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DE RUEHBUL #3733/01 3251126
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3322
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS UK AF CAN
SUBJECT: HELMAND VIEWS ON U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affairs Joseph A. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Over a three-week period in October, PRT 
Helmand obtained a wide range of Afghans views (more than 75 
in all) on the issue of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan.  A 
majority thought that, under any scenario, the country,s 
security problems will not be solved soon, with many 
referencing a decades-long timeframe. While the opinions 
below reflect the perspectives of only one province, they 
collectively represent a cross-section of Helmandi public 
opinion that Washington readers may find of interest.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
HELMAND GOVERNOR AND DEPUTY 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In detailed discussions with PRT reps over a 
three-week period in October, a wide range of Afghans 
(numbering more than 75 in total) mostly from southern 
Afghanistan offered views about U.S. troop levels. State 
Representative to the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(2MEB) spoke to Helmand's governor, deputy governor, several 
day laborers, displaced Now Zad residents, approximately 
three dozen Afghan Army officers, non-commissioned officers 
and enlisted soldiers stationed adjacent to Camp Leatherneck. 
 Farah's governor also commented on the subject, as did 
shopkeepers and elders in the city of Delaram (the part of 
Nimruz Province within the 2MEB Area of Operation (AO)). 
 
¶3. (C) Governor Mangal told State, UK FCO, and PRT reps, and 
2d MEB Commanding General, BGen Lawrence Nicholson, in 
mid-October that U.S. troops would be needed in Helmand and 
Afghanistan for some time.  He said it was important also for 
Helmand residents to see more of their own ANSF on the 
streets, adding sarcastically, "Of course, 40,000 more U.S. 
troops will solve terrorism in Afghanistan!"  NOTE:  Governor 
Mangal has been a strong proponent of U.S. Marine operations 
in Helmand, recently telling CENTCOM Commander Petraeus that 
successes in Nawa and Garmsir Districts would also be 
possible in Marjah, an operation on hold pending approval of 
more U.S. troop and associated ANSF commitments.  He said 
Helmandis were asking him "When can Marjah become like Nawa?" 
 END NOTE  Helmand's Deputy Governor Sattar stressed the 
urgency of Afghans seeing less corruption among officials, in 
addition to a stronger ANSF.  In a lengthy discussion over 
tea at the governor's residence, he said that the coalition 
needed to focus its primary efforts on ANSF training.  He 
likened simply adding thousands of more troops as continuing 
a "project" that so far had not worked. 
 
FARAH GOVERNOR (AND HIS GUARDS) 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Farah's Governor Amin told State Rep, PRT officer, and 
2d MEB CG that more troops could help improve security in 
outlying areas.  He urged the continued presence of Marine 
units in one of the most remote region of his province 
(Bakwa), and said he did not know the population there (which 
is minimal), claiming that the area served as a Taliban 
transit route.  Governor Amin voiced blunt criticism of the 
central government and its lackluster efforts to beat back 
corruption; some parts of the government, he said pointedly, 
"supported the Taliban" (he did not specify further). 
 
¶5. (U) Two of Governor Amin's guards (natives of Kunduz and 
Kunar Provinces) offered contrasting views while seated under 
ripe pomegranate trees.  One said his family and friends did 
not want more U.S. troops to arrive because of the increased 
number of IEDs targeting them, which inevitably left 
civilians hurt.  The other said, "I am sure more troops will 
come, but it is more important to win support from the people 
and to build our army."  Both said Americans needed to talk 
more publicly about strengthening the Afghan army in 
particular.  The Kunar native said that the arrival of U.S. 
troops there had led to more fighting in his home province, 
not less.  Each considered the level of troop commitment to 
be less important than the duration of the coalition 
presence; the guard (an ex-ANA soldier) from Kunduz said he 
"could not imagine" how long a U.S.-Afghanistan security 
partnership was needed, but estimated "more than 30 years" 
was necessary. 
 
DAY LABORERS 
------------ 
 
¶6. (U) A group of day laborers based at Camp Leatherneck told 
the State Rep that more troops might help in the short-term; 
however, over the long term, the situation could become a 
 
KABUL 00003733  002 OF 003 
 
 
trap.  One worker (a Kabul native) said that Afghans also 
needed to hear from the U.S. that "eventually, you Americans 
will leave -- not only that you will stay and help the 
government and army become stronger."  He said a majority of 
his poor family members and neighbors in the capital did not 
see the U.S. military as occupiers per se, but that more and 
more were feeling uneasy about our intentions and the 
unwanted but unavoidable effects of a larger foreign military 
presence.  The laborer said that unemployed, uneducated 
Afghan youth ("some are my friends") were especially 
susceptible to anti-coalition rhetoric. 
 
DISPLACED NOW ZAD RESIDENTS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) About a dozen displaced residents from Now Zad 
currently living in Kwaja Jamal (KJ) on the outskirts of the 
abandoned city described being caught in the middle of U.S. 
Marines and still active Taliban elements in the area.  One 
elder referred to a Pashtun declaring "today, we are caught 
between a tiger and a lion -- your side and the Taliban on 
the other side."  Two children gathered nearby said that they 
only felt safe when they saw ANA around their mud compounds. 
 
