VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0978/01 3142211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 102210Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0017
INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH J3
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL PINR MASS CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: MERIDA 2.0 
 
REF: ANDREW/ASHE EMAIL 6 NOV 09 
 
Per WHA/CEN email tasking of 17 September, Post provides input on 
Merida 2.0: 
 
 
 
¶I. Security Environment-Assessment: 
 
 
 
Costa Rica is not as dangerous as the rest of Central America; 
however, it is no longer safe. 
 
 
 
Until the last two to three years, improving the security situation 
in Costa Rica was almost an afterthought compared to other fiscal 
priorities of the Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) such as health 
and education.  However, the pace of the deteriorating domestic 
security situation in Costa Rica has increased over the past three 
to four years and has forced the Arias Administration to pay more 
attention to it.  Security did not deteriorate overnight.  Rather, 
inadequate security policies, insufficient provisioning, and 
half-measures were the norm for at least 30 years.  While the Arias 
Administration has dedicated more resources and provided better 
legislative tools to address these issues, more equipment and 
better-trained personnel are needed immediately to halt Costa 
Rica's downward spiral.  Without significant and sustained 
improvement of its security situation, public security in Costa 
Rica could deteriorate to a level similar to El Salvador in the 
next five to ten years. 
 
 
 
Costa Rica is a vulnerable drug transshipment point for South 
American cocaine and heroin destined primarily for the United 
States due to its location on the isthmus linking Colombia with the 
United States via Mexico, its long Atlantic and Pacific coastlines, 
and its jurisdiction over the Cocos Islands.  Directly related to 
the problems of drugs flowing through Costa Rica to the north is 
the problem of cash and weapons flowing through Costa Rica to the 
south.  One of the epidemics that Post sees in Costa Rica is the 
rapid growth of the use of crack cocaine.  Drug traffickers, moving 
their product by sea, need refueling and supplies for the trip 
north.  Instead of paying for their provisions with cash, they pay 
in cocaine.  It is this cocaine that often ends up on the streets 
of Costa Rica. 
 
 
 
Highlighting the increasing boldness of criminals, especially drug 
gangs, are recent (Oct/Nov 2009) incidents of well-armed drug gangs 
killing judicial police agents.  The drug gangs were armed with 
AK-47 type assault weapons while the judicial police initially 
responded with 9mm pistols.  While most of the perpetrators were 
captured, the primary suspects remain at large.  Incidents like 
these, and many other violent crimes over the past few years, have 
started to become the norm in this popular tourist destination 
which still trades on its image as a bastion of peace in a troubled 
region.  Between 750,000 and 1,000,000 million Americans visit 
Costa Rica each year and another estimated 50,000 live here on a 
permanent basis. 
 
 
 
Personal security in Costa Rica continues to deteriorate as 
criminals believe that they face little serious threat from law 
enforcement agencies and relatively low chances of being convicted 
in the legal system.  Armed robbery and murder are regular features 
of the evening news, contributing to a groundswell of public 
dissatisfaction with the national uniformed police (known as the 
Fuerza Publica) and a growing disaffection with the judiciary. 
 
 
 
Statistics show that crime rates over the past few years have risen 
an average of 20-25 percent.  Recently updated crime statistics 
comparing and contrasting 2007 and 2008 show an even higher, more 
alarming rate.  For example, in 2007 there were approximately 369 
homicides nation-wide; in 2008, homicides climbed to 512, an 
increase of 38 percent.  The national homicide rate per 100,000 in 
2007 was 8; in 2008 it climbed to 11.  Other types of violent crime 
 
are on the rise as well, including robberies and car-jackings, at a 
rate of approximately 20-25 percent per year.  Violence and crime 
have not only affected the "common" person, it has affected senior 
government officials such as cabinet level ministers and even the 
family of the foreign minister.  The areas with the highest rates 
of crime are in San Jose itself, and in Limon, on the Caribbean 
coast.  Most crimes occur in major urban areas, but rural areas are 
not immune from criminal activity----especially those areas located 
in drug trafficking corridors and popular beach destinations. 
Although we do not yet have statistics for 2009, we expect these 
trends to continue. 
 
