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DE RUEHBI #0440/01 3271319
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P 231319Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7563
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8777
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0851
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0269
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0153
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MUMBAI 000440 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER ASEC IN
SUBJECT: 26/11 ONE YEAR LATER:  CAN MUMBAI BE MADE SAFE? 
 
REF: Mumbai 233 
 
MUMBAI 00000440  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  One year after the tragic terrorist attacks 
of November 26, 2008, Maharashtra's leaders have introduced 
modest improvements in Mumbai's security.  Maharashtra's 
administration and security officials appear sincere in their 
desire to make Mumbai and Maharashtra safer, and to protect its 
citizens from further attacks.  That said, the state faces 
serious challenges in overcoming decades of accumulated capacity 
and leadership deficits - as well as bureaucratic hurdles -- in 
order to make Mumbai safer.  Despite a state election where 
security might have been an electoral issue, voters cast their 
ballots along identity lines, returning the ineffectual 
incumbent coalition to power.  A new, energetic police 
leadership has introduced some modernization efforts, but 
serious questions remain about the professional competence of 
the force and the ability of its political leadership to 
implement serious reforms.  Since the onus for state security is 
constitutionally the responsibility of state governments, these 
issues in India will always be subject to the capabilities, 
competence, and seriousness of the local political leadership, 
some of whom are not currently up to the task.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
26/11 Lessons Learned 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) On November 26, 2008, ten heavily-armed terrorists 
landed in Mumbai, and laid siege to a train station, two major 
hotels, and a Jewish cultural and religious house.  When the 
attackers were finally killed over three days later, over 160 
people were killed, from 23 different nations.   These attacks, 
known as "26/11," exposed huge gaps in competence, coordination, 
and leadership at the state and central level.  During the 
attacks, Maharashtra's politicians were criticized for their 
seemingly dazed and uncoordinated response to the city's tragedy 
as the attacks unfolded over the course of several days.  Some 
members of the Mumbai Police acted bravely in the first, chaotic 
hours after the attacks began, and the force quickly appeared in 
strength at the key sites occupied by the terrorists.  However, 
the Mumbai Police did not have the capability or training to 
combat the terrorists occupying the hotels or the Jewish center, 
which were only cleared, after some delay, by the paramilitary 
National Security Guard forces from New Delhi. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the aftermath of the attacks, the Maharashtra 
government commissioned a "lessons learned" report from two 
retired civil and police officials, Ram Pradhan and V. 
Balachandran.  (See ref A.) While this report is still 
classified, the authors and the press have cited several key 
recommendations that address the state's inability to prevent 
the attacks, and the inadequate response to them.  First, the 
central government needed to improve the quality and regularity 
of intelligence sharing with state governments, and minimize 
inter-agency rivalries that impair timely dissemination of 
actionable intelligence.  Second, states must themselves improve 
procedures for processing, sharing, and acting on intelligence 
provided by the central government or collected internally. 
Third, the state should clarify clear lines of authority during 
city and state crises to avoid the confusion that prevailed 
during the attacks.  Fourth, the state government needs to 
centralize its public communication during crises to prevent the 
undisciplined, uncoordinated release of misinformation that 
occurred during the attacks.  Fifth, the state should develop 
and deploy a professional paramilitary first response team to 
handle such attacks in the future. Sixth, the police should 
prioritize appropriate and timely purchases of weapons and 
equipment to modernize the force and its capabilities.  Seventh, 
the state should bolster its coastal security capabilities, as 
well as improve coordination with the Coast Guard and Indian 
Navy. 
 
