VZCZCXRO8359
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDO #0690/01 3291131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251131Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9533
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000690 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG QA
SUBJECT: MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD COMMENTS ON HOW TO ADVANCE 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
-------------- 
(C) KEY POINTS 
-------------- 
 
--  Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud 
told Ambassador November 24 that Qatar and the United States, 
as strategic partners, seek the same strategic goals in a 
Middle East peace.  However, the two sides differ in some of 
their approaches towards those shared goals. 
 
--  Al-Mahmoud said Qatar supports Hamas in part because it 
won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, 
elections in which Qatar had "pushed Hamas" to participate -- 
at the specific request of the United States and other 
governments. 
 
-- Al-Mahmoud said Qatar also supports Mahmoud Abbas and does 
not want him to resign. 
 
--  Ambassador briefly explored with Al-Mahmoud how Qatar and 
the USG might form the same kind of constructive relationship 
and reinforcing approach on the peace process that they have 
on Darfur, an approach strongly welcomed by Al-Mahmoud, the 
GOQ point man on Darfur. 
 
--  On a possible POTUS-Amir meeting, Ambassador and 
Al-Mahmoud agreed that such a meeting needed to be thoroughly 
discussed and prepped by both sides, so that there were no 
missteps, misunderstandings, or miscues during such a crucial 
meeting. 
 
End Key Points. 
 
¶1. (C)  In a November 24 meeting with Ambassador, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud presented Qatar's 
thinking on advancing peace between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  He noted that Hamas won the Palestinian 
elections.  As such, "in this region we do not see them as a 
terrorist organization."  Even though Qatar and U.S. policies 
on Hamas differ, Al-Mahmoud stressed that Qatar and the U.S. 
are of one mind in support of peace.  Qatar and the U.S., for 
example, share the goal that Mahmoud Abbas stay on as head of 
the Palestinian Authority. 
 
¶2. (C) Al-Mahmoud offered that Abbas resigned because the 
international community is talking, but taking no action. 
Israeli settlement activity has not fully stopped, and the 
results on the ground are not changing.  "The U.S. asks the 
Arabs to do 1, 2, 3 -- but no one makes demands of Israel." 
Al-Mahmoud reiterated that Qatar and the U.S. share the same 
objectives, but not necessarily the same procedures in 
reaching them.  Noting that Hamas participated in the 2006 
Palestinian parliamentary elections and won, he said it was 
impossible for Qatar to isolate them as terrorists after "we 
pushed them to participate." 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador asked if Al-Mahmoud thought it would be 
possible for the United States and Qatar to develop common, 
or at least mutually reinforcing, steps toward the strategic 
goal they share:  a resolution of the Arab-Isareli issue. 
"Yes," replied Al-Mahmoud, "if we work together."  He 
reminded Ambassador that in the past Qatar encouraged the 
U.S. to support Shaykh Sharif in Somalia.  The U.S. and Qatar 
at the time did not see eye to eye.  Now, though, the U.S. 
has come around and supports Shaykh Sharif, noted Al-Mahmoud. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador observed that he arrived in Qatar during a 
period of tension in the bilateral political relationship, 
but "we found a way to work together constructively on 
Darfur."  Ambassador underscored all the good that Al-Mahmoud 
personally had achieved by working with Special Envoys for 
Sudan Williamson and (now) Gration.  Bearing this in mind, 
Ambassador asked how Qatar and the U.S. work might work 
together now on the Palestinian problem. 
¶5. (C) Al-Mahmoud responded, in effect, that the best way was 
stepped up engagement within the political relationship. 
Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, had met 
with Secretary Clinton on the margins of the Forum for the 
Future in Morocco.  More meetings, more consultations, were 
the key. 
 
¶6. (C) Al-Mahmoud attributed the problems in the relationship 
to a lack of communication.  The Bush Administration 
"isolated us" and did not want to discuss aims or procedures. 
 The previous Administration, he continued, chose to listen 
to others in the region about Qatar's motives and policies 
and not discuss concerns with us directly.  "As I've told 
you, we want a strategic relationship for now and the 
 
DOHA 00000690  002 OF 002 
 
 
future." 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador asked if there were differences of opinion 
among Qatar's senior leaders on the strategic relationship 
with the U.S.  Al-Mahmoud said in response, "We definitely 
all want better relations." 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to an eventual meeting between President Obama 
and the Amir, Ambassador said any such meeting would need to 
be worked out in advance.  Al-Mahmoud agreed, observing that 
Qatar had some very bad experiences after opening up its 
strategic relationship with the U.S. and did not want a bad 
meeting. 
 
¶9. (C) Al-Mahmoud, noting that Qatar postponed a GCC Foreign 
Ministers' meeting to help make the Forum for the Future a 
success, said Qatar wants to help the U.S. with the burden of 
advancing peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  We know 
that President Obama and the U.S. are sincere in wanting 
peace.  However, Al-Mahmoud said "negotiations without 
preconditions sound good," but the reality is that continued 
Israeli settlement activity does not set the stage for 
productive talks.  The King of Jordan is under pressure; all 
of us are under pressure, said Al-Mahmoud. 
 
LeBaron