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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001103 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA 
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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/24 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PROP NU
SUBJECT: Nicaraguans Successfully March Against Ortega 
 
REF: MANAGUA 1091 
 
MANAGUA 00001103  001.2 OF 002 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: RobertJ.Callahan, Ambassador, State, US Embassy 
Managua; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Despite the governing Sandinista National 
Liberation Front's (FSLN) tactics to suppress marcher turnout, on 
November 21 civil society and the opposition successfully gathered 
approximately 25,000 participants to protest President Daniel 
Ortega's authoritarian manner of governance.  The FSLN's activity 
the same day also brought thousands of supporters to Managua, but 
gathered far fewer than the governing party expected.  A major 
factor leading to the opposition's massive demonstration was the 
police's ability to provide security throughout Nicaragua. 
Nonetheless, there were violent confrontations between the two 
groups on the roads from Managua back to the departments, which 
resulted in one death.  End Summary. 
 
Despite FSLN Tactics, Civil Society/Opposition March a Success 
 
¶2.  (C) Exceeding expected numbers, Nicaragua's civil society and 
opposition parties gathered a crowd of thousands from across the 
country to protest the one-year anniversary of the November 2008 
municipal electoral fraud and Ortega's re-election efforts.  Local 
media reported that Nicaraguan military intelligence estimated 
25,000 participants.  The crowd included the 18 civil society 
organizations that comprise the Citizens' Union for Democracy (UCD) 
as well as all major opposition parties.  Political and civil 
society leaders that participated included former President Arnoldo 
Aleman, National Assembly Deputy and former presidential candidate 
Eduardo Montealegre, former presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin, 
and the president of the Higher Council of the Private Sector 
(COSEP) Jose Adan Aguerri.  The crowd also included prominent 
figures from the FSLN's government of the 1980s, such as former 
Supreme Court Chief Judge Alejandro Serrano. 
 
¶3. (C) According to Enrique Saenz, president of the opposition Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), the FSLN miscalculated in believing that the governing party's intimidation tactics would dissuade participants from joining the democracy march. Leading up to the UCD protest, Ortega's FSLN employed a variety of tactics to suppress turnout. These tactics included the threat of violence on the roads to Managua and calling for a countermarch. A key tactic was threatening to terminate the permits of operators of public transportation who provided services to members of civil society or the opposition. However, local leaders across Nicaragua told us that they were able to secure the necessary means to transport thousands from all over Nicaragua. Saenz estimated that the residents of Managua outnumbered those from the departments. He believed that Managuans joined the march throughout the morning once they saw the crowds from the departments reach Managua and saw the police did have control of the situation. Other political leaders believed the pressure from various actors (e.g, the Catholic Church) held some influence over Ortega to not release a violent assault against civil society and the opposition.
 
The FSLN Rally - Large Presence, but Good Turnout? 
 
¶4. (C) What was initially planned as a competing countermarch to the UCD protest ultimately morphed into an Ortega-fest at a different time and location from the UCD activity. The FSLN, through the National Workers Front (FNT), originally announced a march that would begin at 9:00 am. In the end, fears of FSLN-instigated violence did not come to fruition. The governing party's "Great March of the Victories" became more a government function (beginning at 5:00 pm after being delayed several times) and centered around Daniel Ortega's speech in which he lauded the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). The back-drop was a huge poster of Ortega with the text "Nicaragua in ALBA - Solidarity, Christianity, Socialism." Government/party media estimated over 300,000 participants at the FSLN activity, but independent media reported a significantly lower turnout. The governing party had hired most of the inter-city buses to transport people to its event, but people from across Nicaragua told us that many of those buses were empty.
 
Police Provide Security for Marches, but Some Violence Erupts 
 
¶5.  (C) On November 21, Police Commissioner Aminta Granera 
demonstrated that her institution is capable of functioning 
properly and protecting citizens' basic rights.  Approximately 
7,000 police across Nicaragua provided security the day of the 
marches.  In Managua, 3,000 police cordoned-off the march routes, 
controlled the major rotundas, and provided buffer zones between 
competing marches.  Outside Managua, 4,000 police provided security 
on the roads to Managua and escorted caravans coming to the capital 
for the march.  Leaders of civil society and opposition parties 
acknowledged the police's positive work in providing a safe 
environment for the protest (in contrast to several recent security 
debacles, reftel). 
 
¶6.  (C) While the marches in Managua took place without any major 
incident, there were confrontations between the governing FSLN and 
the Liberals when the opposition caravans were returning to their 
departments from Managua.  One incident occurred near Ciudad Dario 
in the department of Matagalpa (approximately 90 km northeast of 
Managua).  According to a traveler in the opposition caravan, FSLN 
sympathizers ambushed the opposition buses and fired arms, 
"morteros" (improvised projectile devices), and threw rocks.  The 
Liberals responded with rocks and morteros.  The ensuing exchange 
of rocks resulted in the death of one FSLN supporter and several 
injured.  A similar incident occurred on the road from Managua to 
Leon.  A traveler on one of the buses to Leon told us that the FSLN 
buses blocked the opposition caravan, sprayed the Liberal buses 
with pepper spray, and threw rocks at the opposition members.  This 
resulted in several injuries, including an opposition councilmember 
from a municipality in the department of Chinandega. 
 
Comment 
 
¶7.  (C) The civil society and opposition march was a resounding 
success and surpassed all expectations in bringing approximately 
25,000 Nicaraguans to protest President Ortega's government. 
Likewise, Police Commissioner Granera showed at last that she was 
capable of leading a national police that protects citizens' basic 
rights.  This was a needed shot in the arm to both the opposition 
and the police, but the question now becomes whether civil society 
and the opposition can sustain this unity effort to defend the 
country's democratic space and whether the police can continue 
functioning in a non-partisan manner. 
 
¶8.  (C) The FSLN's actions on November 21 also raise questions. 
The lower than expected turnout at the FSLN's activity suggests 
that all might not be well in the governing party.  Additionally, 
since Ortega's party in the past has demonstrated its ability (and 
will) to violently suppress the freedom of expression, it is 
unclear exactly why Ortega allowed this massive protest march.  As 
mentioned earlier, different political leaders attribute Ortega's 
actions to miscalculation or to domestic and international 
pressure.  Regardless of the reason, the common belief is that 
while Ortega allowed the opposition march, he is not likely to 
change his authoritarian tendencies. 
CALLAHAN