VZCZCXRO6174
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOU #1052/01 3271622
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231622Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5820
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0067
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0726
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0005

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 001052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GV UV
SUBJ: GUINEA - Burkinabe Mediation To Continue Negotiating Process 
 
REF: OUAGADOUGOU 1048 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  President Compaore and his team have convinced the 
CNDD and Forces Vives to continue negotiations of a Guinea agreement. 
 Both sides are expected to formally comment on last week's mediation 
"discussion paper" on November 23 with a third round of proximity 
talks planned in Ouagadougou not later than November 26.  Western 
diplomats underscored to inherent failings of the "discussion paper" 
which the Burkinabe said would be addressed -- all the while 
suggesting that a solution will almost certainly need to include 
Dadis in some capacity through the transition.  The Burkinabe have 
left the door open for some form of observer mission in any future 
transition.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) Foreign Minister Convokes Western Diplomats:  Foreign 
Minister Bedouma Alain Yoda convoked Western heads of mission (Dutch 
(representing the EU Presidency), French, German, European 
Commission, and U.S. Charge) to discuss the status of President 
Compaore's mediation efforts on Guinea.  As noted REFTEL, Compaore 
had come under tremendous press criticism when the Guinean parties 
publicized last week's mediation "discussion paper" as a formal 
"proposal" that effectively would have legitimated Dadis' short and 
long term role as Guinean head of state.  Mission sources report a 
crisis mode in the Foreign Ministry over the weekend as the Burkinabe 
struggled to get things back on track.  With an obvious sensitivity 
to the criticisms made of his president, the Foreign Minister started 
the meeting with a lengthy rehash of the various Contact Group 
meetings that had resulted in President Compaore being asked to 
assume a mediation role in Guinea.  Yoda further stressed that the 
President was not acting in isolation, but in strict collaboration 
with ECOWAS, the AU and the UN.  Yoda said Burkina Faso "wishes to be 
transparent with its partners, but also wanted the partners to be 
aware of the limitations on the mediation." 
 
¶3.  (C) Guineans Back With The Plan:  Foreign Minister Yoda said the 
Burkinabe had worked through Saturday to get the two parties to 
understand that the document they had alternately "accepted" and 
"rejected" was not a mediation "proposal" but simply a "discussion 
paper" designed to get them to focus on areas of agreement and 
disagreement (Comment: The Foreign Ministry shared French and English 
versions of the document and its Annex which has been sent to Embassy 
Conakry and AF/W.  End Comment).  Yoda suggested neither side had 
carefully studied the paper in its entirety previously -- instead 
zeroing in only on the phrases most important to them.  The Forces 
Vives was cited as particularly difficult, "because it is not a party 
-- rather a collection of parties, unions, and civil society -- all 
of who have different specific interests."  Nonetheless, Yoda said 
that by Saturday evening Compaore had been able to get both sides 
committed to staying engaged in the mediation process and had 
"received a reiteration of their confidence in and support of the 
mediator."  Both sides are now expected to come back with written 
comments on the "discussion paper" by the afternoon of the 23rd.  He 
said he understood the CNDD would have nine points of disagreement 
and the Forces Vives two main objections.  The parties will return to 
Ouagadougou no later than November 26 for another round of proximity 
talks.  At this meeting, Compaore will provide a new "discussion 
paper" meant to address issues raised by both sides.  Yoda said 
Compaore's strategy is to continue this series of Draft - Response - 
New Draft for as many rounds as needed to get to something that can 
work.  Yoda saw three main phases: (1) setting conditions of 
"serenity" allowing a transition to take place, (2) the transition 
itself; and, (3) elections and their aftermath. 
 
¶4.  (C) Diplomats State the Obvious:  The Dutch Ambassador backed by 
the French Ambassador told Yoda they could clearly understand where 
the Forces Vives found the text of the discussion paper unacceptable. 
 Both setting Dadis up as Head of State during the transition with 
both executive and legislative power, and allowing Dadis to present 
his candidacy for president with a theoretical absence of only four 
months do not set the conditions of confidence needed for free and 
fair elections.  The French ambassador noted, "Having the person in 
charge of maintaining 'serenity" also being a potential candidate," 
seems untenable.  The European Commission Representative asked, "Why 
do you have to give Dadis 'a flower" by making him Head of State. 
Yoda struggled somewhat but emphasized that the terms of the 
agreement would certainly change but then went on to talk about 
political realities as they saw it.  "The President told both sides a 
solution will require sharing power during a transition -- the CNDD 
will have to yield some control to the Force Vives and the Forces 
Vives will have to accept a lingering CNDD power."  Yoda went on, 
somewhat unconvincingly, to say the mediation had to deal with 
forces, not individuals, suggesting that the language in the 
"discussion paper" saying "The President shall come from the CNDD," 
did not presuppose that the CNDD would select Dadis.  As for the 
eligibility of transition figures to run for President, Yoda noted 
the basic conundrum that "the same people (CNDD and Force Vives) 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00001052  002 OF 002 
 
 
needed to give any transition credibility, also have their own 
political ambitions." 
 
¶5.  (C) Transition Institutions: Yoda asked the diplomats to 
carefully examine the paper that had been put forth to see that it 
was, in fact, the Prime Minister (to be proposed by the Force Vives) 
as head of the Council of Ministers who would have the power in the 
transition with the President "just signing off on decisions of the 
Council."  The French Ambassador (working it seemed without guidance) 
engaged in several detailed questions of (1) why the executive and 
legislative authorities were combined? (Answer: Since the mediation 
is dealing with an "exceptional circumstance," the traditional 
division of institutions would prove divisive and threaten a 
successful transition); (2) Why is there a need for a President at 
all if the Prime Minister supposedly has the power? (Answer: A "Head 
of State" is essential in the African context.  With no "leader," the 
government has no credibility; and, (3) If Dadis has to be given a 
transition role, can it be in a more "advisory" role with no 
executive authority? (Answer: Perhaps).  Comment:  The French 
Ambassador's points did make clear a reluctant French willingness to 
accept a transition role for Dadis, and perhaps run for president, 
all the while trying to ensure he is defanged during that transition. 
 End Comment. 
 
¶6.  (C) Observer Mission:  Charge told Yoda the U.S. shared the 
substantive concerns raised by his European colleagues over Dadis as 
president during the transition and his ability to present his 
candidacy for the presidential elections.  Charge asked whether 
President Compaore was prepared to support an ECOWAS observer 
mission, perhaps along the lines of the 2005 ECOWAS Mission in Togo. 
Yoda replied that the CNDD would clearly reject an interpositional 
force but that an observer mission might still be possible.  He noted 
that the discussion paper had called for an Oversight and Evaluation 
Committee headed by the mediator that would be "assisted by an 
International Observer Group."  While that "Group" remains 
intentionally undefined, Yoda saw it as leaving the door open for an 
ECOWAS observer mission. 
 
¶7.  (U) Conakry Minimize Considered. 
 
HANKINS