¶8. (U) One teenager loudly argued that more U.S. troops would 
create "more war" and that many in the area would rather be 
left alone.  NOTE: A Marine company is stationed in Now Zad, 
which remains abandoned because of its IED and mine-infested 
streets; the day before the foot patrol, a Marine was killed 
by an IED (double amputation) and several others were 
wounded.  As 2d MEB CG, USAID Rep, and State Rep walked to 
the KJ area, a group of locals gathering fire wood nearby 
detonated two more IEDs, killing one and 
wounding seven.  Now Zad's district governor has agreed to be 
based full-time in the area once he is formally approved in 
that position by Kabul officials; work on renovating the 
downtown bazaar is also set to begin.  END NOTE. 
 
DELARAM SHOPKEEPERS 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) While drinking green tea outside several shops in 
downtown Delaram (situated along a busy transit corridor in 
Nimruz Province), eight shopkeepers offered their views about 
U.S. troop levels.  The oldest asked, "What benefit have we 
seen so far?  Will more troops bring more of the same?"  He 
added that funds being spent on U.S. troops should instead be 
directed toward the ANA.  Another argued that "even one 
million more troops" would not be enough to solve 
Afghanistan's problems.  Their most immediate concerns 
centered on access to a local mosque (near a joint 
ANSF-Marine base) and electricity projects.  Several said 
Marines had helped improve security in the immediate area, 
but that Taliban retained free movement farther away. 
 
AFGHAN ARMY OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) In a two-hour exchange at an ANA base located 
adjacent to Camp Leatherneck, approximately three dozen 
Afghan army officers and soldiers (NCOs and enlisted among 
them) commented on possible increases in U.S. troop levels. 
Most had spent years fighting in Helmand and southern 
Afghanistan, many alongside coalition forces.  In one notable 
exchange, the unit's most senior member (a grizzled 36-year 
veteran of the ANA and native of mountainous eastern 
Afghanistan) offered the following assessment (comments 
verbatim): 
 
-"I have served 36 years in the army.  Wars always destroy 
nations.  Our war in Afghanistan continues to be brought to 
us by other countries, especially those near to us." 
 
-"The whole world knows that the U.S. is a superpower.  But 
most people want you to send assets to Afghanistan that bring 
peace, not more assets that bring war.  More war equipment is 
what the enemy wants here, the enemies of the U.S. people and 
the Afghan people." 
 
-"Afghanistan's ground yells for water projects, wheat 
fields; it is not yelling for more war equipment.  Afghans do 
not want more Americans killed and wounded on our land.  War 
equipment does not talk to us." 
 
NOTE:  After his lengthy remarks, the room erupted in loud 
applause.  One lieutenant emphasized the pride ANA took in 
their mission to bring security to Afghanistan, while 
acknowledging direct U.S. support would be needed for several 
more years.  While those gathered represented a limited 
 
KABUL 00003733  003 OF 003 
 
 
sample of ANA officers and soldiers, their near universal 
response to the senior ANA soldier,s comments stood out; 
only one officer, at the outset of the session, argued openly 
in favor of a large U.S. combat troop increase. 
 
¶11. (C) Other gathered ANA officers and soldiers stressed 
that Afghans knew how to fight, and many did not understand 
why the U.S. wanted to spend large amounts of money bringing 
in more U.S. forces.  The funds would be better spent on 
higher ANA and ANP salaries and expanded recruitment and 
training.  The people trusted the ANA.  Afghans would 
cooperate with them, they argued. 
 
¶12. (C) The ANA brigade's chief artillery officer also noted 
that due to political paralysis in Kabul, "no new major 
operations were underway, only simple patrols; we are waiting 
for new orders."  He added that ANA units in Kabul had been 
placed on high alert for several weeks (and seemed to imply 
that the potential for civil unrest, not just 
election-related Taliban attacks, was the main reason). 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶13. (C) This diverse sample of Afghans voiced a common theme 
(apart from a few exceptions):  security in 
Afghanistan needed to come primarily from more (and better) 
Afghan forces -- not through additional American troops. 
Even Helmand Governor Mangal, a vocal advocate of the 
improved security the Marine forces have been able to bring 
to Helmand since their arrival, stepped back from a private 
endorsement of any large combat troop increase beyond those 
forces necessary for a clearing operation in Marjah.  His 
counterpart in Farah, Governor Amin, more closely (and more 
predictably) tracks with what we hear from official-type 
interactions with government leaders on the question of more 
troops: the more the better. 
 
¶14. (C) In contrast, the overall sense from many 
man-on-the-street type interactions more accurately conveys 
the current public mood in Helmand.  This sentiment boils 
down to a theme of a) don't leave, b) keep partnering, but 
also c) don't think sending in new U.S. military forces is 
the best option.  Most apparent in these conversations -- 
whether in a room filled with animated ANA officers and 
soldiers or conversing with elders in front of mud compounds 
and rundown bazaar shops -- was an implied question:  just 
how long will the coalition stay in Afghanistan?  The size of 
our ongoing troop commitment seemed to matter less in their 
minds than U.S.-led coalition stamina, the extent to which 
our side of the partnership will endure.  One Helmand elder 
remarked that Afghanistan's challenges were not only military 
or political in nature but generational. 
 
¶15. (U) This cable was drafted by the State Representative to 
the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and its Commanding 
General, Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, has reviewed 
this cable. 
Mussomeli