VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRY #0716/01 3171329
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY ADD84289 MSI4781-695)
P 131329Z NOV 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4226
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

S E C R E T CONAKRY 000716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY - ADDING REFERENCE CABLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE 
 
REF: CONAKRY 0702 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA MOLLER FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D 
 
¶1. (SBU) This comprehensive look at Guinea three weeks after 
the September 28 killings in the stadium reflects accurately 
the situation in Conakry at that time. Drafted by then Acting 
DCM Cazeau who subsequently left post under ordered 
departure, this piece retains its value. Since the message 
was drafted there has been little real change. The 
commencement of talks in Ouagadougou designed to find a way 
forward that will lead to democratic elections has been the 
most momentous event. 
 
¶2.  (S) SUMMARY.  Although citizens remain shocked and angry, 
Guinea has returned to relative calm and normalcy.  At the 
same time, the political situation remains highly volatile. 
The below discussion provides a baseline analysis of where 
things stand in Guinea post September 28, touching on a 
number of considerations important to USG policy discussions, 
including the junta's perspective, problems with the 
military, the possibility of a power vacuum, the civilian 
response, the posture of the international community, and 
underlying ethnic considerations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) More than three weeks after the September 28 
stadium massacre, Guinea appears to have returned to a state 
of relative calm.  Although scattered violence continued for 
at least three days after the massacre, the national days of 
mourning on October 1 and 2 ushered in what continues to be a 
peaceful, although tense return to business as usual. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The political impasse remains front and center as 
international pressure mounts for the CNDD to step down. 
Strong statements from the U.S., France, the E.U., and the 
International Contact Group for Guinea have galvanized 
civilian leaders who remain firm in their calls for a 
national union government to immediately replace the military 
junta.  International and local actors alike are also pushing 
for an international investigation into human rights abuses, 
an initiative that gains momentum by the day.  Although some 
degree of "normal" has been restored, Guineans wait to watch 
the situation play itself out. 
 
¶5.  (S) The military's egregious human rights abuses have 
effectively destroyed what little credibility the CNDD had 
left.  International and domestic actors alike have put 
elections on hold as the focus has shifted to the immediate 
goal of forcing the junta out of power.  Embassy recognizes 
that there is much debate in Washington about policy 
implications and the way forward. 
 
----- 
DADIS 
----- 
 
¶6.  (S) To date, CNDD President Moussa Dadis Camara has made 
it clear that he has no intention of stepping down. 
Information from contacts suggests that on the contrary, the 
CNDD is under the impression that it can survive for the 
long-term.  Members of the military have demonstrated little 
remorse for the violence, which some feel was necessary to 
reinforce the CNDD's authority.  CNDD leadership may seek to 
appease the population and the international community, but 
only as much as it feels it needs to, and only in so much as 
it serves CNDD's own interests.  In short, the military junta 
is firmly entrenched. 
 
¶7.  (S) That noted, the CNDD does feel the weight of 
international pressure.  The international community has been 
united in a tough position (except for China and perhaps 
Russia). That, coupled with recent announcements such as the 
International Court of Justice's investigation, is reportedly 
sending shockwaves through the ranks of the military.  Some 
of those close to Dadis, such as Sekouba Konate, are 
beginning to realize that if they are to survive 
individually, they need to start distancing themselves from 
Dadis.  In this context, a coup d'etat is a significant 
possibility.  As the current political impasse drags on, it 
is possible that other CNDD players may be increasingly 
willing to &sacrifice8 Dadis (i.e. make him step down) in 
order to maintain the junta,s grasp on power. 
 
¶8.  (S) Although Dadis has rejected calls to step down, it is 
still possible that he may eventually decide that he has no 
other option.  Sustained international and domestic pressure 
on him to do so is critical if Dadis is to feel threatened 
enough to buckle.  If Dadis does step down, several other 
problematic military personalities will need to go with him 
for the sake of stability, including Claude Pivi and Ibrahima 
Diakite Toumbah. 
 
------------ 
THE MILITARY 
------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) Regardless of whether or not Dadis steps down, the 
Guinean military will continue to pose a major problem. 
Factionalism, a pervasive lack of professionalism, and the 
general lack of discipline throughout the rank and file are 
all factors that contribute to Guinea's continued political 
instability.  No one has complete control of the military, 
including Dadis. 
 
¶10.  (S) Many civilian leaders believe that the only way to 
successfully usher in a transition government is to bolster 
that government with external security forces.  While a 
security force might pose a workable short-term solution, it 
may be difficult for that force to extricate itself further 
down the road.  In the meantime, the military has already 
demonstrated the extent to which it is willing to go to 
preserve its grip on power.  Without external intervention, 
the population will have a difficult time pushing its agenda 
for fear of severe retribution. 
 
------------------------ 
THE LOOMING POWER VACUUM 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (S) Assuming that international pressure prevails and 
Dadis does resign, he is going to leave an immediate power 
vacuum.  Civilians will likely call for the installation of a 
national unity government, but it could take days to set one 
up if individual members of Les Forces Vives start jockeying 
for position in order to promote their personal agendas 
(which they have done in the past).  If Dadis departs and 
there is no political solution at hand, chaos could follow. 
The military will seek to maintain its grip on power, likely 
trying to replace Dadis with a more "acceptable" military 
leader to navigate the transition.  In addition, effective 
control of the military will be critical if the factions 
begin to sense that power is up for grabs.  Individual 
members of Les Forces Vives are likely to start cutting 
backdoor power-sharing deals with high level military 
officers. 
 
