VZCZCXRO3175
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFN #0462/01 3341905
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301905Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3001
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0360
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 FREETOWN 000462 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/AAE (KGOLDSTEIN) 
EMBASSY BRUSSELS FOR DOJ/DEA (TSCARANTINO) 
EMBASSY ACCRA FOR DOJ/DEA (JBREEDEN) 
DOJ FOR DEA/OS/OSE (MCMANAMON) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE NARCOTICS WRAP-UP, 2009 
 
REF: A. FREETOWN 270 
     ¶B. FREETOWN 424 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/ 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Sierra Leone continues to stay invested in 
the narcotics issue, and attempting to become more pro-active 
operationally despite resource constraints. International 
actors, including post, UK/SOCA, and the UN remain sources of 
support and encouragement, while also advancing our own 
strategic interests. The JDITF is experiencing some growing 
pains, including integrity and security issues, but has made 
some positive gains through low-level busts and increased 
intelligence-gathering efforts. New information indicates 
that though Sierra Leone is not a direct platform for 
narcotrafficking as it was before the 07/13/2008 plane bust, 
it is being used to support operations taking place in 
Guinea. These activities could embolden networks to establish 
or re-establish themselves here, particularly since a 
high-level of vigilance, even with political will from the 
executive branch, is nearly impossible to maintain in 
poverty-stricken countries. This cable will highlight the 
following topics: JDITF successes and setbacks; Sierra 
Leonean operational priorities; and international community 
involvement and intelligence. End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
JDITF: SUCCESSES AND SETBACKS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The JDITF is pressing forward, focusing since the last 
update (reftel A) on promoting itself for donor recognition 
and support and conducting small-scale busts of cannabis 
farms and Nigerian mules. The main issue that continues to 
face the JDITF is its legal status, particularly vis a vis 
the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and a White 
Paper was drafted which will soon be presented to the 
National Security Council (NSC). The White Paper outlines the 
threat of transnational organized crime to Sierra Leone, and 
proposes that the NSC legally mandate the formal 
establishment of the JDITF, which will eventually be expanded 
into a transnational organized crime unit. Under the National 
Security and Central Intelligence Act (2002), the NSC can 
create sub-committees it deems necessary to fulfill its 
mandate without Cabinet and Parliamentary approval. While 
this will not take authority away from the NDLEA, it will 
give the JDITF solid legal and political legitimacy. Informed 
security contacts indicate that a revised National Drugs 
Control Act is expected in 2010, and could relegate the NDLEA 
back to a policy unit focusing on demand-reduction, 
rehabilitation, and public awareness. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Regardless of the JDITF's technical status, donors 
continue to show interest in supporting it thanks to their 
regular outreach. The German government recently donated USD 
500,000 through the UN to provide equipment and three 
vehicles, and a UN assessment team visited in November to 
start solidifying plans for the West African Coast Initiative 
(WACI), an element of which will establish transnational 
crime units in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote 
d'Ivoire. Should the TCU project be fully-funded, Sierra 
Leone will receive approximately USD 3,000,000 over three 
years. The assessment team consisted of representatives from 
UNODC, Interpol. UN-DPKO, and UNOWA, who stated their intent 
to focus on boosting intelligence-gathering and sharing 
efforts through the Office of National Security (ONS) and the 
Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU). There is 
currently no timeline for this project. On November 30, SOCA 
provided three vehicles for surveillance work, and has 
requested three more. The mini-Dublin Group, chaired by the 
British High Commissioner, had its second meeting in November. 
 
