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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/12 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PHUM PINR OAS CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S CLOUDY ELECTIONS PANORAMA 
 
REF: A) BOGOTA 2833; B) BOGOTA 3145; C) BOGOTA 3047; D) BOGOTA 2772 
E) BOGOTA 3097; F) BOGOTA 3269; G) BOGOTA 3408 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A. Nichols, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) As the May 30, 2010 presidential election draws nearer, 
campaigns have begun and the field of candidates is slowly being 
whittled down.  However, the potential referendum to allow 
President Uribe to run for a third term combined with missing 
electoral rules of the game (especially regarding campaign finance) 
have created an atmosphere of uncertainty that dominates the 
Colombian political landscape.  This uncertainty also affects the 
March 14 national legislative elections, in which Colombians will 
select the entire Senate and House.  If President Uribe does not 
run for reelection, the eight candidates listed below currently 
stand the best chance to succeed him.  The Ambassador is meeting 
with the candidates individually to learn their policy priorities 
and ensure continued bilateral cooperation.  Given the vast 
popularity of Uribe and his policies, nearly all candidates include 
a continuation of his "Democratic Security" in their platforms plus 
a wide range of social and economic proposals.  Since a third of 
Congress has been or is under investigation for having received 
funding from paramilitary and criminal groups, pre-election 
monitoring and campaign finance transparency will likely be keys to 
successful elections in 2010.  Post plans to participate in 
monitoring efforts, and will pay special attention to post-conflict 
consolidation areas.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
THE SHADOW OF AN URIBE THIRD TERM 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The proposed referendum to again modify the constitution 
to allow President Uribe to seek a second reelection was initiated 
through the submission of citizens' signatures, and not by the 
Congress or the Executive.  The Congress approved the referendum 
bill on September 2, but the process by which it was initiated and 
approved is currently under review by the Constitutional Court (ref 
A).  Court President Nilson Pinilla told the media on October 22 
that the Court's final ruling would not come until next year, with 
politicians estimating a February decision.  Even if the Court 
allows the referendum to proceed, the timeline to organize the 
actual referendum vote and mobilize the electorate will be tight. 
Mario Solano, Secretary General of Uribe's "U" Party, told us on 
October 21 that March 7 is the current target date to hold the 
referendum.  Presidential contenders will not know whether they 
will face the formidable Uribe, who has maintained 70% approval 
ratings, until just two months before the presidential elections. 
The Uribe specter not only affects opposition strategies, but also 
pro-Uribe candidates who have a hard time campaigning aggressively 
while Uribe's hopes remain alive. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Further complicating matters, President Uribe has yet to 
declare his intentions clearly.  Uribe's Delphic comments, seeking 
a complete continuation of his policies but noting the desirability 
of change in presidential leadership, seem to be part of a strategy 
to paint the referendum as "the will of the people" and not the 
President's ambition, thus distancing Uribe from other Latin 
American leaders who have perpetuated themselves in power.  Uribe's 
silence has led to rampant speculation over whether he intends to 
run, with some saying that his Administration and party have 
expended so much political capital on the referendum that he 
clearly wants reelection badly, and others hoping that Uribe's 
conscience is telling him that a 12-year presidency would be bad 
for Colombian democracy (ref B).  Even if Uribe does not run, by 
keeping the referendum possibility alive, he is avoiding lame-duck 
status and further consolidating control over the Congress and 
other institutions. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Whatever his intentions, Uribe can not easily declare 
himself a candidate while the constitution prohibits a third term. 
Under the "Law of Guarantees" developed four years ago when Uribe 
was allowed to run for a second term, a sitting president must 
declare his/her candidacy six months before elections (November 30 
in this case) and abide by rules intended to minimize the advantage 
a sitting president has in campaigning.  The referendum will not be 
held before November 30, so Uribe faces a legal conundrum:  he can 
not declare his candidacy because the constitution prohibits a 
third term, but he is required to declare his candidacy six months 
before the election.  Theories abound as to how Team Uribe will 
overcome this next hurdle, including that the deadline will be 
ignored by arguing that the referendum is a "higher law" or that 
Uribe will make a conditional declaration to meet the deadline: 
"if the referendum is approved, I will be a candidate."  The 
current preference, according to Solano, is to have Congress 
eliminate the deadline given the circumstances (Comment:  This 
seems unlikely since only three weeks remain to get this change 
through the legislature. End comment).  In order to avoid further 
legal traps, Solano told us that President Uribe will voluntarily 
comply with the other restrictions imposed by the Law of 
Guarantees, even if he is not yet an official candidate.  However, 
Uribe has not yet made any formal commitment to clear up this grey 
area. 
 
