VZCZCXRO5696
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHMB #0309/01 3160807
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120807Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MBABANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3777
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MBABANE 000309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL WZ ZI SF SADC
SUBJECT: SWAZI FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTS SOUTH AFRICAN 
INTERVENTION MAY LEAD TO MOVEMENT IN ZIMBABWE UNITY 
GOVERNMENT IMPASSE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Earl M. Irving 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  On November 11, Swaziland's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Lutfo E. Dlamini, told 
Ambassador that he recommended a summit on Zimbabwe to King 
Mswati III by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and 
Security.  He and his troika counterparts judged that only at 
that level could Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai be 
persuaded to resume their agreement to work together. 
Dlamini described Mugabe as acting both bored and arrogant 
during the November 5 Maputo meeting on reconciliation.  It 
was only when South African President Jacob Zuma spoke and 
gave Mugabe a deadline for action that the Zimbabwean 
president "sat up and paid attention."  According to Dlamini, 
Zuma made it plain that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had 
fifteen days to re-engage in the coalition government, or he 
would send a mediator to Harare to bring the parties 
together.  The troika ruled out an immediate election in 
Zimbabwe, recommending rather that the Zimbabwean parties 
wait three or so years, or the alternative would be 
untrammeled violence.  Dlamini ruled out the possibility of 
Mugabe running in the next election because he is physically 
frail, and recommended that Tsvangirai begin to market 
himself quietly to the SADC heads of state, to persuade them 
that he is not "a radical" in the pay of the Western 
community.  Though vague about details, the Swazi foreign 
minister suggested that the SADC troika would like to consult 
the European Union and America on the Zimbabwe question.  The 
Ambassador suggested that the SADC troika might think about 
ways to bring about an orderly transfer to a post-Mugabe era 
in Zimbabwe, including the possibility of some sort of 
amnesty process for security force heads.  Dlamini took note 
of the idea, asserting that Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime 
Minister Arthur Mutambara both had rejected a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission like that in South Africa. 
Although convinced of the utility of the SADC mechanism to 
influence events in Zimbabwe, he pooh-poohed Joseph Kabila as 
"the wrong man" to lead the troika, observing that "he can't 
run his own country."  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Swaziland's Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Co-operation, Lutfo E. Dlamini, told Ambassador on November 
11 that he recommended a summit on Zimbabwe to King Mswati 
III by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security.  His 
recommendation was based on a visit to Zimbabwe in late 
October.  He and his troika counterparts judged that only at 
that level could the two key participants in Zimbabwe's 
government of national unity, Robert Mugabe and Morgan 
Tsvangirai, "who hate each other," be persuaded to resume 
their agreement to work together.  Dlamini described Mugabe 
as acting both bored and arrogant upon arriving in Maputo on 
November 5, while the troika heads of state made their pleas 
for reconciliation.  It was only when South African President 
Jacob Zuma, "who invited himself to the Summit," spoke that 
Mugabe "sat up and paid attention."  According to Dlamini, 
Zuma made it plain that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had 
fifteen days to re-engage in the coalition government, or he 
would send a mediator to Harare to bring the parties 
together.  Dlamini made a distinction between Thabo Mbeki, 
whom SADC hired to draw up a plan for Zimbabwe, and Zuma, who 
was elected partially on his promise to sort things out in 
Zimbabwe, but was not formally a part of the SADC mediation 
effort.  Dlamini conceded that the South African president's 
vigorous intervention appeared to yield results. 
 
¶3.  (C) Dlamini said that in spite of the fact that the 
Zimbabwean national unity government did not enjoy 
legitimacy, it was what SADC had to work with.  The troika 
ruled out an immediate election in Zimbabwe, recommending 
rather that the Zimbabwean parties wait three or so years 
before calling them, or the alternative would be untrammeled 
violence.  He ruled out the possibility of Mugabe running in 
that election because he is frail and almost needs a walking 
stick to walk.   Dlamini stated that employees of 
Tsvangirai's office and party earn "an average of USD 7,000 a 
month," more than ten times the amount paid to Zimbabwean 
government civil servants, because the West "tops them up." 
He recommended that Morgan Tsvangirai begin to market himself 
quietly to the SADC heads of state, to persuade them that he 
is not "a radical" in the pay of the Western community, which 
is their current perception.  He thought Tsvangirai had more 
in common with them than Mugabe, whose rhetoric of 
colonialism had little resonance with the new generation of 
African leaders. 
 
¶4.  (C) Though vague about details, the Swazi foreign 
minister suggested that the SADC troika would like to consult 
the European Union and America on the Zimbabwe question.  He 
attributed the violence in the country as being perpetrated 
by a "third force," possibly within the security forces. 
 
MBABANE 00000309  002 OF 002 
 
 
Dlamini seemed surprised to hear from Ambassador that it was 
our impression that the violence was meticulously planned and 
executed by ZANU-PF with government security force 
facilitation, if not participation.  We further indicated our 
belief that it had not been beneath the ZANU-PF government's 
dignity to use food as a weapon in the past.  The Ambassador 
suggested that the SADC troika might think about ways to 
bring about an orderly transfer to a post-Mugabe era in 
Zimbabwe, including the possibility of some sort of amnesty 
process for security force heads.  Dlamini took note of the 
idea, asserting that Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister 
Arthur Mutambara both had rejected a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission like that in South Africa. 
 
¶5.  (C) COMMENT: Dlamini is an active minister who is 
constantly on the road, leaving his ministry demoralized and 
not well briefed about his work.  Whether his frequent trips 
abroad have resulted in tangible benefits for the Kingdom is 
unclear, though they have succeeded in keeping his profile 
high within the government and in the press.  His account of 
his work on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security 
illustrates some of the perceptions and misconceptions with 
which he and, one might extrapolate, his colleagues in the 
troika operate.  Although convinced of the utility of the 
SADC mechanism to influence events in Zimbabwe, he 
pooh-poohed Joseph Kabila as "the wrong man" to lead the 
troika, observing that "he can't run his own country."  To 
illustrate his point, Dlamini reported that when in Kinshasa 
for a summit, King Mswati was lodged in a five-star hotel 
that had no water.  "The king had to wash his hands in a 
bucket," he said in disgust. 
IRVING