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OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3487/01 3051736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011736Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2689
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003487 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2019 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 27 MEETING WITH BALKH GOVERNOR ATTA 
 
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Coordinator Scott Kilner 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY:  Balkh Governor Atta, an ardent Abdullah 
supporter, believes Abdullah Abdullah,s presidential runoff 
preconditions are "completely reasonable."  During an October 
27 meeting with Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) Doug 
Climan and PRT Officers, Atta suggested that accurate 
first-round voting tallies would have given Abdullah more 
votes than Karzai; accordingly, he anticipates that a fair 
and free second round would yield an Abdullah victory.  He 
implied that violence could break out if the second round 
process is compromised.  He conceded that there are two areas 
in Balkh province - Chemtal and Char Bolak - that might 
benefit from enhanced security measures on election day.  The 
Governor expressed confidence that he will retain regional 
and national political influence regardless of the outcome of 
the presidential election, and regardless of whether or not 
he remains Governor of Balkh Province.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Atta voiced support for Abdullah's list of 
preconditions for the second round of the presidential 
elections.  He characterized the terms as reasonable and easy 
for Karzai to implement quickly.  In fact, in Atta's view, 
Abdullah was being too much the diplomat in putting forth a 
"soft" list of preconditions.  Arguing that "you can't 
prevent fraud" just by promising to do so, Atta said he had 
advocated stronger measures, including dismissal of the 
entire IEC Steering Committee - not just IEC Chairman Ludin. 
After all, Atta said, the IEC Steering Committee and others 
seeking to engineer aKarzai victory had "paralyzed 
democracy" and played games with ballots and with the 
emotions of the electorate, disappointing voters by "wasting 
$310 million" on a "travesty" of an election.  Given election 
authorities' involvement in fraud during the first round, 
Atta wondered how anyone could guarantee against these 
authorities perpetrating fraud in the second round.  Warming 
to his theme, Atta said that he personally believes elections 
rules should include banning from the second round any 
candidate complicit in electoral fraud during the first 
round.  However, he added that the Abdullah campaign has not 
asked for that. 
 
¶3. (C) SCR reminded Atta that in an October 12 meeting Atta 
had disclosed his preference for a runoff (rather than a 
negotiated end to the first round) and asked what steps could 
ensure a fair and safe second round process.  Atta conceded 
that Abdullah supporters were very pleased about the decision 
to move to a second round.  He credited the international 
community for overcoming a determined effort by highly-placed 
Karzai supporters to deliver a first round victory to Karzai. 
 He made clear that he believes Karzai supporters are 
prepared to resort to fraud in the second round, too.  He 
highlighted several of Abdullah's preconditions as essential 
to militating against fraud: Ludin's removal, suspension of 
selected central government ministers, and insertion of 
Abdullah-supporting observers into ministries suspected of 
fraudulent election-related activities. 
 
¶4. (C) Atta asked about the aims of the U.S. and others in 
the international community.  Were they seeking security, 
democracy and development for Afghanistan?  Was the primary 
goal to ensure Karzai's re-election?  SCR assured him that 
the U.S. seeks free and fair elections.  The U.S. Government 
has no illusions that it is possible to establish perfect 
democratic institutions immediately, but it is important to 
work towards this goal. 
 
Election-Day Security 
 
¶5. (C) Atta expressed confidence in election-related security 
arrangements for Balkh, although he acknowledged that Taliban 
attacks are possible anywhere in Afghanistan.  He initially 
denied the need for any heightened security presence at 
particular polling centers in Balkh, but when pressed, 
admitted that Chemtal and Char Bolak could be more vulnerable 
to election-day security threats. 
 
If Karzai Wins Second Round 
 
¶6. (C) Asked whether he would be willing to continue as 
Governor in the event Karzai wins re-election, Atta said he 
might, but only/only if Karzai (1) were elected 
"democratically" and (2) began revising his policies.  Of 
course, he added, Karzai might not ask him to remain as 
Governor. 
 