 
 
VOID IN ELECTORAL RULES 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Besides the push for the referendum, the most common 
complaint we hear from candidates and political parties is that 
Congress has yet to approve the implementing law to regulate 
political reforms passed earlier this year.  This means, for 
example, that candidates do not know the campaign finance rules 
(including how much funding they can receive from the government), 
the penalties for receiving support from criminal groups, how 
transportation for elections will be organized, the rules for 
interparty primaries, or if there will be a quota of women that 
must be included in party lists for congressional elections.  A 
joint Senate/House committee is currently attempting to reach 
agreement on an implementing law that will be presented to the full 
Congress for a vote, but the fact that nearly all legislators are 
candidates themselves has made consensus difficult and will weaken 
sanctions for wrongdoing. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Opposition parties are also wary of ruling coalition 
attempts to skew the rules of the game in their favor.  For that 
reason, presidential candidate Rafael Pardo said on October 27 that 
his Liberal Party would boycott the vote on the implementing law. 
Uribe opponents also decry the uncertainty in the application of 
the Law of Guarantees to the President if he indeed becomes a 
candidate.  High-ranking Alternative Democratic Pole Party (Polo or 
PDA) officials complained to us on October 21 that Uribe uses his 
near-weekly town halls and media appearances for campaigning, and 
admitted that Uribe was likely to win the referendum and then the 
election by a landslide.  They added that Uribe's team used the 
party switching period allowed in the reform (ref C) to buy votes 
for the reelection referendum.  The uncertainty in the rules of the 
game with national elections in March and May especially hinders 
planning by Colombia's smaller parties and independent candidates 
(see ref D for election calendar and mechanics).  Green Party 
presidential pre-candidate Antanas Mockus lamented on October 27 
that his campaign depends on state funding and that legislators may 
reduce funding to parties that obtain a low number of votes in 
elections. 
 
TOP 4 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS 
 
FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Out of the opposition and independent candidates hoping to 
succeed Uribe, these four, listed alphabetically, stand the best 
chance of making it to the final ballot: 
 
 
 
-- Sergio Fajardo:  Fajardo, a math professor who was an 
extraordinarily popular mayor of Medellin, spent the past five 
months collecting 700,000 signatures (twice the required number) to 
run as an independent candidate.  He hopes to duplicate Uribe's 
independent feat in 2002.  However, Fajardo has the lowest 
nationwide name recognition among the leading candidates (52-68%). 
He has already campaigned in all of Colombia's 32 departments and 
placed fourth in a late-September nationwide Ipsos poll, but is 
having a hard time competing with party machineries.  Fajardo is 
more popular in large cities; a Gallup poll conducted October 
27-November 3 in Colombia's four largest cities gave him 16 points 
more in name recognition, 17 more points in favorability (improving 
over time) and 9 points less unfavorability than the nationwide 
Ipsos poll conducted at the end of September.  The good news for 
Fajardo is that he has very low unfavorability ratings, so if he 
can get publicity, he should climb in the polls.  He is especially 
popular with women voters.  The Gallup poll has him in a 
statistical tie for first with Juan Manuel Santos in all election 
scenarios that exclude Uribe.  Fajardo may be lured into a 
coalition with another candidate. 
 
 
 
-- Antanas Mockus:  Mockus --a colorful, outside-the-box math 
professor (like Fajardo) and two-time mayor of Bogota-- is the 
leading candidate from the small Green Party.  Though he is very 
popular with Bogota's citizens and has the highest name recognition 
of all the candidates, he stands virtually no chance of winning the 
presidency and will likely seek to join a coalition.  Mockus ran 
against Uribe in 2006, receiving only 1.24% of total votes cast 
(4th place), and was Noemi Sanin's running mate in 1998 (they came 
in third, with 26.77% of total votes cast).  Mockus said on October 
27 that he is worried about the availability of state campaign 
funding and hopes to not be excluded from presidential debates. 
Only 4% of likely voters chose him in the Ipsos poll (7th place of 
the 8 candidates listed here).  Like Fajardo, Mockus is much more 
popular in large cities (highest favorability rating of all 
candidates with 54% in Gallup poll) than nationwide (highest 
unfavorable rating of all candidates with 44% in the Ipsos poll). 
 
