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DE RUEHKG #0737/01 3231441
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O 191441Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0253
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000737 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR (VDEPIRRO) (WSMITH) (JMACK-WILSON) 
WHA/EPSC (MROONEY) (FCORNEILLE) 
EEB/ESC/IEC (GGRIFFIN) 
EEB/ESC/IEC/EPC (MMCMANUS) 
INR/RES (RWARNER) 
INR/I (SMCCORMICK) 
SANTO DOMINGO FOR FCS AND FAS 
TREASURY FOR ERIN NEPHEW 
EXPORT IMPORT BANK FOR ANNETTE MARESH 
USTDA FOR NATHAN YOUNG AND PATRICIA ARRIAGADA 
OPIC FOR ALISON GERMAK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/11/19 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ETRD SOCI PINR PREL IADB IMF TRSY JM
XL 
SUBJECT: Jamaica: Private Sector Nervous Over Delay in IMF Deal; Risk 
of Capital Flight Rises 
 
REF: KINGSTON 601; KINGSTON 914; KINGSTON 956; KINGSTON 121 
KINGSTON 735 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Isiah Parnell, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
 
---------- 
 
¶1. (C) Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding's lack of political 
courage in making  difficult decisions has created a crisis of 
confidence in the private sector.  His promise of an imminent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Standby Agreement worth USD 1.2 
billion has set him,  as well as his Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) 
administration, up for a major failure, as negotiations face delays 
and the exact amount of the deal remains uncertain.  In turn, PM 
Golding appears to be losing confidence in his Finance Minister, 
Audley Shaw, and has told members of the private sector that he 
wants to take the lead personally on IMF negotiations.  Uncertainty 
and apprehension are mounting in the private sector, as investors 
fear a muted IMF deal could set the stage for panic in the 
financial markets.  More sophisticated investors already are moving 
to more secure assets such as US dollars, and the risk of capital 
flight looms large.  Jamaica also suffered another downgrade from 
rating agency Moody's to Caa1 with a negative outlook. At least two 
of the three major financial institutions holding domestic debt 
have expressed a willingness to broker a restructuring deal, but 
the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) appears incapable of seizing the 
initiative.  Fiscal indiscipline and a strategy of merely muddling 
through successive crises have the island  perched precariously on 
the edge of an abyss: unless bold steps are taken to restore 
confidence, the nation's continuing economic decline could pass a 
point of no return.   End Summary 
 
 
 
Private Sector's Mounting Concerns... 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On November 16,  Emboffs met with Patrick Hylton, Managing 
Director of National Commercial Bank (NCB), who voiced a rising 
level of concern regarding the grave economic challenges facing the 
country.  NCB is Jamaica's largest financial institution and the 
largest holder of GOJ debt.  Hylton said he already has seen a 
movement to U.S. dollar assets, as investors fear greater troubles 
on the horizon.  (NOTE: Other key Emboff contacts  have expressed 
similar views while admitting that they themselves are moving into 
U.S. dollar denominated assets, some even taking their resources 
out of the country entirely.  END NOTE).  Hylton commented that 
Jamaicans are still skittish after watching the collapse of 
financial institutions  such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 
the United States, and are fearful of something similar occurring 
locally. 
 
 
 
...IMF Deal is At The Center 
 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) On November 18, Emboffs met with Richard Byles, President 
and CEO of Sagicor Life Jamaica, a provider of insurance and 
financial products, to discuss economic conditions and the status 
of negotiations with the IMF.  Sagicor, along with NCB,  is one of 
the three major holders of GOJ debt.  Byles is convinced that the 
best case scenario for Jamaica in the near term is a deal with the 
IMF that restores confidence to the markets.  However, he fears 
that if a deal is delayed or watered down, then there will be a 
loss of confidence leading to a run on the Jamaica dollar, which 
would force the Bank of Jamaica (Central Bank) to try to defend the 
local currency by hiking interest rates -- an eventuality he said 
would indicate an economic meltdown and spell the end for the 
economy.  The private sector appears to recognize that an IMF deal 
that is not combined with robust measures to address the exorbitant 
debt overhang will merely stave off an inevitable default.  On 
November 19, Jamaica suffered another downgrade on its local and 
foreign currency bonds by international rating agency Moody's.  The 
downgrade to Caa1 from B2 with a negative outlook was in response 
to the agency's belief that Jamaica is close to defaulting on its 
debts.  The delays in securing an IMF agreement were part of the 
justification for the downgrade. 
 
 
 
Private Sector Has Lost Confidence In Golding 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Byles said that PM Golding lacks the leadership to address 
the current crisis facing the country, and that the private sector 
has lost faith in him and Shaw.  Hylton echoed Byles,  noting that 
his confidence in PM Golding and his administration had fallen 
significantly in the past year and that the private sector no 
longer sees him as able to manage through this crisis.  This is 
particularly troubling because, according to Byles, PM Golding has 
said he intends to personally take the lead in the current IMF 
negotiations. Golding has a history of making numerous personnel 
changes in key leadership positions over the past two past years 
(Reftel A).  Byles describes the PM as articulate in discussing the 
issues, but noted that he has a tendency to make knee jerk 
decisions when the situation requires a calm and steady hand. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Hylton also expressed disappointment  in the manner in 
which the GOJ handled the recent dismissal of Derick Latibeaudiere, 
the Governor of the Bank of Jamaica, who had been leading the IMF 
negotiations (Reftel B).  Hylton called Latibeaudiere's removal 
during the middle of a visit by the IMF delegation very poor 
timing, adding that it sends the world the wrong message about 
stability.  Hylton recognized that Latibeaudiere had his opponents, 
but added that even if one disagreed with his policies, he was 
still predictable and communicated his moves to the private sector. 
He said Latibeaudiere had become an institution in his 13 years as 
Governor at the BOJ, and that it will take time to rebuild that 
level of confidence in the new Governor, Bryan Wynter, even though 
he formerly served at the BOJ and is highly respected.  Hylton 
noted that this  was not the time to be rebuilding confidence in 
your Central Bank. 
 