¶7. (C) As if to banish the thought of a Karzai victory, Atta 
 
KABUL 00003487  002 OF 002 
 
 
then shifted to a discussion of violence.  He stated his 
constant and firm opposition to the "culture of violence." 
But he then raised the possibility that some would react 
violently if the second-round election process turns out to 
be undemocratic and non-transparent.  He noted that IEC 
Chairman Ludin "already has predicted" that Karzai will be 
the winner.  According to Atta, the Abdullah camp believes 
that an accurate accounting of first-round voting totals 
would have shown that Abdullah out-polled Karzai, 1.75 
million votes to 1.3 million.  He added that Abdullah 
supporters are optimistic that Abdullah will receive even 
more votes in the second round; therefore, they expect 
victory.  Atta claimed the Abdullah camp is not concerned 
about Abdullah receiving enough votes to win, but about fraud 
in the calculation and reporting of the results.  He strongly 
implied that any IEC decision declaring Karzai the winner of 
the runoff would be suspect. 
 
¶8. (C) SCR underscored the international community's 
commitment to fair and transparent elections.  He solicited 
Atta's views on what more the international community could 
do to ensure a clean election, given that ultimately the 
election process would be Afghan-led.  Sticking to his 
earlier line, Atta reiterated the need to implement 
Abdullah's preconditions.  He urged the international 
community to lend its support. 
 
Role of Regional IEC Staff 
 
¶9. (C) Atta characterized the conduct in the first round of 
elections in his own province as "the best in the country," 
saying he and his colleagues were determined to avoid 
interfering in the democratic process (of elections).  He 
claimed that there was first-round fraud in such "pro-Karzai" 
provinces as Sar-e-pol and Faryab, but that the level of 
fraud paled in comparison to "pro-Karzai fraud" elsewhere. 
He declined to tag IEC regional officials with responsibility 
for the voting irregularities that did occur in the North, 
saying he thought officials at that level of the IEC "were 
not in a position" to perpetrate large-scale fraud. 
 
Atta's Political Future 
 
¶10. (C) Prompted to revisit the question of his own political 
future if he no longer is Balkh governor, Atta reiterated his 
determination to remain active politically.  (See reftel.) 
He cast himself as a political figure with influence well 
beyond Balkh province, even extending to provinces in the 
east, such as Paktika, Logar, Parwan and Nangarhar.  As a 
member of the political opposition, he would continue to use 
his influence to seek changes in government policies. 
 
¶11. (C) Reflecting upon his relationship with Karzai, Atta 
said Karzai had had great affection for him.  However, the 
two differed on both "approaches and ideas," and Karzai 
failed to consider implementing Atta's suggestions for 
reform.  According to Atta, his "problem" was that he tried 
to address corruption in the administration and tried to talk 
to Karzai about the development of a "narco-Mafia" within his 
government - a "narco-Mafia" that he said is causing a 
day-by-day increase in violence and insecurity.  Atta 
expressed concern that, barring implementation of substantial 
reforms, Afghanistan would again become "the land of 
terrorism and narco-business." 
 
Comment 
 
¶12. (C) Atta met SCR and PRT Officers in the evening at his 
"political office," rather than at the Governor's office. 
Dressed in traditional robes, a sport jacket and sandals, 
rather than one of the well-tailored Western suits he wears 
at the Governor's office, he was the picture of relaxation. 
But he displayed his usual political agility, taking 
positions that offer him (and/or the Abdullah campaign) 
maximum flexibility: If Karzai wins, Atta can attribute the 
victory to fraud.  If a Karzai victory sparks violence, he 
can say "Personally, I hate violence, but I told you so." 
Likewise, having cast his lot with Abdullah, Atta 
nevertheless leaves the door open to continuing as Governor 
of Balkh under a Karzai-led central government.  For all his 
cold-blooded political calculations and the ostentatious 
trappings of both his offices, Atta sometimes displays a 
self-effacing charm.  But his self-confidence, his sense that 
he a man destined for even bigger things, usually comes to 
the fore.  It is clear that he is not contemplating 
retirement from public life. 
EIKENBERRY