claimed had now been repaired by the Wen 
visit and Kim Jong-il's face-saving apparent agreement to 
return to the Six-Party Talks. 
 
...For a Price: "3-5-8" Aid Package 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) According to Izumi, the North's alleged willingness to 
return to the Six-Party Talks came at the price of 300,000 
metric tons (MT) of food, 500,000 MTs of heavy fuel oil, and 
800,000 MTs of high-quality coal -- which PRC officials 
referred to as the "3-5-8 package."  The "3-5-8 package" 
carried significant symbolism, as it was the same package 
Beijing gave Pyongyang in 1965, as China emerged from the 
economic chaos caused by the Great Leap Forward and offered 
aid to the struggling DPRK.  Delivery of the latest 3-5-8 
package began in September and would be absent from official 
PRC trade statistics, according to Izumi's sources. 
 
China's DPRK Policy: "Business as Usual" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Izumi suggested it now appeared that for Beijing it 
was back to business as usual regarding the DPRK.  Lingering 
mistrust existed over the nuclear tests, but the PLA was 
confident it could deal with the DPRK as it had in the past. 
The Chinese leadership allegedly viewed the North Koreans as 
"just crazy enough" to actually use military force against 
China, so the PLA had determined to improve bilateral 
relations and "hold them close."  Izumi noted that the 
party-to-party link between Beijing and Pyongyang gave the 
two countries a unique relationship, but ties were far from 
normal.  Asked if China had another redline for provocative 
DPRK behavior, Izumi suggested it did not appear so. 
 
China Prefers Slow Approach to Six-Party 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) China was in no hurry to reconvene the Six-Party 
Talks, Izumi's interlocutors had said, emphasizing that 
Beijing was focused on results more than process.  As an 
issue of face, Beijing was not interested in hosting another 
round unless there were signs that real progress could be 
made.  Chinese officials told Izumi they would like to see at 
least three U.S.-DPRK bilaterals before reconvening the 
Six-Party Talks, suggesting that's what would be necessary to 
get enough progress to make a next round productive. 
 
PLA Calling Shots on DPRK Policy? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) According to Izumi, the PLA currently has the lead on 
China's DPRK policy; according to Izumi's contacts, MFA lost 
the lead following a series of senior PRC visits to Pyongyang 
that failed to persuade the North to return to the Six-Party 
Talks.  While other PRC ministries and institutions had 
concluded that the DPRK was no longer the valuable buffer 
state it had once been for China, the PLA was holding fast to 
old, conventional wisdom.  Izumi downplayed the significance 
of recent criticism of the North in PRC media, claiming it 
was limited to junior academics who had little influence over 
policy in the near term. 
 
China Welcomes OPCON Transfer, Dismissive of LMB 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (C) According to Izumi, senior PRC leaders viewed the 
transfer of wartime operational control of Combined Forces 
Korea from USFK to the ROK (OPCON Transfer) scheduled for 
2012 as an opportunity to split the U.S.-ROK alliance and 
dismissed ROK President Lee Myung-bak as a CEO, not a 
statesman, Izumi claimed.  Beijing had little interest in 
working with Lee and had no plans to engage Seoul on 
substantive political or security issues until after OPCON 
transfer and the next ROK presidential election in 2012, 
Izumi asserted. 
 
"Japan? Who's Afraid of Japan?" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Izumi said his PLA contacts did not find credible the 
threat of a regional arms race triggered by the North's 
nuclear program because they do not believe Japan is capable 
of remilitarizing.  They commented that Japan "just sat and 
watched" two North Korean nuclear tests.  Izumi's PLA 
contacts also noted Japan had decreased its military budget 
during the past seven years and believed that, as long as 
that trend continued, China had no reason to fear Japan. 
STEPHENS