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DE RUCNAI #0005/01 3312203
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O 272203Z NOV 09
FM USDEL SECRETARY//USDEL SECRETARY//ASIA//
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 112705 
 
(Note: the unique message record number (MRN) has been modified. The original MRN was 09 PARTO 000005, which duplicates a previous PARTO telegram number.) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019 
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's November 9, 2009, 
Meeting with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle 
 
¶1.  (U)  Classified by:  Kin Moy, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State.  Reason 1.4.(d). 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  November 9, 2009; 12:30 - 14:00; Berlin, 
Germany. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
Ambassador Philip D. Murphy 
Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon, EUR 
Jeff Hovenier, NSC 
Huma Abedin, S 
Jake Sullivan 
Assistant Secretary P.J. Crowley, PA 
LTG Selva, JCS 
George Glass (Embassy Notetaker) 
 
Germany 
Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister 
Ambassador Wolf-Ruthart Born, State Secretary 
Heiko Thoms, Chief of Staff 
Peter Gottwald, Undersecretary for Security Affairs 
Eberhard Pohl, Political Director, Acting 
Beate Maeder-Metcalf, Director for North American 
Affairs 
 
Andreas Peschke, Press Officer 
Hildegard Bentele, Desk Officer for North America 
 
 
¶4.  (C) SUMMARY:  During a November 9 meeting in Berlin 
to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, new German Foreign Minister Westerwelle 
acknowledged persistent problems of economic development 
in the eastern parts of Germany.  Asked about Turkey in 
the EU, Westerwelle emphasized the importance of not 
closing the door to Turkish EU membership.  He said that 
the EU needed to keep membership as an option in order 
to give Turkey motivation to modernize and keep facing 
the West.  Westerwelle welcomed the Secretary's desire 
for a concrete outcome from Copenhagen, but he was 
concerned about costs, and about getting China and 
developing countries on board.  The Secretary pressed 
Westerwelle on Guantanamo detainees.  Westerwelle 
acknowledged German agreement to look at individual 
cases, but cautioned that acceptance would depend on 
foreign policy consequences.  He noted that the Interior 
Ministry was also critical.  The Secretary and A/S 
Gordon reviewed recent work on energy security for 
Europe.  Westerwelle anticipated a vigorous debate this 
winter, and noted diversification as a key part of the 
new government's energy policy.  The Secretary reviewed 
recent developments on Middle East peace and 
Afghanistan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Lack of Eastern German Development 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (C) The Secretary started the meeting by asking 
about German views 20 years after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  Westerwelle said the polls were very positive. 
However, he noted that unemployment in eastern Germany 
was much higher than in the West.  In addition, he noted 
there was a split between the industrial southern states 
of eastern German and the northern states, which were 
 
 
not very developed at all.  He noted there were still 
lingering issues of discrimination, such as in the level 
of pensions paid in East and West.  Westerwelle said the 
German government had programs to invest in the East and 
in new technologies, such as solar technology.  He 
admitted there was a long way to go to equality.  Most 
difficult, he added, was the migration of young 
Easterners to the cities or the West.  Children were 
abandoning their parents, who now considered that they 
were losing both their children and the investment 
opportunities that went with them.  However, MFA State 
Secretary Born noted that there were new immigrants to 
eastern Germany from Israel, Eastern Europe, and the 
former Soviet Union.  The Secretary observed that many 
New Yorkers had a strong nostalgia for Germany. 
 
¶6.  (C) Westerwelle pointed out that immigration brought 
its own new problems.  It was a good message if the 
Jewish community in Germany was growing.  The United 
States always attracted the best and most talented from 
all over the world.  However, the Europeans have been 
more restrictive and separated on immigration.  The 
Netherlands still had immigrant problems and Germany 
needed to integrate the Turks.  Indeed, he noted that in 
one part of Berlin you could take a stroll and not know 
you were in Germany.  The German integration model, he 
said, needed improvement.  The Secretary acknowledged 
immigration challenges in France, the Netherlands, and 
even parts of the UK.  She noted that over past decades, 
waves of immigrants felt like they were in a different 
country and worked to assimilate; now, however, they 
didn't always assimilate and were able to maintain 
constant contacts with original home countries.  She 
asked why Germany feared having Turkey in the EU. 
 
