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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT LOUIS 000378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PM/SNA, L 
AF/E FOR MARIA BEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV MP SE
SUBJECT: MAURITIUS SOFA DISCUSSION: SMALL STEPS 
 
REF: A. PORT LOUIS 313 
     ¶B. PORT LOUIS 366 
 
Classified By: CDA R. Barrie Walkley, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1. (C) This is an action message. Please see para 10 below. 
 
¶2. SUMMARY: On November 17, in a meeting arranged at the 
Prime Minister's request, Embassy officials met with the 
Mauritian Foreign Minister and officials from his ministry, 
the Prime Minister's office, and the State Law Office.  The 
GOM officials raised a series of concerns regarding the 
boilerplate SOFA text, which they have had for circa one 
year.  Emboffs answered objections and stressed the benefits 
of a SOFA in an insecure world.  The Foreign Minister noted 
his government's willingness to dialogue with the USG on 
signing a SOFA, while the assembled group had a series of 
questions and requests to aid the GOM consideration of the 
proposed language. Post requests Africa Command assistance in 
the next phase of discussions with GOM. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) On November 17, a meeting took place between Emboffs 
and an ad hoc committee led by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Arvin Boolell to discuss steps forward on a possible Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. Government and 
the Government of Mauritius (GOM).  The Embassy team was led 
by Charge d'Affaires (CDA) Virginia Blaser, while the 
Minister was accompanied by Mrs. Doreen Fong-Weng Poorun, the 
acting Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office, 
Aruna Narain of the State Law Office, and several officials 
from the MFA.  After a previous series of meetings seemed to 
lead to little progress (ref A), this meeting was called at 
the invitation of the ForMin after the Charge's recent 
meeting with the PM (ref B). 
 
¶4. (C) The ForMin noted in opening the meeting that there 
were "sensitive, difficult issues" that, if sorted out, would 
allow a SOFA to be signed, emphasizing that a SOFA would have 
to be in accord with "existing legislation" in Mauritius.  He 
noted with a smile that signing a SOFA would have to be 
handled so as not to "send signals of a 'big U.S. military 
buildup in the region.'" 
 
¶5. (C) Mrs. Fong-Weng Poorun of the PM's office listed points 
for discussion, either noting difficulties or requesting 
clarification: 
 
(1) The granting of "privileges and immunities" to military 
personnel, which is not normal Mauritian practice. 
(2) Examples were requested of "mutually agreed activities." 
(Note: these were provided by Embassy team and this point 
seemed addressed by the end of the meeting.) 
(3) The carrying of arms is "very sensitive," as it is "not 
in accord with local law or practice" for non-citizens to 
bear arms in Mauritius. Would it be possible to see what 
other countries, with similar laws, had in their USG-host 
nation SOFAs? 
(4) The USG exercise of "criminal jurisdiction of United 
States personnel while in Mauritius" could be problematic. 
(5) The authorization to "wear uniforms while performing 
official duties" needed to be explained. (Note: Emboffs made 
this explanation and host nation appeared satisfied.) 
(6) Clarification was requested on whether the US would give 
notice that any of its visiting ships would be carrying 
nuclear weapons, or would be nuclear powered. (Note: Embassy 
noted that current USG-Mauritius forms and declarations would 
not change under a SOFA.  GOM counterparts seemed to accept 
this and consider the question resolved.) 
 
 
¶6. (C) An additional point was later raised by Mrs. Narain. 
Due to Mauritian sensitivities over Diego Garcia and the 
Chagos Archipelago, she said, the GOM could not consider 
entering into a SOFA without understanding how the U.S. SOFA 
with the UK refers to that disputed territory.  She asked for 
a copy of the agreement with the UK.  The FoRmin agreed that 
the GOM would like to see a copy of the agreement, noting the 
sensitivities surrounding the UK proposal, recently in the 
news, for a protected marine park in the Chagos Archipelago. 
He asked for a copy of the latest SOFA agreement with the 
Seychelles as well, and "others, if possible."  Charge noted 
that the Seychelles agreement was, in essence, nearly 
identical to the boilerplate proposal made to Mauritius the 
previous year. 
 
¶7. (C) When Mrs. Narain was told that the strict nature of 
the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) should 
assuage Mauritian concerns about allowing the U.S. to 
prosecute U.S. military personnel over offenses committed in 
Mauritian territory, she noted a possible counter-proposal to 
the draft SOFA language, stating that instead Mauritius might 
be able to accept language that would allow the GOM to make a 
choice, such that the Mauritian "Department of Public 
Prosecution would retain the right to prosecute in Mauritian 
courts."  She called this "a parallel mechanism." 
¶8. (C) Emboffs led by the CDA explained carefully that a SOFA 
would not involve a loss of sovereignty for the GOM any more 
than it did for the 100 plus countries which have such 
agreements with the U.S.  Emboffs explained the issues on 
which the Mauritian officials were unclear.  Among other 
points, Emboffs emphasized the severity of the UCMJ, and 
stressed the importance of a SOFA in the context of the 
creation of Africa Command and the increasing security 
threats in the region.  The middle of a crisis, the CDA 
noted, was not the best time to negotiate a SOFA.  The CDA 
asked for a counterproposal from the GOM, but Mrs. Narain 
said the time was not ripe for a formal GOM counterproposal, 
as GOM would like to understand the SOFA and SOFA options 
better; she recommended a SOFA team come to Mauritius for 
direct discussions on points raised. 
 
-------------------------- 
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) While the PM appears positive about a SOFA in person, 
his office appears to have concerns that are difficult for 
the Embassy team to assuage.  The same is true for the State 
Law Office.  This provides cover for the ForMin, whose 
biggest concern seemed to be how such an agreement would play 
out politically in the context of the Mauritian claim on the 
Chagos Archipelago and on upcoming elections, due to be 
declared for sometime between December and July..  Perhaps 
the biggest issue is simply inertia in an election year: as 
long as the GOM sees the threat of piracy as a Seychellois 
and African coast problem, overcoming GOM concerns with a 
proposed SOFA will take focused effort from DOS and DOD 
stakeholders. 
 
¶10. (C) Given recent success in gaining a SOFA with 
Seychelles, Post considers it worth a focused effort to see 
if we can collectively move forward on a Mauritius SOFA as 
well.  Post believes the next step would be to take up the 
GOM's request/offer for a face-to-face informational exchange 
with SOFA experts.  If possible, Post requests the same 
Africa Command team that worked our Seychelles SOFA efforts 
to also visit Post to assist with GOM discussions. At that 
time, we could also provide any cleared SOFA examples from 
other countries, per GOM request.  At the conclusion of these 
discussions, the collective USG stakeholders could determine 
whether future efforts on a Mauritian SOFA continue to merit 
the effort/resources, and, if so, determine forward plans to 
see a SOFA to conclusion. 
WALKLEY