 
 
The Politicians:  Are They Up to It? 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
MUMBAI 00000440  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) After the siege ended, the state's top two politicians 
- one from each of the governing coalition partners, the 
Congress Party and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) - 
resigned at the insistence of their party leaders.  NCP Home 
Minister R.R. Patil, who was in charge of state security and 
made several awkward statements in Hindi (not his native 
language) downplaying the seriousness of the attacks, was the 
first to go.  Congress Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, who 
emerged in public only after the attacks to tour the Taj Mahal 
Hotel crime scene with a famous Bollywood horror film producer 
in tow, soon followed.  Their successors, Ashok Chavan of the 
Congress as CM, Jayant Patil of the NCP as Home Minister, faced 
both a national and state election within nine months of taking 
office.  Strict election codes of conduct precluded elected 
officials from making major decisions, expenditures, and 
procurements for three months during the last year, so the state 
government's operations were interrupted twice, for three 
months, over the past year. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Therefore, for most of the time since 26/11, 
Maharashtra's politicians engaged in fraternal infighting, 
electioneering, and horse-trading over the spoils of office.  In 
both the national elections of May 2009, and the Maharashtra 
state elections of October 2009, the Congress/NCP coalition 
increased their seats. (To the surprise of many, security was 
not an issue in either election.)  After the state elections, 
the Congress and NCP fought for two weeks over the distribution 
of ministries, balancing family and caste concerns, as well as 
the need for both parties to have sufficiently "lucrative," 
money-earning ministries.  The coalition re-appointed Home 
Minister R.R. Patil to the same office in the new state 
government.  While Patil's re-appointment raised accountability 
concerns, Patil has a reputation for being cleaner and more 
serious than other politicians in his party.  Patil is also 
respected by the police leadership, who see him as more 
responsive to the needs and requests of the force. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) By all accounts, Maharashtra has lacked good political 
leadership for almost two decades.  The last ten years of 
Congress/NCP rule has been marked by an inability to implement 
major development or infrastructure programs.  The political 
coalition is openly fractious, ministers routinely criticize 
each other in public, and state leaders devote much of their 
time to balancing these various interests, leaving little time 
for serious pursuits.  In this regard, Maharashtra's politicians 
are not different from those in many other states - too many 
family dynasties, too much corruption, too many builders and 
land developers seeking family fortunes.  However, the 
accumulation of ten years of underperformance, indifference, and 
incompetence has lowered the expectations of civil society so 
much that even the most marginal of improvements would be seen 
as a major victory.  Upon returning to office, Chief Minister 
Chavan has expressed a strong commitment to improving governance 
in the state, but there is nothing in Maharashtra's recent 
history that indicates that his tenure could be different. 
 
 
 
The Police:  Small Movement in the Right Direction~~.. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Since 26/11, the Mumbai police have taken modest, 
positive steps to boost their professional competence.  The new 
Mumbai police chief, D. Sivanandan, is enthusiastic, 
approachable, and focused.  The Indian Administrative Service 
officers in charge of the state Home Ministry are some of the 
best the state has to offer.  Despite the electoral 
prohibitions, some money has been spent on weapons and 
capability enhancement since the attacks.  According to state 
Home Secretary Chandra Iyengar, the state has released almost 60 
million USD for modernization efforts, including weapons, 
coastal patrol boats, training facilities, and armored vehicles 
 
MUMBAI 00000440  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
which will be introduced over the next few months.  The police 
have redesigned and revived the use of Quick Response Teams 
(QRTs), a complement of better armed and trained police at the 
local level, and launched Force One, a 300-member SWAT-like 
team, which has received some training from foreign experts. 
There are many more police stationed at strategic junctions and 
targets, such as five-star hotels.  A team from Mumbai's 
Anti-Terrorism Squad which participated in a recent security 
drill at the Consulate impressed the RSO with their 
professionalism.  The Mumbai Police has shown great interest in 
collaborating with other city police forces, in the U.K. and 
U.S. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Iyengar told Congenoffs that financial resources were 
sufficient for force modernization efforts, but training needs 
were significant.  From basic training for policemen to 
highly-specialized paramilitary units, the state hoped to 
develop facilities and programs for its long-term training 
needs.  The state has already founded a jungle warfare training 
center in Nagpur, and plans to develop urban terrorism training 
centers in Mumbai and Pune.  Using mobile first responder units, 
the QRTs and Force One, the state aims to develop a "response 
which follows a systematic pattern."  However, she emphasized 
that the government was careful to ensure that the Mumbai and 
state police should remain community police forces, and not 
evolve into militias.  Iyengar reiterated the "enormous" need 
for quality intelligence at the state and national level. 
Iyengar noted the efforts of former Home Minister, Jayant Patil, 
who instituted a weekly meeting among the various state and 
central officials to share intelligence and threat assessments, 
greatly improving center-state coordination.  She also praised 
the energy and commitment of Union Home Minster P. Chidambaram, 
who "chases us 24/7." 
 