 
 
-- Rafael Pardo:  Pardo, a former Minister of Defense, Senator and 
Peace Commissioner, emerged from a crowded field to win the 
opposition Liberal Party (PL) primaries.  He represents the 
center-left moderates in the party, led by former president Cesar 
Gaviria who controls the party machinery.  Pardo unsuccessfully 
tried to win the PL's nomination in 2006.  Though the center-left, 
traditional PL has the most-developed party structure throughout 
the country and the largest number of members, turnout in its 
primaries was disappointing (ref E).  The low turnout was 
interpreted by analysts as yet another sign of voter preference for 
Uribe and his policies, and rival Conservative Party (PC) leaders 
are sure the PC will do very well against the PL in 2010.  Pardo 
and the PL actively oppose the reelection referendum, and are 
considering coalitions with German Vargas (Pardo belonged to the 
Radical Change Party for a couple of years), Gustavo Petro or 
others.  Pardo tied for fifth (out of eight) in the Ipsos poll and 
placed fifth (out of seven, Mockus was excluded) in the Gallup 
poll.  He placed in the bottom three in name recognition and 
favorability ratings in both polls. 
 
-- Gustavo Petro:  Petro is the candidate from the opposition Polo. 
The five-year-old Polo, a conglomeration of small parties 
(including communists), represents Colombia's legitimate political 
far left.  Petro surprisingly defeated farther-left party president 
Carlos Gaviria in the Polo primaries (ref E).  In the best 
performance ever for Colombia's left, Gaviria came in second to 
Uribe in the 2006 elections with 22% of the vote.  Petro represents 
the moderate faction of the Polo.  Given Petro's victory, the Polo 
is currently selecting a new party president and secretary-general, 
and trying to reach agreement on a party platform.  The Polo is the 
only major party to oppose the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA), and many of its members support Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez (an albatross given that Chavez is the most 
unpopular person in Colombia, with 88% unfavorable ratings in the 
Gallup poll).  Other candidates are concerned that Polo will 
receive funding or other support from Venezuela.  Despite having 
very low favorability and very high unfavorability ratings (worst 
in Gallup and second worst in Ipsos polls), Petro placed in a 
three-way tie for first (Ipsos) and tied for third (Gallup) in 
voter intent.  The Polo hopes to form an anti-Uribe coalition with 
the PL or others. 
 
 
 
TOP 4 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS 
 
FROM THE GOVERNING COALITION 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) These are the four candidates, listed alphabetically, from 
parties that support Uribe's policies in Congress who stand the 
best chance of making it to the final ballot: 
 
 
 
-- Andres Felipe Arias:  Arias is a pre-candidate from the 
traditional, center-right Conservative Party (PC).  He was Minister 
of Agriculture under President Uribe, and is known as "Uribito" 
because of his close relationship with the President, their shared 
political views and his physical resemblance to a younger Uribe. 
Arias has steadfastly maintained that the PC should not put forth a 
candidate if President Uribe runs.  If Uribe does not run, Arias 
would like to join forces with Santos for the elections.  Arias was 
ahead of Noemi Sanin, his top competitor for the PC nod (primaries 
may occur on March 14), until he became embroiled in the Agro 
Ingreso Seguro scandal where wealthy landowners and political 
contributors received too many funds from the GOC's irrigation 
subsidy program.  Arias' newfound notoriety could very well cost 
him party support.  He was in a three-way tie for first in voter 
intent in the September Ipsos poll (with the lowest unfavorable 
rating of any candidate), but dropped to sixth (out of seven) in 
the November Gallup poll, where for the first time, respondents who 
had an unfavorable image of him outnumbered those with a favorable 
opinion.  Comparing May and November Gallup polls, Arias' name 
recognition rose 11 points, his favorable rating dropped 8 points 
and his unfavorable rating rose a whopping 18 points.  At age 36, 
Arias may have to wait to try his luck until 2014.  On the other 
hand, he told the Ambassador on November 10 that he now has more 
supporters in the House and Senate than Sanin, that legislators do 
not want to oppose Uribe, and that the fact that that the PC 
primaries are scheduled for the same day as congressional elections 
should help Arias as congressional candidates will campaign on his 
behalf.  Arias sees Petro --who he described as smart, politically 
shrewd, persuasive, and backed by a segment of the political 
machinery-- as the biggest threat to governing coalition 
candidates, followed by Fajardo --who he described as publicly 
popular but lacking a substantive platform and party machinery. 
 