 
 
Private Sector Must Lead On Debt, But Faces Prisoners' Dilemma 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Byles said that he does not know Golding all that well, but 
he meets with both him and Shaw.  These meetings also include 
representatives from NCB and the Bank of Nova Scotia (the third 
major holder of GOJ debt).  However, Byles lamented that these 
meetings never seem to result in any viable solutions to the 
country's debt problems.  He suggested that perhaps he and the 
other two key players will need to formulate a debt restructuring 
plan on their own that will provide breathing room for the GOJ, 
without overburdening debt holders.   Byles emphasized that time 
was of the essence and that no one player was going to be a first 
mover.  Thus, it may become crucial that the major debt holders 
coordinate on a plan, particularly because the GOJ appears 
incapable of seizing the initiative to broker a deal.  Hylton also 
voiced support for a debt restructuring deal, but said that he was 
waiting for the other major financial institutions to make the 
first move.  He said he would not make concessions that competitors 
were not making, as well.  He emphasized that his primary 
responsibility was to protect shareholder value. 
 
 
 
 
 
Debt - How Much to Restructure 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Byles suggested that the GOJ needs to fill a JD$ 28 Billion 
(USD 316 million) gap in the fiscal accounts.  This equates to 
about four percent of the JD$700 billion (USD 7.9 billion) in 
outstanding domestic debt.  Jamaica still has about USD 7 billion 
in external debt and, for now, this portion appears to off the 
table for any restructuring plan.  Byles said that 80 percent of 
the domestic debt is short-term in nature and matures within ten 
years; of this, fifty percent is at a fixed rate  with the balance 
in variable rate instruments.  According to Byles, this variable 
rate portion would be the target for any restructuring plan.  This 
debt was issued at interest rates between 17 and 24 percent, with 
some issued as recently as last year.   However, he cautioned that 
those holding the lower end of this interest rate spectrum might 
flee to debt instruments issued by other countries, such as 
Trinidad and Tobago, that are paying  a seven percent rate of 
return and have a very low risk of default. 
 
 
 
At Least Three Firms At Risk for Failure 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Both Hylton and Byles mentioned that at least three smaller 
financial institutions in Jamaica are at risk of failing. 
Speculation is that the three are Capital and Credit Merchant Bank, 
Jamaica Money Market Brokers (JMMB), and possibly Barita 
Investments.  Each holds a disproportionate amount of GOJ debt 
compared to other assets, and would not likely survive a move to 
significantly restructure the debt.  JMMB announced on November 18 
that it was acquiring 80 percent of a Dominican Republic savings 
and loan in order to reduce its investment portfolio in certain 
areas until the markets improve.  Hylton said the Bank of Jamaica 
has had to intervene to support these (unnamed) institutions, and 
appears to be pushing for a merger among them in order to 
strengthen their position and stave off a collapse. 
 
 
 
Business Confidence Stalling, Panic Could Follow 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (C) Any collapse of a financial institution, regardless how 
small, would send shockwaves throughout the financial services 
sector and panic through an already skittish economy (Reftel C). 
(NOTE:  Jamaica is still recovering from a collapse of several 
Ponzi schemes, most notably Olint and Cash Plus (Reftel D).  Olint 
once held an estimated USD 220 million in deposits while Cash Plus 
held  close to USD 45 million.  As liquidators work through the 
records of these schemes, it appears that investors will recover 
only pennies on the dollar in compensation, if anything at all. 
END NOTE).  Both Byles and Hylton said the fallout from the 
collapse of these schemes is still making its way through the 
economic system.  This could lead to higher loan defaults following 
a surge in consumption spending, as investors anticipated outsized 
returns from the schemes.  The private sector is also holding its 
breath for an IMF Standby Agreement, which continues to be pushed 
back (Reftel C).  The GOJ has also telegraphed that the Standby 
Agreement is for USD 1.2 billion, a figure that the GOJ apparently 
pulled out of the air (Reftel D).  Hylton said that if the IMF 
agreement is for only USD 800 million, it will send a panic through 
the system.  Byles made a similar comment and said that any further 
delay in a deal, or a deal for less than the amount promised by the 
GOJ, will result in turmoil in the markets. 
 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) Leaders in the Jamaican private sector appear 
uncharacteristically pessimistic about the immediate future of the 
local economy.  They are placing a great deal of hope on the 
proposed IMF Standby Agreement, but have little confidence in PM 
Golding and his JLP-led administration to get it done.  When the 
JLP returned to power in 2007 after 18 years in opposition, the 
victory was met with a groundswell of optimism in the private 
sector, which thought the country would finally chart a course for 
positive growth and put an end to years of deficit spending.  Two 
years later the private sector is now talking about the 
possibility of panic in the markets and the rising risk of capital 
flight, the initial indicators of which are already being seen. 
Unfortunately for Jamaica, there is no other exiled political party 
to restore hope: and there is little confidence that either the 
JLP,  or the opposition Peoples' National Party (PNP), has the 
courage to overcome the current economic crisis.  If an IMF 
breakthrough is not forthcoming, or if the private sector does not 
take up the mantle to work out a debt restructuring deal, Jamaica 
could see its already dire economic situation take a turn for the 
worse. 
Parnell