VZCZCXRO2389
RR RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHCN #0266/01 3230909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190909Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL CHENGDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3534
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1955
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0826
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0803
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0840
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 4238

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHENGDU 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CH
SUBJECT: CHENGDU B1/B2 VALIDATION STUDY 
 
REF: A)  STATE 172283,  B)  2007 CHENGDU 101,  C)  2005 CHENGDU 139,  D)  2003 
CHENGDU 873,  E)  2001 CHENGDU 183 
 
CHENGDU 00000266  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Consulate Chengdu's Fraud Prevention Unit 
(FPU) conducted a validation study of all private Chinese 
passport holders who were issued B1/B2 visas in CY2008.  Based 
on a review and analysis of 800 randomly-selected visa 
issuances, the illegal overstay rate was found to be 2.0 
percent.  Nearly half of the applicants who illegally overstayed 
their visas were parents going to visit children living in the 
United States.  Most of the others who illegally overstayed were 
working-age and claimed to be managers at small- or medium-sized 
Chinese companies traveling for business meetings or required 
training.  In the majority of these cases, applicants had both 
fraudulent employment and purpose of travel.  School-age 
children and individuals going to the U.S. for tourism appear to 
have significantly lower overstay rates.  While this study did 
not specifically focus on business travelers, its results 
indicate a significant decline in Chengdu's business traveler 
overstay rate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) The Chengdu consular district covers Sichuan, Yunnan and 
Guizhou Provinces, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and the 
Chongqing Municipality.  The majority of the Consulate's NIV 
applicants hail from Chengdu (Sichuan), Chongqing and Kunming 
(Yunnan), followed by Guiyang (Guizhou) and smaller cities and 
towns throughout the region.  Post sees relatively few 
applicants from the TAR. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (U) The social and economic conditions in the Chengdu 
consular district mirror those found in the Mission's other four 
consular districts.  The area supports a healthy mix of industry 
and agriculture, which in recent years has led to increased 
prosperity for the over 200 million residents served by Post. 
As a result, the number of both applicants and issuances of 
B1/B2 visas has increased dramatically in recent years.  From 
CY2004 to CY2008, for example, Post has seen an 83 percent 
increase in B1/B2 applications and a 115 percent increase in 
B1/B2 issuances. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) This is the first comprehensive B1/B2 validation study 
conducted by Post, as previous surveys done in Chengdu were all 
more narrowly focused.  In 2001, 2003, and 2007, studies of B1 
business travelers bearing private passports found non-return or 
overstay rates of 55.0, 25.0, and 12.4 percent, respectively 
(reftels B, C, and D).  In 2005, Post also conducted a survey of 
Chinese public affairs (FAO) passport holders going on official 
travel to the United States, and found an overstay rate of less 
than 3 percent (reftel E). 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) In CY2008, Post issued 17,374 B1/B2 non-immigrant visas 
(NIVs) to holders of private Chinese passports.  To conduct its 
validation study, the FPU randomly selected 800 cases from this 
set of issued visas.  Holders of Chinese diplomatic, public 
affairs, and service passports were excluded from the sample, 
since historically their overstay rates have varied 
significantly from the private passport population (reftel E). 
Third-country nationals were also excluded from the study. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (U) Using the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), the FPU 
pulled records of all B1/B2 issuances during CY2008 and exported 
the data into an Excel spreadsheet file.  Based on CA/FPP 
guidance (reftel A), the FPU identified a random sample of 800 
B1/B2 issuances, which provides a margin of error of 3 percent 
 
CHENGDU 00000266  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
with a 95 percent confidence level.  The data set was sent to 
CA/FPP, which then processed the biographical information 
through the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Arrival and 
Departure Information System (ADIS) database.  DHS provided the 
entry, exit and any change of status information for each 
applicant. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (U)  According to the definitions used by CA/FPP, issuances 
with corresponding ADIS entry and departure records, without 
overstays, including those with DHS extensions of stay, were 
considered good return travelers to China (reftel A).  For those 
individuals with arrival records but without matching departure 
records, Chengdu's FPU individually reprocessed these cases 
through ADIS to confirm the lack of departure record.  While not 
definitive proof, the absence of a departure record in ADIS is a 
significant indicator that a person may have overstayed their 
visa or was a non-returnee.  For each of these individuals, the 
FPU conducted telephone inquiries and attempted to contact each 
suspected non-returning applicant.  After a minimum of three 
unsuccessful attempts, the individual was placed in the final 
"illegal overstay" category. 
 
 
 
Results 
 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The data compiled for this study are listed below: 
 
 
 
Total cases in random sample = 800 (total = 100%) 
 
 
 
Traveled = 747 (93.4%) 
 
Did not travel = 53 (6.6%) 
 
 
 
Of those who traveled: 
 
 
 
Returned to China = 700 (87.5%) 
 
Currently in status in U.S. or have legally adjusted status = 31 
(3.9%) 
 
Confirmed illegal overstays = 16 (2.0%) 
 
 
 
(Note: numbers in parentheses above are percentage of 800 total 
cases in sample.  End note.) 
 