 
 
Polling data from CID-Gallup and others tell us that domestic 
insecurity is now the number one issue for the people of Costa 
Rica, despite the effects of the current world-wide financial 
crisis.  In one out of every four homes there is at least one 
person who has been a victim of crime in the last four months. 
This data has been consistent for the past two years of polling. 
The Costa Rican people do not believe that the government is doing 
enough to combat crime and believe that drugs, including both the 
use of and trafficking of cocaine through Costa Rica, are a major 
part of this problem. 
 
 
 
Costa Rican law enforcement agencies struggle in their effort to 
address these security challenges due to being underequipped, 
undermanned, undertrained, and underfunded.  With no military, 
Costa Rica does not have nor does it need a defense plan.  What it 
sorely lacks is a coherent domestic security plan.  While the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is officially charged with both 
national and domestic security, there are several institutions that 
have police-type responsibilities.  Within MPS are the Fuerza 
Publica (or Public Force, uniformed cops numbering around 10,000 
total); the Drug Control Police (PCD), a rough equivalent to the 
DEA that is very small with only about 200 officers; the Air Wing 
with basic Cessna and Piper aircraft, including two helicopters, 
numbering around 15-20 aircraft with only about half operational at 
any one time (and only one helicopter, an aging Hughes 500 that the 
USG donated in the mid-80s, operational at any one time); and a 
barely capable coast guard with aging 82-foot patrol boats and a 
couple of dozen or so smaller launches  that are often not 
operational.  Maintenance has traditionally been a weak area for 
Costa Rican security agencies, especially its coast guard (however, 
with recent USCG maintenance training, the situation is improving). 
MPS has a SWAT-like special police unit. 
 
 
 
Despite a commitment by the Arias Administration to increase the 
size of the Fuerza Publica, hiring has barely kept pace with 
attrition.  As crime has increased, so have the number of companies 
offering private security services (and the number of weapons 
imported to arm them).  There are now more armed private security 
guards in Costa Rica than there are police officers. 
 
 
 
Charged with investigation of all crimes committed in Costa Rica 
are the judicial police (OIJ) that fall under the Costa Rican 
Supreme Court.  This 1100 agent organization is a rough equivalent 
to all U.S. federal law enforcement agencies and is by far the most 
professional security institution in the country and we find 
little, if any, corruption in it.  They are also the only police 
organization that can carry out investigations and detective work 
(although PCD can do so for drug-related crimes).  OIJ also has its 
own SWAT-like police force as does the DIS/Presidential Ministry, 
the intelligence service. 
 
 
 
Costa Rica also has tourist police, customs police, transit police, 
immigration police, and other organizations that have police-like 
responsibilities.  One of the biggest problems confronting these 
security institutions is their inability to smoothly coordinate 
amongst themselves. 
 
 
 
The USG works with all of the afore-mentioned agencies, but the 
majority of our involvement is with the MPS and OIJ.  Thanks to the 
 
Merida Initiative, we also work with the Ministry of Justice for 
our prison management program. 
 
 
 
In comparison with the rest of the region, corruption in Costa 
Rica's security forces is relatively low.  That said, the uniformed 
police in particular continues to struggle with criminal elements 
in its own ranks.  In 2009 over 40 police officers were 
arrested/fired for connections to narco-trafficking.  The MPS has 
initiated a program of "zero tolerance" for police officer 
corruption and over 150 police officers have been dismissed or 
suspended for various corrupt activities since 2008.  Costa Rican 
authorities appear committed to combating public corruption and the 
GOCR conscientiously investigates allegations of official 
corruption or abuse. 
 
 
 
The GOCR has increased its spending on security and for FY10 the 
Ministry of Finance proposed an increase of 27 percent.  To address 
crime/citizen security issues effectively over the next 3-5 years, 
the GOCR should continue to increase security spending at these 
levels and strengthen its overall national security plan; the USG 
should continue in Merida 2.0 the sustained commitment that we have 
seen in Merida.  Even such increases may be insufficient if the 
drug cartels and other criminal actors further increase their 
presence and violent activity in Costa Rica, which is already 
reaching a critical level.  Equipping and training the police, 
coast guard, investigative agencies, and other security 
organizations are paramount.  If the GOCR does not 
maintain/increase its security budget and the USG stops funding 
after the three years of Merida, our efforts with Merida will be 
wasted.  A sustained, multi-year effort approach by the USG to 
security in Costa Rica is crucial. 
 
