VZCZCXRO8958
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHPL #0366/01 3201142
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161142Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4832
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0370
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0190

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT LOUIS 000366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MP
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S QUARTERLY CALL ON MAURITIAN PRIME 
MINISTER RAMGOOLAM 
 
REF: PORT LOUIS 066 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Virginia M. Blaser for reasons 1.4 (b 
and d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 11, Charge d'Affaires (CDA) 
enjoyed a cordial one and a half hour meeting with Mauritian 
Prime Minister Ramgoolam to discuss a variety of issues, 
including the PM's position on counter-piracy cooperation, 
peacekeeping deployments, the pending Status of Forces 
Agreement between the US and the GOM, the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Madagascar, lagging administrative 
and diplomatic reciprocity issues, and the overall 
US/Mauritius bilateral relationship.  Charge noted that 
long-standing, unresolved issues between the two countries 
did not appear to properly represent the positive relations 
we shared.  The PM concurred and agreed to move forward with 
more positive action on our requests, and to insist his 
ministers do the same. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
THE PM OPENS WITH IRE ABOUT CHAGOS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) After opening pleasantries, PM Ramgoolam started the 
meeting voicing his frustration over the UK handling of the 
announcement regarding the proposed Marine Protected Area in 
the Chagos Archipelago.  The PM said that his government had 
been given very little time to review the proposed 
announcement and plan, noting that the first news he had was 
a phone call from British Foreign Secretary David Miliband a 
few days prior.  The PM had to drop a number of high priority 
issues (such as review of the upcoming GOM budget) to quickly 
review the proposal and make a few adjustments. Although he 
was pleased that HMG accepted input and changes made by the 
GOM, he felt inappropriately rushed. Ramgoolam speculated 
that the idea of the Marine Protected Area was one that 
Miliband was pushing either for UK election purposes or, more 
likely in the PM's view, to place Miliband in a strong 
position to leverage for a senior EU spot.  The PM finished 
by saying that the GOM does not support this plan or the way 
it has been rolled out. 
 
-------------------------- 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In preparation for the incoming Ambassador, CDA 
noted, she had spent a good bit of time reviewing our 
"record" with Mauritius, and had been surprised by how many 
issues remain outstanding and/or were resolved without 
agreement between the US and Mauritius.  The relationship 
between the two countries is positive and strong, which is 
why having long-standing, unresolved issues on the table 
seems to undermine the true spirit of the bilateral 
relationship our two countries enjoy, she explained.  The PM 
invited CDA to provide examples of such issues, and the two 
discussed positive ways forward on points raised below. 
 
-------------------------- 
COUNTER-PIRACY COOPERATION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) CDA asked the PM for his thoughts on the role his 
country could or would play regarding counter-piracy efforts 
in the Indian Ocean region.  The PM noted his country's 
reluctance to get involved in piracy trials, and specifically 
noted that the MFA and State Law Office were disinclined to 
support any GOM involvement at this time.  CDA pointed out 
that many meetings among a variety of partners, to include 
the UK, French, EU, and UNODC, with his government had taken 
place over the past several months. Stakeholders felt that at 
this stage it would be useful for the Prime Minister to hear 
directly from the UNODC on the issue of counter-piracy 
cooperation and, more specifically, the manner in which 
piracy trials and infrastructure support for such trials 
could be supported via the UN.  The PM agreed to meet with 
UNODC representatives the first week in December.  (NOTE: CDA 
subsequently spoke to the UKHC, who noted that while the 
French Ambassador as sitting EU chair would be best placed to 
arrange that meeting, the French Ambassador declined to do so 
until he had "specific orders" from Brussels. In light of 
this unwillingness, the UK agreed to take the lead to set up 
the UNODC briefing on point.) 
 
--------------------- 
RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO 
--------------------- 
 
PORT LOUIS 00000366  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) CDA noted that the message the USG received from the 
GOM on Kosovo recognition has been very mixed, from an 
outright "no" delivered repeatedly by the MFA to the 
unsolicited June 2009 phone call to CDA from the PM in which 
he said he would recognize Kosovo in July despite his MFA's 
strong urgings to the contrary.  After the PM's statement 
that he would trump the MFA decision, no recognition 
announcement was ever made, and CDA wondered about GOM's 
current plans.  The PM acknowledged his call and decision to 
recognize Kosovo, but said action by him then was delayed due 
to extreme pressure put on him by the MFA career diplomats 
(such as Secretary of Foreign Affairs Neewoor) who strongly 
feel that recognizing Kosovo undermines the GOM position on 
the Chagos Archipelago.  CDA requested the PM to reconsider 
the GOM's position on recognition of Kosovo. 
 