 
 
~..But There's a Long Road Ahead 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Despite official expressions of high confidence, most 
citizens and experts are skeptical that the Mumbai police will 
be able to institutionalize a higher level of professional 
competence in the near or medium term.  As with most colonial 
legacy police forces, the main job of the Mumbai Police is law 
and order; in that, they largely ensure that the city's many 
religious and cultural festivals and political rallies take 
place peacefully.  As such, the police have developed little 
enthusiasm for protecting or pursuing the interests of average 
citizens.  Underpaid, ill-trained, and living in slums 
themselves, the police spend a great deal of their time shaking 
down the local populace or colluding with vested interests to 
supplement their low salaries.  Moreover, the force has limited 
capability to investigate crimes, have only small amounts of 
technology, and will often use force and intimidation to elicit 
confessions during interrogations.  The police are repeatedly 
subjected to political pressures, and must devote significant 
manpower to VIP protection.  Petty careerism and bureaucratic 
and legal battles have forced two changes in the Director 
General of Police, the senior-most ranking officer in the state, 
in the last six months, paralyzing the force at the top. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Indeed, mistrust of the police in Mumbai remains 
high, and most Mumbaikars expect the police to take advantage of 
them when vulnerable, rather than provide help.  Moreover, the 
police admit to few good contacts in the state's Muslim 
communities, either for intel collection or 
relationship-building, and Muslims are underrepresented on the 
force.  Many question whether the police will buy the right 
equipment for their force, and whether ever-present corruption 
in the procurement process will derail, or delay, sensible 
purchases.  A retired Admiral told Congenoff that the new police 
boats are riverine boats, not coastal boats.  An Israeli 
security expert who trained Force One informed Congenoff that 
the group was better trained than the regular police, but was 
some years away from being a competent, professional force. 
 
MUMBAI 00000440  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
Overall, the police have made modest improvements in their 
security capabilities, and the momentum is in the right 
direction.  With several decades of accumulated capacity 
deficits, however, the police will face huge challenges in 
speedily modernizing their approach and changing their image. 
 
 
 
Coastal Security 
 
---------------- 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) In the aftermath of 26/11, security experts called for 
improving India's coastal security capabilities.  India has a 
coastline of 7,500 km (mainland and islands), with 12 major 
ports and 187 minor ports.  With a coastline of 720 kms, 
Maharashtra has the largest number of ports with two major ports 
and 53 minor ports; Gujarat has 1600 kms of coastline, with 40 
minor ports and two major ports.  The Maharashtra police share 
responsibility for coastal protection with the Indian Coast 
Guard and the Indian Navy, both of which have stations in 
Mumbai.  The Maharashtra police are charged with security up to 
five nautical miles from shore, the Coast Guard from five to 12 
nautical miles, and the Navy beyond 12 nautical miles. 
Recognizing that the state would not be able to patrol its 
entire coastline, Iyengar told Congenoffs that police and local 
officials have approached fishing communities to serve as the 
"eyes and ears" for policing efforts and for reporting 
intruders. 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Coast Guard Western headquarters in Mumbai 
oversees India's coastal territorial waters from the border with 
Pakistan border in Gujarat to India's southern tip.  After the 
26/11 terror attacks, the GOI sanctioned an additional 14 new 
coast guard stations to plug the security gap along the 
coastline.  The Coast Guard also plans to recruit an additional 
3,000 personnel to enable it to effectively combat terrorism 
from the sea.  The Coast Guard plans to acquire 20 fast patrol 
vehicles, 41 interceptor boats, 12 coastal surveillance aircraft 
(Dorniers), and 7 offshore patrol vehicles, and to place 46 
coastal radars spanning 9 coastal stations across India. 
 
