VZCZCXRO5943
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3658/01 3161228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121228Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3159
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003658 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AID ECON PHUM PREL AF ELAB SOCI PGOV KPRM
PREF 
SUBJECT: JUVENILE HUMAN RIGHTS AT RISK IN AFGHAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  According to UNICEF's Chief of Child 
Protection, the situation for children in Afghanistan has 
improved only slightly, if at all, nationwide -- despite the 
proliferation of NGOs in-country and the volume of money 
channeled toward children's programs. Poverty-reduction 
programs are apparently not reaching many financially 
insecure families, creating incentives for juvenile crime and 
exploitation.  The juvenile justice system, while making some 
improvements, often denies children basic rights.  This 
report is the first in a series of cables on children at risk 
in Afghanistan.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Poloffs met with outgoing UNICEF Chief of Child 
Protection Noriko Izumi on September 30 and incoming Chief 
Helen Schulte on November 2 to discuss the issues on the 
ground regarding child protection in Afghanistan.  Child 
arrests, particularly those by the National Directorate of 
Security (NDS), remain a key UNICEF concern.  At any given 
time, 20-30 children are being detained in the general 
juvenile population for "crimes against national security," 
including  suspected suicide bombing.  (NOTE: The detention 
of children for national security issues contravenes the 
spirit of the Afghan Juvenile Code, which presumes that 
children cannot be held to the same standard as adults.  END 
NOTE.)  Ironically, NDS child arrests are a means of tracking 
insurgency groups' recruitment patterns.  The Taliban 
allegedly offer high pay to recruits, including offers to 
feed the children's families, and they may be targeting 
internally displaced persons in camps.  Only anecdotal 
evidence exists for this claim, however, as UN monitoring has 
been impossible given the insecurity and inaccessibility of 
certain sections of the country. 
 
¶3. (U) Background: The law recognizes that children in 
custody deserve certain legal protections: in practice, their 
basic rights and many aspects of due process are often 
denied, including presumption of innocence, the right to be 
informed of charges, access to defense lawyers, and the right 
to not be forced to confess.  Detention is supposed to 
function as a last resort, and the juvenile rehabilitation 
centers (JRCs) are to house only convicted child prisoners. 
But in practice, children are routinely detained pre and 
post-trial; some are treated as adults; and some released 
into the general prison populations of Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ)-run facilities.  Many of the juveniles in the criminal 
justice system are victims rather than perpetrators of crime, 
particularly crimes of sexual exploitation.  Some children 
are allegedly imprisoned as a family proxy for the actual 
perpetrator, who may be a breadwinner. 
 
¶4. (U) The Juvenile Code regards children at risk, children 
in need of care and protection, and children in conflict with 
the law, as equally under their purview.  One potential 
byproduct of such treatment is the unnecessary 
institutionalization of children, but according to Izumi, 
some juvenile detainees intentionally commit crimes in order 
to take advantage of the shelter, food, and education the 
juvenile detention centers offer.  Yet the conditions of the 
JRCs are troubling: only two of the country's 30 JRCs are 
owned; the rest are rented, and are thus in serious 
disrepair. (NOTE: Four provinces lack JRCs: Panjshir, 
Nuristan, Uruzgan, and Paktika. End note.)  The Kabul JRC is 
severely overcrowded. 
 
¶5. (U) Some improvements have occurred: The Ministry of 
Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MoLSAMD) has 
placed one social worker in the Juvenile Criminal 
Investigation Department in Kabul to work alongside police 
and prosecutors.  This is a small but important start in 
recognizing extenuating circumstances for juvenile crime, 
particularly petty crimes such as food theft.  A June 2008 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between MoLSAMD, the 
Ministry of Interior, and the Attorney General's Office, 
currently being revised to include the Supreme Court and the 
MOJ, makes official the role of social workers in child 
protection.  On the basis of this MOU, UNICEF developed a 
social inquiry report (SIR) summarizing an arrested child's 
socioeconomic background so that the prosecution can consider 
relevant family circumstances.  Since June 2009, the SIR has 
been used in every new juvenile case in nine provinces, with 
the result of a significant decrease in sentencing to 
residential JRCs. 
 
¶6. (U) Izumi states that a more substantial social welfare 
system for families is required; the government appears to 
recognize this need.  However, a considerable gap remains in 
the number of trained social workers, a profession which is 
not yet embraced nationally.  Social workers lack 
certification, and an apparent cultural mistrust of social 
work complicates the situation. Formalizing the profession, 
 
KABUL 00003658  002 OF 002 
 
 
including monitoring and regulatory mechanisms, is therefore 
crucial in order to expand child protection activities. 
 
¶7. (U) Family livelihood opportunities remain the central 
source of child protection problems, in Izumi's view.  A 
recent household income survey found that households on the 
western border earned one-fifth the national income; the 
incentives for juvenile crime are thus high.  (NOTE: 
Supporting Izumi's point, a 2007 AIHRC study illustrates the 
role of poverty in juvenile crime in Afghanistan: of children 
AIHRC surveyed in JRCs, 55 percent rated their family "poor" 
or "very poor," 69 percent reported that they had been 
working prior to their arrest; 72 percent of boys had not 
completed primary school; and 34 percent of offenses were 
property-related. Further, "theft" is the second highest 
category of arrest, after "ethical crimes".  END NOTE.) 
 
¶8. (U) Izumi believes that poverty-reduction programs cannot 
reach the families most desperately in need; the poorest 
families often may not qualify, as they are "too risky" to 
qualify for micro-finance programs or "too unstable" to 
qualify for skills training.  (NOTE:  Microfinance programs 
typically require evidence of creditworthiness with criteria 
that impoverished individuals and families often lack: a 
social network through which a loan group can be formed; 
previous entrepreneurial experience; property documents; or 
the recommendation of a community leader or shura.  Thus, for 
example, internally-displaced persons are often ineligible. 
END NOTE.)  Izumi said the international community must 
accept the blame in these scenarios for their unwillingness 
to commit to the neediest families, and thus potentially 
exacerbating the very cycle of poverty they seek to break. 
Further, Izumi believes that Afghanistan's social network is 
fraying and chronically-poor families are increasingly 
vulnerable.  Despite the proliferation of NGOs in country, 
the volume of money channeled toward children's programs, and 
NGO efforts to reach the neediest, the social class gap is 
widening, and children are increasingly at risk. 
 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: Embassy discussions with other NGOs 
involved in child-protection issues confirm Izumi's general 
outlook: an increasing number of children are vulnerable due 
to a difficult economic environment that compels dramatic 
solutions to financial problems, including crime.  Once in 
the criminal justice system, youth are further at risk since 
the justice system, reflecting the culture at large, is only 
now beginning to acknowledge the economic roots of juvenile 
crime.  Further, the system functions in practice with a 
presumption of guilt and a lack of recognition of the 
different needs of youth.  End Comment. 
EIKENBERRY