¶4. (C) The JDITF's operational work has been hampered by 
resource constraints and an ongoing struggle to maintain 
integrity. The recent cannabis farm bust, "Operation Green 
Hay," netted several farmers and destroyed their crops, but 
some targets had been tipped off weeks prior (reftel B). The 
JDITF was also responsive to three alerts of potentially 
inbound, load-carrying flights in October, but leaks from the 
JDITF enforcement unit made public knowledge the fact that 
they had been placed on stand-by. The JDITF Management Board 
and external advisors are now reconsidering how best to grade 
intelligence, control access, and activate the task force's 
enforcement arm, as necessary. Open information-sharing, even 
 
FREETOWN 00000462  002 OF 004 
 
 
at senior JDITF levels, appears to carry significant risks: 
ONS/CISU told Poloff that they will only share low-level 
intelligence with their SLP counterparts on the task force, 
and would only pass along "hot" information (i.e.: regarding 
significant cocaine loads or wanted traffickers) if 
absolutely necessary. Even in what is, by Sierra Leonean 
standards, an elite squad, the cadre of SLP officers involved 
below Assistant Inspector General (and JDITF Chairman) Morie 
Lengor, are proving themselves to be hard to fully trust. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SIERRA LEONEAN OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Task Force remains focused on cannabis production 
as an area in which progress can be made, and recently found 
small amounts of what they believe to be crack cocaine during 
a routine marijuana seizure (Note: Drug identification is 
unreliable here, but the amounts were too small to send to 
the UK for testing. End Note.). It appears that large amounts 
of cannabis are being driven over the Guinean border and sold 
- one bale is equivalent to the price of an "okada" 
(motorcycle), which is a lucrative deal for an unemployed 
youth. Besides cannabis, the task force has also had some 
success focusing on Nigerian mules through 
intelligence-gathering and profiling. The SLP recently 
arrested four Nigerians at Lungi Airport on suspicion of drug 
trafficking: one proved to have 26 capsules of cocaine in his 
stomach, while the other three were clean - they remain 
detained for traveling on false Spanish documents. Officers 
have finally started collecting evidence during these 
incidents, including doing a check of all cell phones and 
documenting numbers and contacts (Note: Post passed an 
inventory of numbers from each of the suspects' phones to 
DEA/Accra. End Note.). While little evidence was seized 
beyond their phones and travel papers, the Sierra Leoneans 
are now interested in gathering and analyzing evidence 
themselves, rather than turning it over immediately to SOCA 
or bagging and ignoring it. The "Nkeke" case involving 26 
capsules has also resulted in the arrest of three SLP 
officers assigned to Lungi: they allegedly stole 16 of the 
capsules to sell on their own before turning the suspect and 
remaining cocaine over to the JDITF. 
 
¶6. (C) The Nigerian network, previously unexplored, will 
likely create a significant amount of work for the task 
force. The Nigerian High Commissioner, Godson Echegile, 
reportedly pays informants to track Nigerian criminals 
in-country and has information to share regarding trafficking 
operations. He has allegedly been reticent to provide this 
information to the SLP, which he believes to be corrupt and 
ineffective, but may be willing to pass intelligence to the 
UN and other diplomats: UNIPSIL has made overtures to him, 
and he will likely be invited to the next mini-Dublin Group 
meeting. An approach by the CDA and British High Commissioner 
may also prove effective. At this point, the JDITF does not 
know where the Nigerians procure the cocaine, or where in 
Freetown it is packaged. We do know, though, that more 
Nigerians are traveling in and out of Sierra Leone than ever 
before: Immigration processed more than 400 Nigerians at 
Lungi between August and October. 
 
¶7. (C) Besides new leads, the July 13, 2008 case continues to 
haunt the JDITF. Six individuals wanted in connection with 
the case returned to Sierra Leone from Guinea in September, 
including Narandas Emeric Edward Bangura, an employee of 
Gibrilla Kamara (GK). Narandas reportedly returned to Sierra 
Leone to re-establish GK's business and claim his frozen 
assets and property. The JDITF successfully surveilled and 
arrested the six men, but they were later granted bail 
despite SLP protests. The magistrate, who was likely bribed, 
agreed to rescind bail, but Narandas and the others had 
already fled. CISU suspects that Narandas re-joined his boss 
in Conakry. GK is a sore subject with Task Force members, but 
intelligence suggests that he is laying low in Guinea and 
will likely only return to Sierra Leone if forced to. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT/INTELLIGENCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (C/NF) The British are active in Sierra Leone, and attend 
the Integrated Intelligence Group meetings. Besides providing 
some operational support for JDITF surveillance and busts, 
they are also working their own investigations. One 
 