 
 
¶9.  (U) Of the 800 B1/B2 visas issued in Chengdu in CY2008, 
Chengdu's FPU detected 16 illegal overstays for a rate of 2.0 
percent.  All of these illegal overstays were travelers who 
stayed in the U.S. longer than their Authorized Until Date (AUD) 
granted to them by DHS upon entry into the U.S.  Nine travelers 
stayed beyond their AUD without a DHS-authorized extension but 
eventually returned to China.  Seven of these travelers, 
however, not only stayed in the U.S. longer than their AUD, but 
also appear to still be in the U.S. illegally. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (U) Thirty one travelers from the sample have legally 
adjusted their status with DHS.  These cases include adjustments 
to student F1 status and others who received legal extensions of 
stay, whereby a traveler has their AUD adjusted to a later date. 
 According to CA/FPP guidance (reftel A), these issuances are 
treated as good return travelers since they did not illegally 
overstay their visas. 
 
 
 
 
CHENGDU 00000266  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶11.  (U) It is noteworthy that there were no confirmed overstays 
for individuals whose purpose of travel was tourism, nor were 
there for any summer or winter student home stay programs. 
Likewise, no school-age children were found to have overstayed 
their visas.  Due to the small population sizes involved in this 
study, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about who is 
likely to overstay a visa.  However, all of the 16 confirmed 
illegal overstays match one of the following three profiles: 
 
 
 
The Three Overstay Profiles 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶12.  (U) Visiting relatives in the U.S.:  Seven of the 16 
confirmed overstay cases were applicants who went to visit 
relatives in the U.S.  Of these, six were parents going to visit 
their children (and in some cases, also their grandchildren) who 
were either American citizens, Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs), 
or temporary workers on H1B visas.  In five of the six Chinese 
parent cases, the applicants had previously traveled to the U.S. 
and returned to China, maintaining legal status throughout their 
previous trips.  This finding suggests that prior travel to the 
U.S. should not be viewed as a guarantee that Chinese parents 
will necessarily maintain their legal status in the U.S.  The 
seventh case is one where the applicant went to visit his LPR 
wife and child in the U.S. and illegally overstayed his visa, 
although he did eventually return to China after his trip.  He, 
too, had previous legal travel to the U.S. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Fraudulent business travelers:  Five of the 16 illegal 
overstay cases involved applicants with confirmed fraudulent 
employment and purpose of travel.  In each case the individual 
claimed to be a business traveler, but presented fraudulent work 
credentials and fake invitation letters from U.S. inviters.  In 
four of the five cases, the applicants were in their 30s or 40s 
and claimed to be managers of small- or medium-sized Chinese 
companies.  In the fifth case, the applicant purportedly worked 
for a large U.S. firm as the regional branch manager.  None of 
these applicants had prior travel to the U.S. and only one had 
any prior travel abroad.  Based upon the FPU's investigation, 
all five of these travelers have not only illegally overstayed 
their visas, but also appear to have illegally immigrated to the 
U.S. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (U) Business meetings and training:  Four of the 16 illegal 
overstays were business travelers going to the U.S. for 
training.  Three of them worked for larger, well-known companies 
within the Chengdu consular district and were sent to the U.S. 
for employer-sponsored technical training.  The fourth case 
involved an individual who was going for non-technical business 
training and had previously traveled to the U.S. several times 
before her overstay.  Based upon the FPU's investigation, all 
four had legitimate employment and purpose of travel at the time 
of their interviews.  Unlike the group of fraudulent business 
travelers mentioned above, all four have returned to China after 
their illegal overstay. 
 
 
 
Analysis and Comment 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (U) Since Chengdu saw a significant increase in the number 
of fake business travelers in recent years, Chengdu's 
interviewing line officers and the FPU became increasingly 
vigilant about suspect cases.  The number of cases referred to 
the FPU for investigation and the number of confirmed fraudulent 
cases increased substantially during CY2008.  Because these 
types of applicants - had they been issued a visa - would very 
likely have overstayed or not returned to China, refusing their 
visas appears to have helped lower the overall B1/B2 overstay 
rate. 
 
 
 
 
CHENGDU 00000266  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Because applicants matching the fraudulent business 
traveler profiled above are still very prevalent in Chengdu, the 
FPU has developed a fraud library with an extensive collection 
of fake employment and invitation letters.  The FPU also 
conducts training for adjudicating officers to help them 
identify suspect business travelers. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) The local economy in the Chengdu consular district 
provides ample opportunities to earn a good living, and as a 
result, applicants issued B1/B2 visas appear to be generally 
well-qualified.  While this survey did not disaggregate business 
and leisure travelers, the trend in Chengdu's declining overstay 
rates is clear.  The study's finding of a 2.0 percent combined 
business and leisure overstay rate suggest both groups generally 
do not abuse their B1/B2 visas.  The results are also in marked 
contrast to Chengdu's previous validation studies going back to 
CY2001 (reftels B, D, and E), in which B1-issued business 
travelers showed significantly higher overstay rates.  However, 
as this general B1/B2 validation study is unable to provide 
detailed information about specific population groups, Chengdu's 
FPU is planning to carry out more targeted NIV validation 
studies in the future.  Possibilities include validation studies 
focusing on business travelers, parents visiting children, 
tourist groups, and students and exchange visitors. 
BROWN