 
 
Central Government Reforms 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) In response to the 26/11 Mumbai attack, the central 
government pushed through Parliament two sets of legal reforms 
designed to strengthen India's security apparatus.  The first 
amended India's Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 to 
increase from 45 to 90 days the period a terrorist suspect can 
be detained by police without being charged.  This provision 
provides Indian police more time to investigate, collect 
evidence, and build a case if they suspect the accused is 
involved in a terrorist plot.  According to two prominent Indian 
terrorism attorneys, no one has so far challenged the law in 
court despite initial media concerns about possible civil rights 
violations. 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) The second reform was the passage of the National 
Investigation Agency (NIA) Bill of 2008, which created an agency 
tasked with investigating terrorist attacks and authorized to 
function across Indian state borders without seeking separate 
permissions.  India's federal constitution grants states 
authority over law enforcement and public security, so NIA has 
tread lightly so as not to encroach on state sovereignty.  The 
NIA has so far surmounted jurisdictional obstacles to register 
three cases, most recently against David Headley, the Lashkar-e 
Tayyiba operative arrested by the U.S. FBI in Chicago. 
 
 
MUMBAI 00000440  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
¶15.  (SBU) There appears to be little residual domestic 
political impact from the Mumbai terror attacks at this point. 
The emotional reaction of the Indian people in the first few 
weeks after the attacks dissipated relatively quickly.  The 
Indian people have become inured by decades of such attacks. 
For many of the slum dwellers and poor of India, the attacks 
represent the first time wealthier classes were directly 
affected.  The fall out, if any, during the April-May 
parliamentary elections was arguably positive for the ruling 
Congress Party as the Muslim electorate in important pockets 
rallied to the party seen as the traditional defender of 
minorities.  Heavy media coverage at the anniversary of the 
attacks will no doubt resurrect memories of the spectacle in the 
minds of the Indian people and the opposition will attempt to 
get some play out of it in parliament this session. There have 
been some consequential legacies of the attacks, nevertheless: 
India now has in place a competent, take-charge Home Minister, 
who is strengthening India's security and intelligence 
activities and addressing a host of other major issues such as 
Kashmir and the Naxalite/Maoist threat; and the environment for 
U.S.-India cooperation on counterterrorism has improved 
significantly. 
 
 
 
Comment:  One Year Later, Concerns Remain 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  One year after the terrorist attacks of 26/11, 
Mumbai is only marginally safer than it was a year before. 
While no one blames state security officials for the initial 
incursion of the attackers -- many cities around the world 
remain equally vulnerable to this kind of attack, which can 
never be completely prevented - we remain concerned that the 
state police do not have the professional capabilities to stop 
or contain serious, coordinated violence in the city.  Moreover, 
we are skeptical that local political leaders have the 
competence and purposefulness to support and implement 
modernization efforts.  While the police will likely be able to 
upgrade their "hard" infrastructure through weapons and 
equipment purchases, the "soft" infrastructure -- training, 
better policing, intel gathering, and better coordination and 
implementation - will be a major struggle.  With the 
constitutional responsibility for internal security largely left 
to the states, there are bound to be major discrepancies of 
capacity, competence, and coordination between the state and 
central governments, and among the states.  Despite some 
positive steps in the right direction since the attacks, we 
believe that there is still significant ground to cover before 
Mumbai's security is in the hands of trained, purposeful, 
competent professionals.  End Comment. 
FOLMSBEE