--------------------------- 
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The GOM has had a draft SOFA for review for over a 
year, the CDA noted. Based on earlier discussions among 
visiting Africa Command General Kip Ward, the PM, and the 
CDA, it had been the USG's impression that the GOM was 
interested in pursuing a SOFA with the United States. 
Subsequent to that meeting, however, a number of diplomatic 
notes from the MFA indicated a hardline unwillingness even to 
discuss a SOFA.  CDA remarked upon what appeared again to be 
a reversal of the GOM stance on such an agreement.  The PM 
said that he supported positive discussions toward a SOFA and 
that he would speak to the Foreign Minister to ensure that 
the GOM tone and stance on discussions changed immediately. 
(NOTE: In a meeting the following day between CDA and the 
ForMin, the ForMin noted he had received a call from the PM 
who told him to change "the impression the USG has on such 
points." The ForMin scheduled a meeting the following week 
with all SOFA stakeholders with the idea of opening up more 
pleasant and productive discussions with the US on that 
point. More SEPTEL.)  CDA thanked the PM for being willing to 
open up discussions again and for his personal support of US 
military activities in Mauritius and the region. 
 
------------------- 
POLICE PEACEKEEPERS 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The PM and CDA discussed ways in which Mauritius can 
demonstrate leadership in the region, and agreed that the 
long awaited Mauritian police peacekeepers are a positive 
step in this direction. CDA asked for an update on where and 
when Mauritians would contribute in this fashion, noting that 
it had been some months since the Embassy received 
information that the peacekeepers were "a go."  The PM 
expressed surprise that nothing had been done since that 
time, and agreed to follow up with his security and police 
leadership to press them for final decisions on the 
deployment. 
 
------------------- 
AGOA AND MADAGASCAR 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) With regard to the Mauritian position on Madagascar's 
possible loss of AGOA entitlement, CDA noted that the USG had 
not officially heard from the GOM on its position.  She urged 
the PM to ensure that the GOM voice was heard in the review 
of AGOA.  Subsequent to the meeting with the PM, the Embassy 
received a diplomatic note and letter from the Foreign 
Minister to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce which pushed for 
U.S. continuation of AGOA for Madagascar.  The letter 
underscores the GOM alignment with the AU position on the 
need to restore "constitutional legality" in Madagascar, 
adding that the loss of AGOA eligibility for Madagascar would 
undermine efforts at reconciliation. Furthermore, investment 
from Mauritius in the Malagasy textile and apparel section 
comes to circa $27.3 million and Mauritian companies in 
Madagascar employ 8,000 workers there. (NOTE: Full note to be 
forwarded to AF/EX septel. END NOTE.) 
 
---------------------- 
DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Finally, CDA raised the long-standing issue of 
diplomatic reciprocity, noting that despite regulations in 
the Vienna Convention, bilateral agreements with the USG 
(such as on work permits for spouses), and GOM regulations 
 
PORT LOUIS 00000366  003 OF 003 
 
 
and handbooks which actively underscore GOM intentions to 
support foreign missions based on reciprocity, the GOM falls 
well short of its support to the US Embassy in Port Louis 
compared to the reverse in Washington.  From spousal 
employment, to paying taxes on purchases and utilities, to de 
facto high car duties and taxes for imported vehicles, the 
spirit and fact of reciprocity are not being sustained. CDA 
asked for the PM's support in multi-ministry review of 
policies which undermine reciprocity for US diplomats in 
Mauritius.  As this issue is first the role of the protocol 
office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the PM said he 
would speak to the ForMin to ask for quick action on 
responding to these reciprocity problems.  Such a lack of 
support is not, he said, the message he wants the U.S. 
receiving from his government. (NOTE: During CDA's subsequent 
meeting with the ForMin the next day, he agreed to arrange a 
multi-ministry meeting to resolve outstanding problems for 
the Mission.  The meeting date, however, has not yet been 
set. END NOTE.) 
 
------------------------------ 
DELIBERATE UNDERMINING BY MFA? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Never overly foreign affairs focused, the PM is even 
more in "internal affairs" mode due to the upcoming budget 
announcement and pre-election maneuvering in advance of the 
likely Spring 2010 election. Even so, the PM appeared 
genuinely uncomfortable that his government hasn't delivered 
on a good number of bilateral requests from the USG.  He 
blamed, in large part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
particularly the "career diplomats" there who, he alleges, 
may be attempting to deliberately undermine the US/Mauritius 
relationship in order to make the PM "look bad prior to the 
elections."  He told CDA that he believed many of them would 
be "standing with the opposition" during the upcoming 
elections. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C)  Post relations with the PM and key ministers -- 
including the Foreign Minister -- are positive.  Of all the 
ministries with whom we work, however, the MFA tends to be 
the most difficult and least supportive of US requests at the 
below-minister level.  Unfortunately, this means that to move 
a position or even receive a hearing on a position (i.e. in 
the UN or other political issues such as Zimbabwe), Post must 
gain the direct support of the PM.  Without active support 
from the PM, much simply does not get decided, or is not 
decided in our favor. Because of this, Post will continue to 
push for regular meetings between the PM and COM, above and 
beyond courtesy calls and VIP events. To the best of our 
knowledge, the US Embassy is the only mission here to 
organize such quarterly meetings with the PM. 
BLASER