VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0914/01 3071228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031227Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0205
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0051
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

UNCLAS KINGSTON 000914 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR (VDEPIRRO) (WSMITH) (JMACK-WILSON) 
WHA/EPSC (MROONEY) (FCORNEILLE) 
EEB/ESC/IEC (GGRIFFIN) 
EEB/ESC/IEC/EPC (MMCMANUS) 
INR/RES (RWARNER) 
INR/I (SMCCORMICK) 
SANTO DOMINGO FOR FCS AND FAS 
TREASURY FOR ERIN NEPHEW 
EXPORT IMPORT BANK FOR ANNETTE MARESH 
USTDA FOR NATHAN YOUNG AND PATRICIA ARRIAGADA 
OPIC FOR ALISON GERMAK 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV PINR IADB IBRD IMF TRSY XL JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: CAUGHT IN A DEBT TRAP-- CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR 
RESIGNS; IMF SOLUTION? 
 
REF: KINGSTON 614; KINGSTON 800; KINGSTON 422; KINGSTON 517 
KINGSTON 551 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) The resignation of the Governor of the Central Bank, 
Derick Latibeaudiere, during the middle of an International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiations may be a sign that the time has 
come for the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) to face the severity of 
the situation and negotiate a solution with private holders of 
Jamaican debt, a resolution referred to as a "debt operation" by 
the IMF.  On November 2 the Standard and Poor's rating agency 
downgraded Jamaica to CCC from CCC plus in response to 
Latibeaudiere's departure fearing the likelihood of selective 
default.  Jamaica holds the unenviable record of being among the 
most indebted countries in the world, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 
108 percent.  At the end of July 2009, the country's stock of 
public debt stood at USD 14.2 billion, which means that each 
Jamaican's share of debt is about USD 5,260, in a country with a 
per capita income of less than USD 4,500.  Most of the debt load 
arose over a seven year period due to persistent fiscal deficits as 
well as the take-over of government guaranteed debt.  Over the same 
period, there was a marked shift in borrowing from multilaterals to 
private creditors, with a majority of the country's debt now owed 
to Jamaican residents.  This, combined with Jamaica's proud record 
of never defaulting on debt, makes any prospect of an involuntary 
debt solution daunting.  However, the worsening fiscal dynamics 
combined with the continued contraction in GDP will make any 
further jump in the stock of debt increasingly unsustainable. 
Jamaica might therefore be forced to finally swallow its pride and 
embark on the politically and financially difficult path of debt 
restructuring.  End summary. 
 
 
 
The Raw Numbers 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Jamaica holds the unenviable record of being the fourth 
most indebted country in the world behind Zimbabwe, Japan, and 
Lebanon.  At the end of July 2009, Jamaica's stock of public debt 
stood at USD 14.2 billion or 108 percent of GDP.  Domestic debt 
accounts for USD 8 billion of the total debt, while external debt 
accounts for the remaining USD 6.2 billion.  At this level, each 
Jamaican's share of the national debt amounts to USD 5,260, above 
the per capita income level of less than USD 4,500.  The gargantuan 
debt places a huge burden on the country's limited resources, with 
almost 52 cents of every dollar of revenue collected by the 
Government of Jamaica (GOJ) being used to pay interest.  Interest 
and principal payments together (total debt servicing) account for 
over 100 percent of revenues, forcing the GOJ to borrow to service 
debt; a clear warning sign of the chronic fiscal and debt 
challenges facing the country. 
 
 
 
History of Debt 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Jamaica's insatiable appetite for debt had its genesis in 
the lost decade of the 1970s, when a combination of external and 
 
 
 
 
 
domestic policy-induced shocks set the stage for borrowing. 
Ironically, the 1970s oil crisis not only increased Jamaica's 
demand for funds to pay for the commodity, but also provided a 
willing cadre of lenders awash with oil revenues.  Even worse, the 
country's foray into socialism and by extension distributive 
policies, led to persistent fiscal deficits and an erosion in 
output.  By the end of the decade, the left-leaning Michael 
Manley-led government was forced to tap multilateral and bilateral 
lending agencies for loans in order to fill the gap in the 
country's finances. 
 
 
 
Forming An Addiction 
 
-------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The rising debt load accelerated in the 1980s, when the 
center-right Edward Seaga led-administration capitalized on the 
availability of highly concessionary loan facilities.  This policy 
led to a doubling of the debt load to 212.4 percent of GDP by 1984. 
Of this amount, external debt accounted for 152.9 percent, up from 
63 percent in 1980.  However, unlike the previous period when 
output was declining, the latter part of the 1980s was 
characterized by robust economic growth and fiscal surpluses.  The 
Peoples National Party (PNP)-led administration that followed from 
1989 to 2007 also had a significant appetite for borrowing, but 
unlike the earlier decades when debt was sourced from the external 
market, this period saw a rapid acceleration of financial 
liberalization and the development of the domestic capital market. 
 
