VZCZCXRO1125
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYN #2079/01 3220603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 180603Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3223
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0185
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0368

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002079 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PROP YM
SUBJECT: HIZBALLAH AND THE HOUTHIS: DIFFERENT GOALS AND 
IDEOLOGY 
 
REF: SANAA 1995 
 
SANAA 00002079  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  In their ongoing pursuit of Western support 
for their struggle against the Houthis, ROYG officials have 
latched onto recent, unsubstantiated media claims of 
Hizballah cooperation with the Houthis in Sa'ada in order to 
bolster their argument that the Houthis are a terrorist 
organization.  However, such arguments ignore the cultural 
and ideological differences between Hizballah and the Houthi 
rebels and, thus, the unlikelihood that they would work 
together.  Furthermore, the Houthis could more accurately be 
characterized as a movement with religious undertones and 
politically addressable grievances rather than a radical, 
religiously motivated sect with which the ROYG cannot 
negotiate.  Even their demands for greater religious freedom 
could be addressed through political means.  While the 
possibility remains that practical reasons could trump 
ideological differences, especially in light of recent 
regionalization of the conflict, no solid evidence has been 
shown of Hizballah activity in Sa'ada or of any desire on the 
part of the Houthis for such a partnership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) As tensions continue to rise in the Sa'ada conflict 
between ROYG forces and the Houthis, ROYG officials and 
government-owned media, with an eye towards securing Western 
support, have ramped up statements asserting that the Houthis 
have joined forces with Hizballah (reftel).  Claiming that 
the Houthis and Hizballah share a common ideology and goals, 
the ROYG argues that the USG should view the Houthis as a 
terrorist organization on par with Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP).  However, considering the ideological and 
political differences between the Houthis and Hizballah, such 
broad generalizations lack factual foundations. 
 
WHO ARE THE HOUTHIS? 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Houthis, springing from a more moderate Zaydi 
Shi'a tradition, are characterized by a greater loyalty to 
the Zaydi tribe rather than to the broader Shi'a religion, 
and attract members based on political beliefs and grievances 
held by the community in which they have historically lived. 
Hizballah is a radical Shi'a group which has committed 
terrorist acts.  When questioned about the ideological 
affinities between the Houthis and Hizballah, Majid al-Fahed, 
a well-connected Sa'ada local and director of Yemeni NGO 
Civic Democratic Foundation, said they each represent 
completely different strands of the Shi'a faith.  Fahed added 
that the Houthis are more inspired by political grievances 
than by religious differences with the central government. 
This evaluation of the Houthi movement has been echoed 
repeatedly by other Sa'ada locals, including during 
discussions PolOff held on September 2 with Sa'ada tribesmen, 
who characterized the Houthis as a "social and political 
movement" rather than a religiously or ideologically 
motivated movement.  According to Abdullah al-Muaid, Sa'ada 
local and Ministry of Local Administration official, the 
Houthis' primary goal is "convincing the central government 
to give more authority to the local levels...but not actual 
independence from Yemen." 
 
¶4.  (C) Members of the ROYG, however, continue to 
characterize the Houthis as a radical Shi'a group that takes 
issue with the government for sectarian reasons rather than 
for legitimate political grievances and, as such, finds a 
logical ideological partner in Hizballah.  Ministry of 
Defense Chief of Staff Major General Ahmed al-Ashwal told 
PolOff on September 14 that the Houthis "are the same as 
Iran, the same as Hizballah; they share the same doctrine and 
ideology."  Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi told the 
Ambassador on September 7 that the Houthis clearly were not 
fighting for political grievances as they had failed to 
delineate what they want from the ROYG, but were instead 
fighting for a vague and radical ideology.  (NOTE.  The 
Houthis have issued a number of statements listing their 
grievances, which include adherence to a previously 
negotiated Doha agreement and the payment of promised 
reconstruction funds to Sa'ada inhabitants for damage 
inflicted by ROYG forces during previous rounds of fighting. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶5.  (C) When questioned about the source of the Houthis' 
ideology,  Deputy Foreign Minister Muhi al-Dhabbi told PolOff 
on Oct 17, "These religious extremes (Houthis and AQAP) are 
new in Yemen.  We have a very moderate religious tradition. 
 
SANAA 00002079  002 OF 003 
 
 
It,s the Wahhabism from outside that,s created al-Qaeda, 
the twelver Shiism from Lebanon and Iran that has inspired 
the Houthis," explaining that Yemenis traditionally belong to 
either a moderate brand of Zaydi (Shiite) faith, including 
President Saleh, or moderate Shafi (Sunni) faith. (NOTE.  The 
Houthis identify themselves as members of a moderate Zaydi 
Shi'a community historically present in Sa'ada.  END NOTE.) 
Some Arab academics have actually argued the opposite: that 
Zaydi Shiism does not stem from external radicalizing 
influences, but that it is an indigenous political movement. 
A July 2009 article by Abdullah Lux in the academic journal 
Contemporary Arab Affairs concludes, through numerous 
interviews with Houthi leaders and analysis of statements 
from Abdul Malik al-Houthi, that the Zaydi discourse 
connected to the Houthi movement is actually distinct from 
the Twelver Shiism practiced in Iran and among Lebanese 
Hizballah members and that there is a "lack of evidence of 
direct support (to the Houthis) by either Hizballah or Iran." 
 