--------------------- 
Turkey in the EU 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.      (C) Westerwelle said this was a difficult question 
for both the government and the parliament.  If Germany 
had to decide now on Turkish access to the EU, the 
decision would be a clear no.  He explained that the EU 
could not integrate such a large country.  Turkey was 
not modern enough to enter the EU.  However, Westerwelle 
pointed out that his Free Democratic Party (FDP) had 
made clear to the Chancellor's Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) that a decision on Turkey was not required 
this year, but rather in five or six years.  Therefore, 
the FDP believed that it was important to keep the door 
open until that time, so that Turkey had good reason to 
work for better structures.  Otherwise, he explained, if 
Germany slammed the door shut now, this would affect the 
entire internal situation in Turkey.  He suggested the 
day might come when the EU would actually invite Turkey 
in, but Turkey would decline.  Westerwelle continued 
noting that Turkey at present faced West, but it could 
change to face East.  This was important, he said, for 
both NATO and the EU. 
 
-------------------- 
Climate Change 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.      (C) The Secretary recalled that Chancellor Merkel 
had spoken about climate change earlier.  She asked 
Westerwelle what he thought would happen in Copenhagen 
 
 
and what the goal should be.  Westerwelle said the 
Eastern European countries had a different perspective, 
since they were poorer.  He said it was important to get 
a result from Copenhagen.  He commented that the G-20 
Finance Ministerial a few days prior had found little 
success on this issue due to high costs.  If we wanted 
success in Copenhagen, he said we needed to ask if we 
were willing to spend money. 
 
¶9.      (C) The Secretary agreed with trying to get a 
result and then asked for Westerwelle's views on the 
Danish proposal for Copenhagen. 
 
¶10.     (C) Westerwelle said the EU Council had a common 
position, but that many tough iQs had been put aside 
until the recent U.S.-EU summit.  It was important to 
get developing countries to do their part.  But in the 
end, the question was how much money we were willing to 
spend.  The Secretary said there had to be some 
determination that we would present some proposal.  Even 
if the proposal was less than ideal, we needed to be as 
unified as possible.  We needed to find a way to pull in 
China and the developing countries, but in a way that we 
could also hold them accountable.  The Secretary 
recounted that the Chinese FM had told her he needed 
lots of money from the developed world.  She had said 
ok, but asked him what he was willing to commit to.  He 
replied that it was difficult to commit to anything. 
The Secretary then shot back that it was also difficult 
to obtain money.  The Secretary went on to acknowledge 
that there were skeptics in the EU that the United 
States could not do much at Copenhagen, and that U.S. 
legislation would not be completed.  However, it was 
important to remember the United States  just finished 
eight years of denial and was now doing a lot. 
 
¶11.     (C) Born said expectations were growing that we 
might best focus on a political agreement in Copenhagen. 
The Secretary replied that it would need teeth.  She 
noted that Australia had ideas, and the ROK had some 
ideas.  However, if everyone eventually arrived at the 
Danish political proposal, it couldn't just be 
aspirational.  There had to be, she said, in every 
country some internal mechanism to help meet goals.  For 
example, if India were to pledge to spend a certain 
amount on reforestation, there needed to be some 
mechanism to hold them to it.  The same held, she said, 
with U.S. car emissions; there must be accountability 
measures.  Westerwelle asked if there was sufficient 
support in the United States for such an agreement.  He 
said that when Merkel spoke to the U.S. Congress, the 
Germans noticed the lack of Republican support for 
climate change.  The Secretary replied that the 
Republicans didn't like anything the Administration did. 
However, she projected that some Republicans might go 
along on climate change.  She did not anticipate robust 
Congressional opposition.  She said that if the 
Administration got Congressional approval for Cap and 
Trade, it might also possibly consider building more 
nuclear power plants to get some Republican support. 
This kind of trade off was being discussed by some 
Democratic and Republican senators. 
 
-------------------- 
Guantanamo Detainees 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶12.     (C) The Secretary said that she had been hopeful 
that Germany could take some Guantanamo detainees.  She 
acknowledged that this issue was not raised during the 
busy election campaign and formation of a new 
government, but she would like to reopen the dialogue in 
the hope that Germany could accept one or two detainees. 
She explained that the detainees were divided into three 
categories:  (1)  people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
who were the most difficult of cases; (2) detainees the 
USG has evidence against and planned to try; and (3) 
those who were safe enough to discharge to other 
countries.  She noted that some Uighurs had been 
discharged to Palau and Bermuda, where they were very 
happy.  She said the largest remaining group were 
Yemenis. 
 