FREETOWN 00000462  003 OF 004 
 
 
individual of interest is Mohib Shamel (Sierra Leonean cell 
no. 076-700-259), a Lebanese-Brit who works out of Birmingham 
and visits Sierra Leone every six weeks. The Shamel family is 
active in the mining sector here, and Mohib reportedly comes 
to Sierra Leone to do charity work in the Kono District. 
According to SOCA, however, he is connected to Daniel 
Kinahan, an Irish businessman involved in narcotrafficking 
throughout Europe and currently the target of a major 
investigation. SOCA believes that Shamel represents Kinahan 
in Sierra Leone, and that Kinahan may be interested in 
expanding his network to West Africa. Shamel is reportedly in 
communication with individuals who worked for/with the 
Perezes. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) On the intelligence side, SOCA has received 
information that a meeting is expected to take place soon 
between three Colombians, one Dutch, and one Danish 
individual to discuss narco-trafficking opportunities in 
Guinea. If the meeting goes well, they will reportedly travel 
from Sierra Leone to Guinea: SOCA implied that the Colombians 
are already active in the sub-region, and that the Europeans 
are potential partners for them. While further information is 
classified and cannot be shared, SOCA contact said that they 
have names and numbers for the individuals, and may share 
more in the coming days or weeks. 
 
¶10. (C) The Spanish have a new interest in Sierra Leone, 
based on a Sierra Leonean-flagged vessel that has been 
involved in human smuggling and linked to narcotics 
trafficking. The "Jean Marie" is a target of the Spanish 
Drugs and Organized Crime Unit, which placed a transponder on 
it in Dakar in 2008. Suspected of carrying loads of people 
and possibly drugs between Sierra Leone/Liberia/Guinea and 
the Canary Islands, it also made a trip to the Delta de 
Orinoco area of Venezuela. In late 2008, it returned to 
Freetown from Venezuela and the transponder subsequently died 
or was removed. On November 25, the SOCA representative 
positively identified the Jean Marie at a Sierra Leone 
marina, following what some consider to be a lackluster CISU 
search for it (Note: The Jean Marie is owned by the uncle of 
CISU's Director General. Some feel he deliberately delayed 
the search, while others believe it simply wasn't a priority 
relative to other issues. There is no indication that the 
CISU DG is corrupt. End Note). Because the Spanish don't have 
a bilateral agreement with Sierra Leone to conduct 
operations, they will likely prevail upon SOCA to remove, and 
possibly replace, the transponder. One interesting note is 
that the vessel moored directly next to the Jean Marie in 
Freetown appears to be the same as the one it was 
photographed next to in Senegal. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The JDITF is struggling with expected issues, such as 
limited resources and maintaining operational integrity. 
While their efforts, particularly in addressing the new 
Nigerian concerns, are laudable, the enforcement branch is 
currently not trustworthy enough to handle sensitive 
information. They can and should be a partner in any 
significant initiatives, but only with the caveat that 
information and plans be carefully channeled through top 
leadership with controls placed on who knows what and when. 
This view is shared by others in the international community, 
including SOCA and the UK Advisor to ONS. The JDITF is 
currently cutting its teeth on low-level cases, and until 
they prove themselves ready for robust investigations, will 
continue to be somewhat marginalized by Sierra Leonean 
intelligence interests and others. That said, the JDITF 
Management Board is aware of the issues, and seeking to 
remedy them as best they can. 
 
¶12. (C/NF) Comment, Con't: The Sierra Leoneans are currently 
not generating information about major narcotics interests in 
the country, but continue to track those linked to the 
Perezes, and surveilled Shamel on SOCA's behalf. Information 
about the possible meeting of Colombian and European 
interests indicates that Sierra Leone is, at the very least, 
seen as a "safe" location for meetings and possibly for 
logistics bases. Though Guinea appears to still be the 
preferred place for doing business, a change there could push 
activity to Sierra Leone. While capacity has somewhat 
increased to address an influx, there continues to be 
significant limitations in what Sierra Leone can do. End 
 
FREETOWN 00000462  004 OF 004 
 
 
Comment. 
FEDZER