HOUTHIS AND HIZBALLAH: DIFFERENT SHI'A STRAINS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶6.  (C) Zaydi Shiism departs from the Shiism practiced in 
Lebanon, where Hizballah has drawn many of its supporters, in 
a number of significant areas.  Most notably, Zaydis do not 
recognize the legitimacy of the last 7 of the 12 historic 
imams of mainstream Shiism prominent in Lebanon.  Instead, 
the Zaydis recognize only the first 5 imams and then follow a 
line of succession they can trace down to their very own 
tribe, which culminated in the last Zaydi imam to rule Sana'a 
until the republican coup of 1962.  ROYG officials have often 
used this fact to argue that the Houthis desire an overthrow 
of the central government and a reinstatement of the Imamate; 
however, the Houthis have never stipulated such a desire. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Houthis have, however, demanded greater autonomy 
in the religious texts used and the religious teachings 
presented in their schools.  The Ministry of Religious 
Endowments has centralized control over curriculum, requiring 
all schools to teach one version of national religious 
education.  While the ROYG has paid lip-service to religious 
freedom, as guaranteed in the constitution, there have been 
increased restrictions on religious expression as the 
conflict in Sa'ada has worsened.  There are known cases of 
Zaydi Shi'a imams being removed and replaced with Sunni imams 
in northern mosques, and the ROYG continues to refuse license 
requests from Zaydi schools.  Among their list of political 
grievances, the Houthis have stipulated greater religious 
freedom as a requirement for peace; but this is one among 
many purely political objections to the ROYG and one that 
could be addressed through political means under the 
constitution.  Ultimately, the religious underpinnings of the 
Houthis have less to do with the movement than does the 
weakness of the central government in the north and the 
refusal of the ROYG to address grievances long-held by the 
inhabitants of northern governorates. 
 
HIZBALLAH FOUNDATIONS POINT TO IRAN 
---------------------------------- 
¶8.  (C) While the Houthis have never expressed regional 
ambitions, limiting their political goals to Yemen, Hizballah 
has openly used both Lebanon and Syria as staging grounds for 
anti-Israel offensives and has received substantial support 
from Iran for its activities.  Hizballah was founded in 
response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during the 
Lebanese civil war in 1982.  According to Adam Shatz's 
influential 2004 article on Hizballah's founding, its leaders 
were inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini and its militia members 
were trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  Iran has 
continued to provide Hizballah with funds and weapons, 
including Katyusha rockets, which have been fired at Israeli 
targets on numerous occasions.  U.S. media and UN reports 
from as early as 2002 have documented Iran's material and 
training support for Hizballah, with some estimates as high 
as USD 50-60 million annually. 
 
¶9.  (C) Leaving potential religious differences aside, 
speculation remains that the Houthi-Hizballah partnership may 
be advantageous from a logistical perspective.  On October 6, 
Faris al-Saqqaf, director of the local think tank Center for 
Future Studies and confidante of President Saleh's son Ahmed 
Ali, told PolOff, "It is easy for Yemenis to travel to 
Damascus; they don,t even need a visa.  From there, the 
Houthis go to Lebanon for Hizballah training, this is for 
sure.  Maybe they even go to Iran, but definitely to 
Lebanon."  Hizballah, which is reportedly seeking 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to use against Israeli 
aircraft, could be seeking training opportunities with 
 
SANAA 00002079  003 OF 003 
 
 
anti-aircraft artillery in northern Yemen where they could 
avoid detection and the severe retaliation they would face in 
Lebanon if the Israelis discovered their operations.  Adam 
Shatz, Hizballah analyst and literary editor of The Nation, 
has noted that Iran's former foreign minister, Kamal Kharazi, 
urged Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah's leader, to refrain from 
activities that may give Israel an excuse to invade Lebanon. 
On the other hand, Fahed points out the unlikelihood that the 
Houthis would agree to such influence from Hizballah, 
pointing to their fierce independence: "The Houthis would not 
accept the outside influence of Hizballah.  Tribes don't even 
want to be influenced by the central government or other 
tribes in Yemen." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶10.  (C) ROYG officials have repeatedly attempted to convince 
the USG to classify the Houthi rebels as a terrorist 
organization, first by alleging AQAP connections, then 
ambiguous "Iranian influence," and now by claiming Hizballah 
collaboration.  Although we cannot exclude that Hizballah may 
desire joint training with the Houthis for logistical 
reasons, a Hizballah-Houthi alliance remains unlikely due to 
deep-seated cultural and ideological differences and the lack 
of international ambitions on the part of the Houthis. 
Furthermore, no solid evidence has been shown of Hizballah 
activity in Sa'ada. The Houthis have never mentioned any 
partnership with Hizballah, perhaps recognizing that evidence 
of such an alliance would substantiate the ROYG's argument 
that the Houthis are part of an international terrorist 
network.  END COMMENT. 
SECHE