 
 
 
Growth in Domestic Debt, Emergence of a Financial Crisis 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The evolution of the domestic capital market was to open 
up a new borrowing option for a government now hooked on debt, due 
to the re-emergence of persistent fiscal deficits.  Between 1996 
and 2003, the national debt increased by 71 percentage points, with 
the largest annual increase of 22 percentage points occurring in 
¶2001.  Several factors led to the growth of the debt during this 
period.  Most importantly was the rapid development of the 
financial market, spurred on by liberalization in the sector.  This 
led to an eventual collapse of the financial sector in the latter 
half of the 1990s.  The GOJ opted to rescue failed financial 
entities including several key banks, insurance companies, and 
pension funds.  The subsequent resolution of the financial crisis, 
commonly referred to as the Financial Sector Adjustment Company 
(FINSAC), resulted in the GOJ absorbing USD 3.1 billion in debt 
(41.2 percent of GDP), probably the most expensive resolution to a 
financial crisis worldwide in terms of cost to GDP. 
 
 
 
Borrowing From Peter to Pay Paul 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Jamaica's burgeoning debt stock can also be attributed to 
the absorption of public sector liabilities, commonly referred to 
as contingent liabilities.  Between 1996 and 2003 the GOJ absorbed 
USD 124.3 million (4.9 percent of GDP) in government guaranteed 
debt from public enterprises.  Losses from the Bank of Jamaica 
(Central Bank) accounted for a further USD 187 million (8.7 percent 
of GDP) over the period.  For the GOJ the single greatest 
 
 
 
 
 
contributor to the build-up in debt has been the practice of 
borrowing to service debt, due to persistent fiscal deficits over 
the years.  These fiscal deficits, which are largely the result of 
the GOJ's failure to collect sufficient tax revenues to cover 
expenditures,  have forced the government into the position of 
either rolling over debt when it comes due or borrowing from one 
set of creditors to pay another. 
 
 
 
Who Holds The Debt? 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Since 1999 there has been a marked shift in borrowing from 
multilateral and bilateral lenders to domestic creditors.  At the 
beginning of the 1990s over 75 percent of the total debt stock was 
owed to external lending agencies.  However, by the end of the 
decade there was a dramatic reversal, with 60 percent of the debt 
stock owed to locals.  There was also a shift within the external 
debt portfolio from official to private creditors.  Even though 
these loans were sourced at much higher rates of interest, it was 
more attractive to the Patterson-led administration, which was bent 
on avoiding the scrutiny of the multilaterals.  Patterson, a strong 
proponent of the Non-Aligned Movement, was also keen to pursue 
domestic policies and escape what he considered the "dictates of 
outsiders".  The policy started with the much heralded ending of 
borrowing relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
¶1996.  By the end of 2004 the GOJ had repaid its outstanding debt 
to the IMF.  Bilateral debt also declined from USD 1.7 billion in 
1996 to USD 0.6 billion at the end of 2008. 
 
 
 
A Return to the Multilaterals 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The most dramatic shift in terms of the nature of the debt 
was the USD 3.8 billion movement in debt sourced from external 
private creditors in just over a decade.  Although these bonds were 
sold in the external capital market, they were immediately bought 
by Jamaicans on the secondary market.  When the PNP's 18 year rule 
came to an end in August 2007, the new Jamaica Labour Party-led 
government opted for a major policy shift and returned to the 
multilaterals.  Since 2007, the GOJ has secured cheaper loans from 
the multilateral lending agencies led by the Inter American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank (WB).  The GOJ's timing 
was remarkably advantageous as it occurred just months before the 
worst global economic recession in decades and the tightening of 
credit worldwide. As the external capital market closed to Jamaica, 
the GOJ was able to source almost USD 1 billion from these 
institutions at concessionary rates of interest. 
 
 
 
Possible Liability Management Program? 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) The worsening fiscal dynamics led by declining revenues, 
has forced the GOJ to increase its appetite for domestic private 
debt.  This pushed interest rates as high as 24 percent, thus 
further stifling access by private creditors at a time when credit 
is crucial to kick-start the moribund economy.  The meteoric rise 
in domestic debt combined with the local ownership of external 
private debt also makes any prospect of a liability management 
program (a managed or technical default on debt) explosive within 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamaica.  Add to this the country's proud and enviable record of 
never defaulting on debt, and the possibility of a radical solution 
appears less likely. 
 
