VZCZCXRO7988
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0177/01 3290717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 250717Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1218
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0091
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1310

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR FPA 
NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: THOUGH PESSIMISTIC ABOUT OUTCOMES, IRRAWADDY STAFF PRAISE 
U.S. BURMA POLICY IN DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000177  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
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Summary 
 
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¶1.  (C) In a discussion with The Ambassador on November 18, 
staff at the Irrawaddy Magazine - the most widely-read Burmese 
exile media outfit - praised the conclusions of the U.S. policy 
review on Burma, while simultaneously expressing skepticism the 
GoB would take steps to address core U.S. concerns.  Imploring 
the U.S. to push forward by engaging all stakeholders, Irrawaddy 
Editor Aung Zaw characterized the policy as "comprehensive" and 
non-discriminatory.  Despite this endorsement, everyone agreed 
that the regime was unlikely to work to redress Burma's ills. 
End Summary. 
 
 
 
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The Right Policy 
 
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¶2.  (C) The Ambassador opened the 45-minute meeting by sharing 
the conclusions of the U.S. policy review and asking the 
assembled Irrawaddy journalists for their views on the situation 
in Burma.  Aung Zaw praised the more nuanced approach and the 
inclusion of engagement in the U.S. toolkit, noting that the 
policy had "injected new energy" in Jakarta, Bangkok, Rangoon 
and Brussels.  The policy "does not discriminate and is 
comprehensive," he remarked, imploring the U.S. to press forward 
with engaging all stakeholders.  The Ambassador reaffirmed that 
we intend to continue talking to all parties involved, both 
inside and outside Burma. 
 
 
 
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Campbell Visit Positive 
 
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¶3.  (C) Observing A/S Campbell's November 3-4 visit to Burma had 
been positively received in virtually all circles, Aung Zaw 
inquired when he would next go to Burma.  The Ambassador noted 
that subsequent discussion had not been scheduled, and that the 
visit had been designed to build on the meeting A/S Campbell 
held with U Thaung on the margins of the UNGA.  Aung Zaw 
remarked that perhaps an interlocutor with more experience than 
U Thaung could help broaden the dialogue to areas such as 
counternarcotics cooperation and humanitarian assistance.  "You 
need to continue using both carrots and sticks," another 
reporter opined. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning specifically to U.S. engagement, Aung Zaw stated 
that one unintended consequence was that the regime thought it 
now had more leverage in its dealings with the EU, China and 
Japan as a result; U.S. engagement allowed the GoB to attempt to 
play them all off against each other.  Nonetheless, Aung Zaw 
stated that according to a prominent Burmese businessman with 
connections to the regime, A/S Campbell's visit had significant 
potential.  The businessman told him that after the visit, 
Senior General Than Shwe asked for a comprehensive and 
historical report about the U.S.-Burma relationship. The 
Ambassador reaffirmed that we would continue  to engage key 
partners in Europe and Asia to coordinate policy approaches and 
advance mutual interests in Burma. 
 
 
 
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2010 and Than Shwe 
 
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CHIANG MAI 00000177  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to The Ambassador's question about the most 
optimistic scenario for the 2010 elections, Aung Zaw expressed 
pessimism that the Burmese regime would take steps to amend the 
2008 Constitution and level the playing field.  Release of 
500-800 key political prisoners and a more pragmatic approach by 
the National League for Democracy in advance of the 2010 
elections are the most we can hope for, he opined.  He did, 
however, hold out hope that Aung San Suu Kyi could be released 
or that a true dialogue with her could commence due to Senior 
General Than Shwe's desire to leave a positive legacy.  If she 
is released, Aung Zaw remarked, the U.S. will welcome it, but 
ethnic minority populations will still live in jungles, and 
refugees will continue crossing into Thailand. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) All four Irrawaddy journalists expressed uncertainty 
with regard to what Than Shwe hoped to gain from a dialogue with 
the U.S.  One said he wants to preserve his family's wealth and 
the military's power.  Another opined that he wants 
international sanctions lifted and the international community's 
respect.  Yet another speculated that he may just be buying time 
to further consolidate his power, while readily admitting that 
"we don't know what he wants.  Does the U.S.?" 
 
 
 
¶7.  (U) Ambassador John approved this cable. 
MORROW