 
 
II. Merida to Date-Post/Host Nation Impressions: 
 
 
 
The Merida Initiative is just barely "off the blocks" here in Costa 
Rica as of November, 2009.  We received our first year of Merida 
funding (from FY08-appropriated funds) only in June, 2009 and 
initiated our first Merida-related activity in August, 2009.  So at 
this point, there is little feedback on how effective Merida has 
been and what effect the current programs have.  However, over the 
past few years Post has continuously evaluated and updated what 
assistance Costa Rica really needs.  The story has not changed much 
from our predecessors to those of us in position now:  What Costa 
Rica really needs is help in properly equipping its police, proper 
police training to include police professionalization training, and 
properly equipping and training its coast guard.  When 
equipping/training the police, we need to ensure that we include 
the OIJ police as well as the uniformed police from MPS. 
 
 
 
From funds that Post manages, we have the following programs for 
the first year of Merida support: 
 
 
 
-$2.8 million in maritime assistance funds (FMF).  Letters of 
Agreement (LOAs) were signed in July and October with the Costa 
Rican Coast Guard and our DoD counterparts to purchase three SAFE 
boats (interceptors) and to modernize/repair the three existing 
82-foot patrol boats.  To date (November 2009), no SAFE boats have 
been delivered and no repair has begun. 
 
 
 
-$1.6 million in police equipment funds (INCLE).  We recently began 
purchasing police equipment and to date only have delivered a few 
items, such as a GPS and some drug detection kits.  We are 
responding to one of the Fuerza Publica's (uniformed cops) main 
deficiencies, which is communications, with the refurbishment of 
their radio repair workshop to prepare for the purchase of hundreds 
of new radios. 
 
-$200K to improve fingerprint programs via Central American 
Fingerprint Exchange (CAFE).  In late August an FBI fingerprint 
team did their first evaluation.  See 09 San Jose 897 for further 
details. 
 
 
 
-$200K to improve prison management.   In late September/early 
October, a prison specialist visited Costa Rica to start this 
program.  His report is in clearance, but it is clear that a lot of 
training in prison management is needed and Costa Rica's prisoner 
capacity is already over its maximum. 
 
 
 
Post agrees with all of the above programs and hopes to see them 
continue in Merida and Merida 2.0. 
 
 
 
There are some Washington-managed funds as well, including a border 
post evaluation/further drug detection kits donation by CBP that 
will occur in February, 2010.  With this training and donation, 
Costa Rica's security agencies will be well-equipped in 
drug/contraband detection for some years to come. 
 
 
 
Merida has been positively received by host nation officials, but, 
as indicated above, it is too early to gauge the impact of our 
assistance.  Undoubtedly, with the donation of nearly 20 drug 
detection kits, we would expect over the next year to have higher 
(or at least more frequent) drug seizures.  The Costa Ricans see 
Merida as vital, but want higher amounts of funding.  They believe 
that just because the situation in Costa Rica is not as bad as, for 
example Guatemala, it does not mean that they should receive less 
assistance. 
 
 
 
Costa Rica does seem to have responded with further commitments of 
funding for security, with the FY10 proposal by the Ministry of 
Finance to increase security funding by 27 percent.  They have been 
recruiting and training officers to try and bolster the amount of 
uniformed cops on the street, but are barely maintaining the status 
quo of 10,000 due to retirements, firings, etc.  Recently, Post 
approved an export control check ("Blue Lantern") of MPS order of 
350 9mm pistols to better equip their police, which was fully 
funded by the Costa Rican government. 
 
 
 
As to specific Merida-related equipment resource requests, the 
Costa Ricans would like to acquire at least three newer patrol 
boats in the 80-110 foot range to replace the aging 82-footers that 
we are currently in the process of repairing.  They will need to 
eventually replace these 82-footers, but the first year of Merida 
maritime funding should extend their life by about five years. 
They have also requested the modernization of their Air Wing with 
newer aircraft, such as 1-2 Cessna Caravans, and between 2-4 
helicopters such as the Bell L4. 
 