 
 
GOJ Gets Cold Feet, Shelves Debt Relief Plan 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) During August of 2009, on the back of a downgrade from 
ratings agency Standard and Poor's (S and P), the GOJ retreated 
from a voluntary liability management program offered by local 
financial institutions (REFTEL A).  In its analysis the S and P 
stated that the offer had the smell of a default, which set off 
concerns within the GOJ.  The initiative was aimed at relieving the 
GOJ's short-term debt service costs by exchanging high-cost debt on 
a voluntary basis for debt with lower rates of interest.  Minister 
of Finance and the Public Service Audley Shaw in a press release 
stated that Cabinet had taken a decision not to pursue this option, 
stating, "Cabinet, after careful consideration of the proposal and 
mindful of the uncertainty in the market, has decided that the 
Government will not be pursuing this proposal."  The move would 
have provided the GOJ with some financial breathing room in the 
near term, since the GOJ did not pursue the option it was forced to 
increase its allocation to interest payments by USD 182 million, in 
the recently tabled Supplementary Estimates (REFTEL B).  This 
brought the overall allocation of interest payments for fiscal year 
2009/10 to USD 2 billion or almost half of the entire recurrent 
budget.  It also represents a 30 percent increase on the amount 
allocated last year, further highlighting the debt conundrum facing 
Jamaica. 
 
 
 
Point Of No Return 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) The general consensus appears to be that the time has 
come for the GOJ to face the severity of the situation and 
negotiate a solution with private holders of Jamaican debt, a 
resolution referred to as a "debt operation" by the IMF (REFTELS C, 
D, E).  So firm is the IMF in its conviction, that Director of 
Fiscal Policy at the Ministry of Finance, Courtney Williams 
confirmed to Emboffs that this issue is a potential deal breaker in 
the country's current negotiation for a USD 1.2 billion Stand-By 
Agreement.  Williams said that although the IMF is pleased with all 
the other concessions made by the GOJ, they are still awaiting a 
replacement for the failed liability management program, as a 
viable solution needs to be found to the debt predicament. 
Barclay's Capital, a New York-based division of Barclays Bank, has 
also weighed in on the country's debt plight, suggesting that 
Jamaica is approaching the "point of no return" and that it will 
take more than fiscal adjustments to regain long-term 
sustainability.  The investment bank is proposing that the GOJ 
should seek the help of the IMF to restructure its debt instead of 
seeking another loan to merely postpone the country's agony. 
 
 
 
Head of Central Bank Steps Down 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Derick Latibeaudiere, the Governor of the Bank of 
Jamaica, who has been staunchly opposed to any form of debt 
restructuring, resigned (possibly was forced out) on October 30 in 
 
 
 
 
 
the middle of a visit by representatives from the IMF.  His 
departure could open the door to a possible debt operation with the 
IMF.  On November 2, the S and P downgraded Jamaica to CCC from CCC 
plus in response to Latibeaudiere's departure fearing the 
likelihood of selective default. 
 
 
 
 
 
Former Russian Official Weighs In 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) The most radical suggestion to date has come from the 
former Russian Finance Minister, Alexander Livshits.  Speaking to a 
group of Jamaican businessmen in Kingston, the former Minister 
argued that the time had come for the GOJ to commence negotiations 
with the London Club of creditors to bring its debt under control. 
Livshits, who oversaw a similar arrangement while he was Minister, 
stated that Jamaica already is experienced in dealing with the 
Paris Club having negotiated similar agreements in the past.  He 
suggested that after the restructuring process, the debt should be 
capped and new borrowing limited to cheaper funds.  "There should 
be a special Government decision or, better, a law establishing a 
long-term framework for new borrowing", he continued.  He opined 
that ultimately Jamaica will only rid itself of a heavy debt burden 
in the medium-term if it generates economic growth by investing in 
projects such as those leading to cheaper energy. (NOTE: Livshits 
currently represents UC Rusal, whose bauxite operations in Jamaica 
have ceased operations due to high domestic energy cost. END NOTE) 
 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) After years of mortgaging the country's future to satisfy 
its insatiable appetite for debt, even the GOJ now appears to be 
coming to the realization that the current debt dynamics are 
unsustainable.  Ever mindful of guarding its reputation of never 
defaulting on debt, the GOJ has been slow to take the necessary 
measures to address its unsustainable debt problems.  This was most 
evident when the GOJ shunned the opportunity to gain some relief 
under a debt liability management program.  The JLP-led government 
knows a debt restructuring move will be both politically and 
financially explosive because a large portion of the external 
private debt is held by Jamaican creditors.  Apart from hurting 
domestic creditors and possibly financial sector stability, any 
attempt to address debt could also drive savvy investors to switch 
to foreign assets, creating the unwelcome problem of foreign 
exchange market instability.  However, despite the possible 
short-term ramifications, it would appear that radical surgery in 
the form of a debt operation will be required to address the debt 
problem and to provide the economy with a fighting chance for 
recovery and growth.  The GOJ cannot afford to attempt to muddle 
through - otherwise, it might well lead to strangulation by debt. 
End Comment. 
Parnell