VZCZCXRO3997
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHFN #0453/01 3241219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201219Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2990
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 FREETOWN 000453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS SL
SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS LIBEL LAW 
 
¶1. Summary: On November 10, Sierra Leone's Supreme Court 
dismissed a suit brought by the Sierra Leone Association of 
journalists (SLAJ) that sought to repeal portions of the 1965 
Public Order Act criminalizing libel, nearly two years after 
the action was instituted. The country's journalists' 
association asked the Supreme Court to interpret certain 
portions of the 1965 Public Order Act, and also consider 
repealing the part that criminalizes libel. SLAJ argued that 
the provisions of the Act contravene the country's 1991 
constitution and inhibits free speech. The Supreme Court 
dismissed the suit in its entirety, saying that the Act 
requires no further interpretation and that it poses "no 
imminent threat" to journalists. SLAJ said they are 
disappointed by the ruling, but will continue to urge the 
President to make good on his pre-election promise to review 
and possibly repeal it. The judicial ruling, however, could 
leave the President with very little maneuverability on this 
issue. End Summary. 
 
¶2. SLAJ filed a complaint with the Supreme Court in February 
2008, challenging the constitutionality of certain portions 
of the 1965 Public Order Act. The 1965 Public Order Act 
stipulates prison terms of one to three years for the 
malicious publication of "defamatory matter," and denies 
truth as a defense. SLAJ asked the Court to determine the 
following questions: (1) whether the provisions of those 
portions of the Public Order Act criminalizing libel without 
the caveat of truth contravene the right of freedom of speech 
guaranteed by the constitution; and (2) whether the 
provisions of those sections can be demonstrably justifiable 
in light of Sierra Leone's obligations under international 
conventions. SLAJ also asked the Court to grant declaratory 
judgment regarding the following: that the sections 
criminalizing free speech are unconstitutional, and therefore 
null and void; and the restricting the right of freedom of 
expression under Section 25(2) of the Constitution does not 
(save the provisions of Section 26, 27, 32-36) and cannot be 
demonstrably justifiable in a democratic society. 
 
¶3. SLAJ argued that the law poses a threat to press freedom, 
and that it is neither reasonable nor necessary in a 
democratic society. Three senior journalists submitted 
affidavits to the Court detailing their harsh experiences 
with the libel law. Final arguments were presented before the 
Court on March 9, 2009, and the Court was required to hand 
down a verdict within the constitutionally-mandated time 
limit of three months. In June, SLAJ implemented a five-day 
media blackout on the judiciary protesting the Supreme 
Court's failure to rule on the case within the stipulated 
timeframe. The protest was called off after President Koroma 
assured SLAJ that he would urge the Supreme Court to hand 
down a verdict. 
 
¶4. The Supreme Court's judgment dismissed the SLAJ motion in 
its entirety. The Court found no ambiguity in the words used 
both in Section 25 of the Constitution or the portions the 
1965 Public Order Act in question. The Court also said the 
first question of the motion seemed to indicate an 
"application" of the law and not an "interpretation" of it. 
Even if that were the case, it ruled that such a claim must 
"be based on a factual situation and must not be speculative 
and hypothetical as the present case." The Court also 
dismissed the two declaratory claims on the grounds that they 
did not meet the strict standards required for granting 
declaratory judgment on constitutional questions. Among 
others, it said that to warrant a declaratory judgment, an 
applicant must have proven that he or she has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a 
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he or she has 
suffered in some infinite way common with people generally. 
Furthermore, it said SLAJ could not prove that "its legal 
rights have been infringed or likely to be infringed nor the 
exclusive suffering it has sustained or likely to sustain." 
 
 
¶5. On November 13, SLAJ issued a press release expressing its 
disappointment at the judgment. It dismissed the judgment as 
the "toughest legal setback for the struggle for press 
freedom, media pluralism and freedom of expression in Sierra 
Leone in recent times, with far reaching implications for 
professional media practice and democratic governance." SLAJ 
said it would, however, continue to urge President Koroma to 
make good on his pre-election promise to review the law. The 
government has not issued any official statement on the 
ruling. 
 
¶6. Comment: Koroma showed a willingness to work on this 
issue, though he never committed to repealing it: this is in 
direct opposition to the stance of former President Kabbah, 
who used the libel sections of the law to file suits against 
his detractors. However, SLAJ myopically painted Koroma into 
 
FREETOWN 00000453  002 OF 002 
 
 
a corner by filing the suit and pushing for a legal decision, 
which makes it all but impossible for him to request a review 
without giving the appearance of Executive Branch 
interference with judicial independence. Given the Court's 
history of bias in favor of the Public Order Act - one 
justice filed numerous successful libel suits, and the Chief 
Justice has historically ruled against journalists in such 
cases - SLAJ would likely have been better-served by focusing 
their energy on garnering civil society and popular support 
for a Presidentially-mandated review. This strategic error 
could mean that the Public Order Act will continue to stand 
in Sierra Leonean jurisprudence for years to come. End 
Comment. 
CRISS