 
 
Other Merida-related specific requests by the Costa Ricans: 
 
 
 
-Police professionalization training for approximately 200 of their 
mid-level managers.  Chief of Police Erick Lacayo specifically 
mentioned the training that the Miami-Boston Group has done in 
Panama as an example of what he wants in Costa Rica.  This is 
something we definitely support and we estimate would cost around 
$400K a year; we should maintain it for 2-4 years and it should 
qualify for Merida 2.0. 
 
 
 
-Costa Rica recently initiated a community policing program.  They 
requested assistance in this program, which could be included in a 
police professionalization program, as well as assistance in police 
patrolling techniques. 
 
-Costa Rica needs a new police academy.  The current facility is 
inadequate and not large enough to train incoming recruits, forcing 
them to spread the academy regionally in 6-7 areas.  This causes 
problems in standardization of training as well as transportation 
costs.  Additionally, the police academy curriculum needs to be 
thoroughly reviewed. 
 
 
 
-They would like to "reconstruct" their police academy field 
training facility at Murcielago (it would be an extension of their 
police academy), located in the northwest of Costa Rica, and 
continue to receive U.S. SF training (7th Group) there.  They would 
like Murcielago to become a regional field training facility for 
other Central American countries to eventually use. 
 
 
 
- MPS asked for help to secure their southern border at Sixaola, on 
the Caribbean side of Costa Rica on the border with Panama.  They 
need better infrastructure there, such as an inspection building, 
and border inspection equipment (equipment we will donate, but 
there is not adequate infrastructure for inspections or securing 
the equipment).  In general, they requested assistance for the 
strengthening, training, and equipping of their border police. 
 
 
 
-They requested prevention programs for arms trafficking, 
trafficking in persons, and gangs. 
 
 
 
-They would like to install FLIR (Forward-looking Infra-red Radar) 
on three of their Air Wing aircraft.  Additionally, they would like 
to re-configure the cockpits of several of their aircraft so that 
they can be night-vision capable. 
 
 
 
-K-9 support.  They would like more dogs, especially trained in 
drug detection, explosives, cadaver dogs, etc. 
 
 
 
-IBIS-type forensic ballistic tools for investigations. 
 
 
 
III. SWOTs Summary-Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Th reats: 
 
 
 
-Strengths: 
 
The GOCR clearly sees the need for increased security and answered 
with the request for 27 percent more in law enforcement spending. 
After a bruising political battle on passing CAFTA-related trade 
laws, the Costa Rican National Assembly went back to work and 
passed several important pieces of security reform legislation over 
the past year.  This included a new anti-organized crime law, 
immigration reform, strengthening of a law on terrorist financing, 
protection of witness and victims law, and others.  See 09 San Jose 
715 for more information on these new laws.  Other legislation 
currently under consideration in the GOCR's National Assembly 
includes instituting a regulatory and tax regime for casinos and 
gambling as well as a bill that limits the amount of fuel that 
vessels may carry, especially for fishing vessels that often 
re-supply drug-running go-fasts. 
 
 
 
Costa Rica also receives foreign assistance from other countries; 
Post coordinates with these other embassies via a regularly 
scheduled "Mini-Dublin" donors meeting.  For example, Costa Rica 
received 200 police patrol cars as a donation from China in late 
2008/early 2009.  While the reliability of these vehicles is still 
unknown (they are a licensed copy of Mazda vehicles), they do 
represent an increase in ability by the MPS. 
 
The MPS also initiated several new security strategies in 2009, 
included among them were a new community policing program, 
attempting to develop a national security policy (currently in the 
GOCR interagency clearance process), and several special strategies 
to combat crime.  These special strategies include an increased 
police presence in the province of Limon, long known for narcotics 
smuggling activity as well as the highest murder rate in the 
country.  The latest initiative in Limon, known as "Operation 
Limon: Sea, Air, and Land," yielded significant results.  According 
to GOCR sources, an additional 130 uniformed police have been 
stationed in Limon in nine new police stations.  MPS also provided 
the police there with new patrol cars, motorcycles, boats, and 
buses.  As a result of this effort, the homicide rate in Limon, 
which has been the highest in recent years, saw a dramatic 
reduction this summer. 
 