¶13.     (C) Westerwelle said he welcomed the 
Administration's decision to close Guantanamo.  He said 
that some might argue that the United States was 
responsible for the problem.  It was important, he said, 
to fix the problem.  He said that at some point Germany 
had said it would look at individual cases.  Westerwelle 
said he believed German acceptance of detainees would 
depend on each individual in question.  The Secretary 
said she was asking him to consider carefully selected 
dossiers.  She said it was his decision, but the United 
States appreciated help trying to close Guantanamo. 
Several European countries, she noted, had already 
agreed to accept detainees.  She said that the USG was 
prepared to brief details.  She suggested it would be a 
good time for Special Envoy Dan Fried to visit. 
Westerwelle observed that both MFA and Interior were 
involved in any decision.  He said he also had to 
consider consequences of any decisions with other 
countries, such as China.  Westerwelle said who Germany 
might accept would depend on the foreign policy 
consequences. 
 
--------------- 
Energy Security 
--------------- 
 
¶14.     (C) The Secretary mentioned energy security, 
observing that the EU was trying to get more pipeline 
and gas routes so as to reduce sole source reliance. 
She noted that Richard Morningstar was the U.S. envoy 
working this critical issue. 
 
¶15.     (C) The Secretary said the great tragedy of Ukraine 
was that Ukraine had energy supplies.  If properly 
structured, Ukraine could get close to energy 
independence.  She noted that every month Ukraine was 
presently asking the IMF and United States for energy 
assistance.  However, Russia did not want Ukraine to 
close deals or develop reserves.  The Secretary warned 
that if we did not provide competition to Russian energy 
sources, we would all be at their mercy.  She suggested 
Germany look seriously into this area. 
 
¶16.     (C) Westerwelle said there was a virulent 
discussion in Germany last winter, and this would be 
repeated this winter.  He projected there would be a new 
orientation of German energy policy:  First, Germany 
would focus on its own production, including nuclear, 
wind, etc.  Secondly, Germany would look at renewable 
sources.  Finally, Germany would seek independence 
 
 
through diversification.  He mentioned the NordStream 
project as part of this.  He acknowledged that Germany 
would not achieve energy independence quickly, but he 
agreed it was vital. 
 
¶17.     (C) Westerwelle asked about the Middle East road 
map and settlements.  The Secretary said the United 
States was just trying to get negotiations started.  She 
recalled that since President Obama was inaugurated, 
there had been the fallout from the Gaza war, then 
Israeli elections, during which time it was hard to get 
much dialogue before May. 
 
¶18.     (C) Turning to Israel, the Secretary said that when 
one negotiated one normally came in with maximum 
positions at the start.  When the United States said it 
wanted a stop to all settlements, Israel had replied 
that under Israeli law it could not stop ongoing 
construction that already had permits.  However, the 
Israelis agreed to stop new activity.  She said that the 
United States might decide to take that commitment 
forward; it would be a big step if Israel stopped new 
settlements.  It would be the first time Israel would 
stop something it considered a legitimate activity.  At 
a minimum, such a commitment would freeze the situation 
on the ground. 
 
¶19.     (C) Westerwelle asked about Afghanistan.  The 
Secretary said she planned to attend the Karzai 
inauguration.  She said that foreign ministers would 
need to emphasize that Karzai must have new relations 
with young people and with the United States.  The 
centerpiece of the new effort in Afghanistan would be 
more training for the army and police.  She said 
Germany's help monitoring and securing the North would 
be important.  Stabilizing population centers was 
needed, especially for Kandahar.  However, stabilization 
work was needed in the North and West.  The Secretary 
said the United States would be ready to announce 
changes at the time of the inauguration, but we couldn't 
do without Germany's help. 
 
¶20.     (C) Westerwelle said it was his understanding the 
inauguration might be the 19th.  However, he considered 
it important to come back with Afghan commitments.  He 
said that Afghanistan developments had been 
disappointing.  He had traveled there.  Issues of good 
governance, he said, should not just be limited to 
speeches.  He recalled that we were investing large 
military and financial resources in Afghanistan.  The 
Secretary said we could not allow Karzai to continue as 
he has up to now.  Too many governments had taken him at 
his word.  He was very charming.  However, a year later 
people saw that nothing had changed.  The Secretary said 
that all our governments had enabled him to get away 
with changing nothing.  She recalled that President Bush 
had spoken every week with Karzai whether something was 
happening or not.  Afghanistan could not, she 
emphasized, be a case of nation-building.  There has 
been some positive progress.  People did not want the 
Taliban back.  However, she emphasized that the people 
felt abandoned and left alone.  She concluded that we 
could not allow the Taliban to gain momentum. 
 
CLINTON