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id: 234042
date: 11/10/2009 11:11
refid: 09CARACAS1443
origin: Embassy Caracas
classification: SECRET
destination: 09CARACAS1351|09CARACAS1367|09CARACAS1376|09CARACAS1419|09CARACAS1426|09CARACAS1430
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001443 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2029 
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR MCAP MOPS VZ
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONFRONTATION 
WITH COLOMBIA 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 1430 
     ¶B. CARACAS 1426 
     ¶C. CARACAS 1376 
     ¶D. CARACAS 1367 
     ¶E. CARACAS 1351 
     ¶F. CARACAS 1419 
 
Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor Rolf Olson, for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (SE) Summary: On November 8, President Chavez called on 
Venezuelans to "prepare for war" due to the threat posed by 
Colombia and the United States. Chavez again hammered the 
Colombian government for "shamelessly delivering its 
sovereignty to the U.S." through the recently signed 
U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Chavez's 
comments followed dual announcements on November 5 by Vice 
President Carrizalez and Foreign Minister Maduro that the 
Venezuelan government (GBRV) was deploying 15,000 National 
Guardsmen and ramping up its intelligence-gathering 
activities in states that border Colombia to "track down and 
neutralize irregular groups" in the aftermath of several 
violent incidents. These announcements were made against a 
backdrop of serious domestic problems for the GBRV. 
Venezuelans are unhappy about widespread water shortages, 
increasing power blackouts, and spiraling crime rates. Chavez 
has a well-established track record of using external threats 
to shift attention away from the GBRV's shortcomings. No 
meaningful movement of National Guard troops has been noted 
since the Carrizalez announcement, and post does not/not 
believe a full-scale war between Colombia and Venezuela is 
looming or even conceivable at this point. But as Chavez 
stares down the bumpy road that leads to the 2010 National 
Assembly elections, he appears willing to run the risk of a 
more serious incident on the border than we have so far 
witnessed. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) During his November 8 "Alo, Presidente" television 
broadcast, President Chavez charged his military leaders to 
prepare their forces and the Venezuelan public for the 
possibility of armed conflict with Colombia and/or the United 
States. Chavez asserted that through its signing of the DCA, 
"Colombia has delivered its sovereignty to the Empire... the 
Government of Colombia is no longer in Bogota, it's been 
transferred to the United States." Concluding that the 
presence of American soldiers in Colombia would inevitably 
lead to an attack against Venezuela, Chavez urged: "Let's not 
lose a single day in our principal mission -- preparing 
ourselves for war and helping the people prepare themselves 
for war, because it's the responsibility of all.... 
Revolutionary students, workers, women: everyone together..." 
Reinforcing the point that this call to arms was simply a 
reaction to the nefarious intentions of others, he pondered: 
"If we lived in a world in which the sovereignty of the 
people and international law were respected, we could 
dedicate ourselves to something other than war." Chavez 
claimed to be paraphrasing President Lula saying that "the 
only thing he had seen from Obama was the coup in Honduras 
and the military bases in Colombia." 
 
¶3. (SE) Chavez's comments follow dual announcements on 
November 5 by GBRV officials of an increased Venezuelan 
military presence and intelligence-gathering along the border 
with Colombia. Vice President and Minister of Defense Ramon 
Carrizalez stated that 15,000 National Guard troops were 
being deployed in the border states of Zulia, Tachira, 
Barinas, Apure, and Amazonas "to identify, track down, and 
neutralize irregular groups that are trying to destabilize 
our government." While stridently accusing the USG and 
Colombia of seeking to undermine the Venezuelan government 
(Ref A), Foreign Minister Nicholas Maduro stated that the 
GBRV would "increase intelligence efforts" along the border, 
as well as "continue strengthening our political and military 
capacity... so that not even one U.S. soldier can set foot in 
this country." Border tensions have heightened in recent 
weeks in the aftermath of the killing in Tachira of ten 
kidnapping victims alleged by the GBRV to be paramilitaries, 
as well as the November 2 murder of two National Guard 
officers at a Tachira checkpoint (Refs B and C). However, in 
the three days since Carrizalez's announcement of the 
National Guard "deployment," no significant movement of 
forces has been observed, and a simple redeployment of forces 
already based in the areas in question may constitute the 
extent of the mobilization. 
 
¶4. (SE) The recent events near the Colombian border and the 
GBRV's reactions come at the same time that Chavez's 
Bolivarian political project faces diminished popular support 
due to deteriorating public services and a crime problem that 
the GBRV has been unable to contain. Caracas-wide water 
 
CARACAS 00001443  002 OF 002 
 
 
rationing commenced on November 2, leaving entire 
neighborhoods without water service for two days each week 
for the foreseeable future. Diminished capacity to meet 
electricity demand has led to frequent blackouts across the 
country (Ref D).  On November 8, local daily El Universal 
reported that according to projections, the number of 
homicides in Venezuela will grow by 48 percent between 2008 
and 2009 -- from 13,129 in 2008 to an estimated 19,400 by the 
end of 2009. Even among Chavez's traditional political 
supporters, frustration about the lack of progress on such 
issues has begun to set in (Ref E). 
 
¶5. (SE) Comment: Coupled with these serious domestic 
challenges and the recent violence in the border area, 
Chavez's rhetoric suggests he is willing to run the risk of 
-- and perhaps even sees opportunity in -- a low-level 
military incident of some sort with Colombia. Such an 
incident could have several potential benefits for Chavez: it 
would help distract domestic and international critics; serve 
to rally his followers around the flag; facilitate the 
further militarization and centralization of Venezuelan 
society; and create a more favorable security environment on 
the Venezuelan side of the border for friendly Colombian 
rebels (contact with whom he may still deny). It could even 
serve as a possible pretext for postponing next year's AN 
elections, should the political climate remain unfavorable. 
Finally, he may see value in bloodying Colombia's nose as 
talk of a possible third Uribe term continues, or of playing 
the victim of a Colombia-originated incident. Chavez appears 
to recognize the stiff internal political headwinds he 
currently confronts, and the announcement last week that the 
AN elections will take place on September 26 (Ref F) provides 
him a timeline with which he can map out an electoral 
strategy that minimizes the fallout from his government's 
shortcomings. 
 
¶6. (SE) Comment Continued: Post does not/not believe a 
full-scale war with Colombia is looming or even conceivable 
at this point. While Chavez is manipulating the DCA issue at 
least in part to justify certain internal measures, some 
local observers think that he really believes a 
U.S.-Colombian move against him is possible -- or even in 
train. If true, this belief could propel him to take reckless 
actions both internally and/or abroad. End Comment. 
DUDDY 

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