 
 
The MPS has increased the length of police recruit training from 
three to six months.  Also, by December 2009, MPS will have 
installed a Closed Circuit TV system with 300 cameras in the San 
Jose area to target criminal activities and transmit intelligence 
information in real time.  MPS continued its effective cooperation 
with the USG to interdict narcotics and to combat crack cocaine 
consumption in Costa Rica. The Ministry, with USG assistance, is 
continuing a container inspection program at the Caribbean port of 
Limon. The UNODC signed an agreement with the GOCR to establish a 
container intelligence program that should complement our container 
inspection program. 
 
 
 
While resources are still insufficient, the government also makes 
good faith efforts to invest in education and poverty reduction 
programs, which can help attack the root causes of crime. 
 
 
 
While Costa Rica struggles to stem the flow of drugs across its 
borders, especially in the porous area in the south with Panama 
(specifically in Paso Canoas and in Sixaola), the job that Costa 
Rica is doing to seize illegal contraband cannot be underestimated. 
 
 
 
 
As of mid-October 2009, Costa Rican authorities had seized 14.7 
metric tons (MT) of cocaine, of which 8.6 MT were seized on land or 
air and 6.1 MT were seized in national and/or joint maritime 
interdiction operations with U.S. law enforcement. The GOCR also 
seized over 175,805 doses of crack cocaine, 10 kg of heroin, nearly 
700 kilograms of processed marijuana, and eradicated over 600,000 
marijuana plants.  They also seized 268 doses of ecstasy and 34 kgs 
of ephedrine.  Additionally, Costa Rican authorities confiscated 
more than $1.4 million in U.S. and local currency.  The more than 
52,000 drug-related arrests made in 2009 represent a raw increase 
of 17,000 arrests (or 33 percent higher) over 2008.  However, there 
remains a significant prosecution backlog. 
 
 
 
 
 
                -Weaknesses: 
 
 
 
Some senior officials in the current government, including the 
Minister of Public Security when she first took office, downplayed 
the seriousness of the public security situation here.  The current 
justice system tends to favor social engineering over strong law 
enforcement initiatives as an antidote to crime.  For example, 
instead of punishing a drug dealer by putting him in jail, Costa 
Rica would rather build a drug rehabilitation clinic.  While 
rehabilitation clinics are excellent, you still have the drug 
dealer on the street.  In reference to the example of the drug gang 
that killed an OIJ agent recently (as noted in para 4 above), the 
first reaction of the MPS was to suspend the purchase of firearms 
by foreigners rather than seek out criminals who illegally 
trafficked weapons into the country.  The low conviction rate and 
increasing incidents of crime show few results from this "soft on 
crime" policy.  Certainly the "soft" approach to combat poverty and 
 
addictions is very important, but cannot work without tough 
enforcement of criminal laws. 
 
 
 
The Costa Rican Coast Guard is generally weak on maintenance 
issues.  For example, there is no implemented maintenance or 
inventory system that has resulted in equipment failure or loss. 
However, with SOUTHCOM funding, the USG is funding the construction 
of a new coast guard station in the Pacific port of Caldera.  This 
facility will include a maintenance center.  Additionally, we have 
had several Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) conduct maintenance 
training.  Continued MTTs for maintenance and subject matter 
exchanges will help address this concern.  Additional weaknesses in 
their coast guard include the lack of qualified operations officers 
to conduct maritime missions and low pay with a high cost of 
living.  Affecting all police forces, low pay can provide an 
environment of corruption. 
 
 
 
Among the various police forces, the national uniformed police 
(Fuerza Publica) are considered to be the least effective and most 
corrupt.  Improving the quality and performance of this force is 
essential in order for the government to have a significant impact 
in reducing crime.  One of the fundamental problems with the 
uniformed police is their minimal selection criteria for 
applicants, thus, people with inadequate skills and inappropriate 
backgrounds are hired.  The difficulty in firing police officers, 
unless they are clearly linked to corruption or narco-trafficking, 
exacerbates the problem.  Addressing these two problems requires an 
investment of money (e.g., for technical assistance in developing 
selection criteria, part of a police professionalization program) 
combined with a more significant investment of political capital. 
 
