VZCZCXRO1450
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOU #1038 3221243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181243Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5801
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0064
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0722
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0002

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GV UV
SUBJ: BURKINABE STILL CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON GUINEA - BUT NOT TOO 
QUICKLY 
 
REF: CONAKRY 722 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Guinea mediator President Compaore will convene a 
second round of CNDD and Forces Vives proximity talks November 19 and 
20 in Ouagadougou.  Bukinabe advisors indicate Compaore will present 
a "synthesis paper" that pulls together agreement on most security 
and humanitarian issues but recognizes fundamental differences on 
political issues -- particularly the continued presence of Dadis.  No 
breakthrough is expected at this meeting.  The Burkinabe see little 
chance of an armed ECOWAS intervention force (as requested by the 
Forces Vives but want more than the unarmed civilian ECOWAS 
Observation Mission the CNDD has indicated it would accept.)  End 
Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge met November 18 with MFA Cabinet Director Vincent 
Zakane to get a read out on Burkinabe mediation efforts in Guinea. 
Zakane, who has been intimately involved in President Compaore's 
mediation efforts, confirmed that the two Guinean delegations as well 
as AU and ECOWAS representatives would arrive in Ouagadougou today 
for meetings November 19 and 20.  Zakane noted that the talks would 
be in proximity format since "it is still too early" to get the two 
sides to sit at the table together.  Zakane outlined that the two 
previous visits of the Forces Vives and CNDD delegations had elicited 
position papers on political, humanitarian and security issues. 
Compaore had developed a synthesis from these two documents that 
Zakane noted "tries to emphasize areas of convergence" in 
humanitarian and security areas where "their positions are the same." 
 Zakane recognized that the two sides remain diametrically opposed on 
the key political issues of transition back to rule of law -- 
particularly on the future role of Dadis.  Highlighting somewhat 
Compaore's limitations, Zakane noted that, as a mediator, "we have no 
army to force a solution in Guinea.  All we have is the force of 
dialogue."  Zakane, who did not share the synthesis document, 
expected limited results from the November 19 and 20 talks as he 
assumed the two parties would have to consult with their bases 
further.  Nonetheless, he said he was "personally optimistic" that 
Compaore will eventually find a mutually acceptable political exit 
strategy for Compaore -- noting the heavy political investment 
Burkina Faso has made in this initiative. 
 
¶3.  (C) Charge noted that the U.S. strongly supports the idea of an 
observation mission for Guinea to help stabilize the inherently 
fragile situation.  Zakane noted that the Forces Vives strongly 
stressed the need for an armed intervention force or, at minimum, a 
robust civil/military observation mission.  The CNDD, on the other 
hand, rejects completely the idea of an intervention force and is 
opposed to a military observer element in any observation mission. 
Noting that, "we can't introduce an intervention force if it will be 
resisted by the Guinean armed forces," Zakane said he thought it 
would be essential to have military members in any observation 
mission, "to allow us to understand credibly what is going on and to 
help diffuse any problems that arise with the military."  Zakane 
called the Guinean military "a sick institution" that, while an 
important element in any solution, is itself deeply flawed. 
 
¶4.  (C) Noting Charge's experience in Mauritania, Zakane said the 
precedents set following the Mauritanian coup played a heavy and 
generally negative role in the Guinea crisis as "Dadis wants to be 
treated by Aziz and the Forces Vives are afraid of being 
diplomatically trapped like the Mauritanian opposition."  Zakane was 
critical of the recent history of international community response to 
coups saying, "You reject them all but don't seem to have the will to 
stick with it to the end.  Coup leaders know there is a good chance 
the international community will relent which, inevitably, gives them 
incentive to stay on."  Although somewhat contradictory from his 
first argument, Zakane also criticized western efforts to exclude 
individuals from post-coup elections since such exclusions "normally 
stir up ethnic or tribal concerns."  In the Guinea case, Zakane 
noted, "Dadis has successfully personalized in himself the fate of 
the Guinea Forestieres who see any effort to block his ability to 
present his candidacy as an effort to marginalize their ethnic group 
which has never been allowed to govern." 
 
¶5.  (U) Conakry Minimize considered. 
HANKINS