 
------------- 
THE CIVILIANS 
------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Guineans remain shocked and angered by the September 
28 massacre, but the population as a whole has endured a 
number of such tragedies, perhaps less heinous but certainly 
horrific, over the last fifty years.  This is a population 
that has been held hostage for decades by its own military, 
now more than 30,000 strong.  At the same time, the actual 
number of politically active civilians is relatively small. 
They are led by Guinea's intellectual elites, many of whom 
are considered tainted because of their willingness to work 
for or with former President Conte, and in some cases, with 
Dadis.  Furthermore, the opposition is broadly divided along 
ethnic lines, which fosters distrust and disunity. 
 
¶14.  (S) The opposition was deeply divided up until Dadis 
started indicating that he was considering running for 
president, a development that started forcing individuals to 
unite in a more productive, forceful way.  That unity led to 
the September 28 demonstration and the subsequent violence, 
which has further solidified the opposition as a bloc. 
Unfortunately, as soon as the common enemy (the CNDD) is 
removed, we may start to see cracks in the opposition as 
individuals look to their own agendas once again.  Unity in 
purpose will be all the more critical, however, if civilians 
are to successfully check military attempts to retain power. 
 
¶15.  (S) If international and domestic pressure fails to 
convince Dadis to step down, civilian leaders could 
ultimately decide to live with what they have.  As 
distasteful as this might be, Guineans have a history of 
avoiding conflict and discord to the point of sacrificing any 
chance for positive change.  Time is of the essence.  As 
weeks and months go by with the CNDD still in power, 
civilians are increasingly likely to consider how they can 
make the best of a bad situation.  Again, individual 
interests will come into play here as opportunists explore 
their options.  Currently, the momentum for change is present 
and civilians are not yet close to backing down.  However, 
Guinean history suggests that passive acceptance is a 
possibility. 
 
----------------------- 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
----------------------- 
 
 
¶16.  (S) To date, the international community has taken an 
almost universally tough stance towards the military junta. 
Partners who were difficult to mobilize nine months ago are 
now helping to lead the charge on allegations of human rights 
abuses and assertions that the military junta's time is over. 
 The fact that the violence was so heinous in nature is 
likely to keep Western nations committed to a common course 
of action, at least for the next few months. 
 
¶17.  (S) ECOWAS and the African Union may be more nuanced. 
The two organizations have been firm in their position with 
the rest of the international community, and will likely 
continue to be so as long as the momentum on the ground 
remains steady.  However, if civilians start to back off 
their objective or if the military looks like it is going to 
implode, individual member nations of these African 
organizations could start to waver.  In particular, Guinea's 
neighbors are likely to be concerned about regional security, 
which may ultimately trump concerns about human rights or the 
trajectory of Guinea's leadership.  Maintaining the current 
momentum will be critical to avoid backsliding. 
 
¶18.  (S) The CNDD will be increasingly desperate to find 
friends over the next few weeks.  While the multi-billion 
dollar deal with China (reftel) had been in the works for 
months, the fact that China went ahead and signed it just a 
few days after the rest of the international community 
signaled its commitment to isolate the junta, has thrown the 
CNDD a much needed lifeline.  They will be looking to China, 
and probably Iran and Libya as well, for political and 
economic support in the days ahead.  Russia is also an 
unknown at this point.  As part of the International Contact 
Group for Guinea (ICG-G), Russia agreed to the strong ICG 
statement issued on October 12.  However, Russia's 
involvement is likely to hinge on their economic interests 
and they could take a position more favorable to the CNDD. 
 
--------- 
Ethnicity 
--------- 
 
¶19.  (S) While there have been isolated incidents of ethnic 
violence in Guinea's history, the country has never really 
been seen as at risk for ethnic conflict.  However, Dadis' 
ethnocentric policies have sown the seeds of discontent. 
Furthermore, the September 28 violence is widely viewed as 
having been committed by the Forestiers with the victims 
having been largely Peuhl.  Some members of the Peuhl 
community are angry and want revenge.  Others realize that 
with the CNDD out of the way, they may finally have a chance 
to claim power. 
 
¶20.  (S) If the junta steps down peacefully, ethnic tensions 
should fade into the background.  However, if the military 
implodes or if Dadis is forced out by a coup, we could see 
escalating incidents of ethnically motivated violence.  At 
this point, the liklihood of a large-scale ethnic conflict 
seems minimal.  However, if tensions continue to fester 
without a workable political situation on the horizon, 
ethnicity could become an increasingly dangerous element of 
Guinea,s tenuous transition. 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶21.  (S) At this point, USG policy is focused on pressing the 
CNDD to step down.  That pressure is having a positive 
effect.  For it to be effective, it is critical that the 
international community, united, generally maintain the 
current momentum. Embassy has provided policy options in 
reftel for Department consideration. 
 
¶22.  (S) While our attention is presently on the junta, it is 
imperative that we start thinking about what needs to happen 
if we are successful and the junta actually steps down. 
Guinea's political situation is highly volatile and simply 
removing the junta does not at all guarantee a peaceful 
resolution since a resulting power vacuum would certainly be 
problematic.  This is an issue the Embassy and Washington 
should consider in terms of how to influence a positive 
course of events leading to a true democratic transition. 
Moller