 
 
Along with narcotics smuggling, Costa Rica faces an increase in use 
of its territorial waters for alien smuggling.  Two groups of 
illegal migrants were apprehended in the last quarter of FY 2009. 
Both groups were apparently organized in South Africa and 
transported to Colombian waters by ship, then offloaded into 
smaller boats for the trip north via the Caribbean coast of Central 
America.  In addition, local immigration officials are pursuing 
evidence that passengers transiting San Jose's international 
airport are obtaining false documents from U.S.-based smugglers who 
arrange document switches in the international departure lounge, 
thus avoiding scrutiny by immigration authorities. 
 
 
 
Despite new, stronger legislation in 2009, Costa Rica's legal 
framework is still too open to money laundering.  We submitted a 
proposal requesting the launch of a Department of Treasury 
financial enforcement program-and placement of a resident advisor 
in-country supported by Merida funds. 
 
 
 
Although it is difficult to obtain exact prosecution rates, the 
justice system seems to be overwhelmed and is not convicting 
criminals as it should be.  The Public Ministry (which includes the 
Office of the Attorney General) could do a better job in putting 
criminals behind bars.  According to statistics that we have 
received from various sources, including a former Minister of 
Public Security, over the past 10 years only 10 percent of filed 
criminal complaints have been resolved (either by conviction or 
other settlement). 
 
 
 
From the initial prison assessment done in late September 2009, it 
is clear that the prisons have reached a state of over-capacity. 
Although in February, 2009 two new modules were added to an 
existing prison in the province of Limon adding 352 new cells, 
nation-wide the jails are at least 3-4 percent over-capacity. 
Despite the aforementioned weakness in the Public Ministry, due to 
the new laws that were passed in 2009, we expect more criminals to 
go to jail and overcrowding will only get worse.  There are no 
plans to construct any new facilities, only plans to add some 
modules to existing centers. 
 
According to our contacts in MPS, the GOCR is currently engaged in 
an internal interagency clearance of a national security plan. 
However, we suspect that it will not be sufficient to handle the 
security challenges that Costa Rica faces.  In addition, there will 
be a change of government in May of next year (2010) after February 
elections, which could produce a further delay in a cohesive and 
clear national security plan. 
 
 
 
-Opportunities: 
 
 
 
As previously mentioned, Post analysis of Costa Rica's needs to 
address its citizen security issues include: 
 
 
 
-Properly equipping and training the police, but especially the 
uniformed police- this includes police professionalization 
training; and 
 
 
 
-Properly equipping and training the coast guard.  Most drugs that 
enter/flow through Costa Rica or its territorial waters do so on 
its Pacific coast.  As previously mentioned, some drugs enter Costa 
Rica as payment for services provided; these drugs remain here and 
are a root cause for the national crack cocaine epidemic.  A 
well-equipped coast guard not only helps interdict drugs moving 
north, but helps limit the amount of drugs on the streets in Costa 
Rica. 
 
 
 
-Although there already exists an INL-funded inspection facility at 
the Penas Blancas border crossing point with Nicaragua, the 
importance of that area as a natural chokepoint cannot be 
overemphasized.  Most security experts, both official and 
non-government, agree that Penas Blancas is the most important 
border crossing point in Central America to intercept drugs flowing 
north and weapons and cash flowing south.  Strengthening this 
border crossing area is vital to combating narco-trafficking and 
other illegal contraband.  Even the narco-traffickers seem to 
indicate that it is the toughest point to cross in Central America. 
Within the last year, the PCD captured documents from a drug 
smuggler indicating what to do as he progressed north from Colombia 
with his cargo; when it came to Penas Blancas, the instructions 
simply read "go with God" and wished him luck.  This border 
crossing area represents the last best chance to intercept drugs 
and other contraband before the U.S.-Mexican border. 
 
 
 
To ensure the success of our assistance, Post advocates a 
sustained, continued investment in assisting Costa Rica until at 
least 2015-2020.  Examples of and recommended funding amounts for 
these "Merida 2.0" programs are as follows and are INCLE funds 
unless otherwise noted.  These recommendations depend upon the full 
funding of Merida "1.0" for the first three years, FY2008-2010: 
 
 
 
-Continue police equipment support to Costa Rica at a rate of 
$500,000 a year, starting in FY-2011 until 2013 and then $100,000 a 
year until FY2020.  This includes equipment for both MPS and OIJ 
units; 
 
 
 
-Continue police professionalization program at a rate of $400,000 
a year from FY2011-2013 Funding should start in FY09 Merida at 
$400K and be continued in FY10 Merida at $400K.  Funding should be 
$200K a year for FY14-15; 
 
 
 
-Coast Guard maintenance support.  We will continue to need to 
support maintenance for the Costa Rican Coast Guard's (SNGC) 
smaller patrol boats, including past INL-purchased boats.  These 
INCLE funds, different than FMF's funds for Merida-purchased boats, 
 
are critical for keeping the SNGC operating in their littoral 
waters, where the majority of drug-running go-fasts operate in the 
Eastern Pacific along Costa Rican's coastline.  Post anticipates 
funding for this program should be $200K a year from FY2011-2015. 
We should hire a Personal Service Contractor (PSC) to assist in 
maritime maintenance.  Additionally, Post understands that SOUTHCOM 
may be able to provide a "Caribbean support tender," basically a 
U.S. maritime vessel that travels throughout the Caribbean 
providing spare parts and maintenance support to nations in this 
area.  Costa Rica's coast guard certainly needs this kind of 
support. 
 
 
 
-The judicial police (OIJ) need continued training opportunities 
that have begun under current Merida funding.  This includes 
evidence handling training, advanced tactical training, management, 
etc.  Funding should be at $400K a year from FY2011-2013 and then 
at $200K a year until FY2015. 
 
 
 
-With FMF funding: Maritime regional interdiction/Enhancement of 
Costa Rica's capability to conduct, WMD interdiction, and CT 
operations: $1.790 million fully funded.  For $790K, we envision 
the funds to be spent as follows:  $100K for Enduring Friendship 
sustainment, $250K for Hughes 500D maintenance support, $250K for 
major maintenance support to SNGC patrol boats (82 footers), $70K 
for flight crew safety equipment, $20K for ammunition 9mm/.556, and 
$100K for support of patrol and smaller boats.  The remaining $1 
million goes for additional SAFE boats.  Post envisions these 
programs being funded from FY2011-2014. 
 
 
 
Full funding of Program and Development Support (PD&S) is required 
to run these programs.  We estimate that PD&S funds should be, at a 
minimum, $200,000 a year. 
 
 
 
Finally, the beginning of a new Costa Rican administration in May 
2010 (after February 2010 national elections) presents an 
opportunity, as all of the leading candidates have identified 
improving public security as a top priority. The frontrunner has 
said that, should she win, she would request further USG security 
assistance.  The current government fully supports improving police 
training as do the leading presidential candidates.  The government 
could benefit from USG expertise in this area. 
 
 
 
                -Threats: 
 
 
 
The main threats to Costa Rican security are Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) and the ever-growing and more violent 
criminality caused by drug trafficking.  Although not all crimes 
are derived from drugs or drug proceeds, Post estimates that most 
crimes have a drug-connection.  Both the northern and southern 
borders are relatively "easy" to pass through, but the most porous 
area is clearly the southern border with Panama, especially in the 
Paso Canoas area.  It is in this area, as well as the landing zones 
that go-fast boats use to land drugs on Costa Rica's Pacific coast, 
that Costa Rican security organizations have the least impact on 
illegal contraband movement.  At the northern border of Pe????as 
Blancas, there is more control and an INL-built inspection station 
that assists in drug detection activities; no such facility exists 
on the southern border.  Another location on the southern border 
with Panama that is worrisome to the Costa Ricans is the relative 
ease of crossing the border on the Caribbean side nea