 
 
-- Noemi Sanin:  As a former foreign minister (the first female FM 
in Latin America) and Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Spain and 
Venezuela, the charming Sanin is a household name respected for her 
foreign policy prowess.  However, she does not have a strong party 
base, was unsuccessful in presidential bids in 1998 (3rd place as 
an independent, 26.77% of total vote) and 2002 (4th place as an 
independent, 5.8% of total vote), and does not yet have a solid 
domestic platform.  This time she is running as a pre-candidate for 
the PC, but is not a staunch party militant.  Sanin believes the PC 
should present a candidate even if Uribe runs.  Some Conservatives 
have criticized her for alternating between praise and condemnation 
of Uribe (e.g., accusing him of having paramilitary support and of 
buying the reelection referendum).  Sanin is competing with Arias 
for the PC nod, and is now the favorite to win as she has never 
been implicated in a major scandal.  However, PC insiders told us 
that Sanin was not a true conservative and many conservatives would 
support Santos if she won the PC primary.  She has alienated Santos 
and Arias, but the Polo president and secretary-general told us 
October 21 that they could agree to a coalition with her.  Although 
Sanin had the second-best image in the Ipsos poll, she only placed 
fifth in voter intent.  From March 2008 to November 2009, her 
favorable rating has dropped from 70 to 53% and her unfavorable 
rating has increased from 13 to 30% in the Gallup poll.  She tied 
for third with Petro in voter intent in the November 2009 Gallup 
poll, behind Fajardo and Santos. 
 
 
 
-- Juan Manuel Santos:  Santos, President Uribe's former Defense 
Minister, is Uribe's "U" Party candidate if Uribe does not run. 
His website is www.sinoesuribeesjuanmanuelsantos.com ("if it's not 
Uribe, it's Juan Manuel Santos"), and his main slogan is 
"reelection or Santos."  Santos plans to continue Uribe's 
security-focused policies.  Santos had the best public image of all 
candidates in the Ipsos poll and joined Mockus and Sanin atop the 
Gallup poll.  He was in a three-way tie for first in voter intent 
in the Ipsos poll and tied with Fajardo for first in the Gallup 
poll.  If the elections were held today without Uribe, Santos would 
most likely win.  However, the relatively new "U" Party depends 
heavily on President Uribe's popularity, does not have a 
well-developed nation-wide party structure and is suffering 
financial shortfalls.  An alliance with the PC would make the most 
sense, but Santos and Sanin do not get along.  See ref F for a 
readout of the Ambassador's October 23 lunch with Santos. 
 
 
 
-- German Vargas Lleras:  Vargas is the president of the Radical 
Change Party (CR), a pro-Uribe spinoff of the PL and part of the 
pro-Uribe congressional majority coalition.  Although he supported 
Uribe's second term, Vargas strongly believes a constitutional 
modification permitting a third term would be undemocratic.  Arias 
described Vargas as the natural successor to continue Uribe's 
security policies until Vargas destroyed his chances by opposing 
Uribe's reelection.  Vargas' opposition of the reelection 
referendum dashed his hopes of joining forces with the "U" Party 
and forced some congressmen to leave his party for the "U" or PC 
(ref C).  His fall from grace is reflected in the polls, with only 
3% of likely voters picking Vargas in the Ipsos poll and 6% in the 
Gallup poll (last place in both polls out of the eight candidates 
listed here).  On October 20, the CR Secretary General described 
his party as "Liberal but with security and counternarcotics 
teeth."  Vargas told the Ambassador on October 27 that he hopes to 
form a coalition with the Liberals but could never form a coalition 
with Polo due to ideological differences.  The former Senate 
President (and top vote-getter by far in the 2006 congressional 
elections) has the best defined platform thus far on a range of 
topics.  A survivor of various assassination attempts (he lost some 
fingers to a bomb), Vargas would expand Uribe's security policies 
while increasing attention to social and infrastructure issues. 
 
 
 
REDUCING THREATS THROUGH ELECTION OBSERVATION 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Eighty-seven of the 268 members of Congress were or are 
under investigation in the "parapolitical scandal" from the 2006 
elections (including 17 who have been acquitted).  The 
investigations, carried out by the Supreme Court, center on the 
legislators' direct involvement in, or financial and other support 
from, paramilitary organizations.  Although the scandal has faded 
from the headlines, it crippled the Congress and citizen confidence 
(54% of Gallup poll respondents had an unfavorable image of 
Congress).  Avoiding a repeat in the 2010 elections is paramount, 
and some reforms aimed at increasing transparency and penalties 
were enacted this year.  In that sense, pre-election monitoring, 
especially of the legislative elections, will be even more 
important than Election Day observation.  International help, 
including in vetting candidate lists and strengthening party 
responsibility, will be crucial to clean elections.  Many party 
leaders have expressed to us their concerns about narcotics money 
in campaigns.  PC leaders told us on October 20 that they have 
already disqualified candidates and are vetting all candidates with 
the Comptroller, Inspector General and Prosecutor General.  The PC 
considers reasonable doubt of wrongdoing enough to warrant 
disqualification, even in the absence of a legal case or 
conviction. 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) Election Day violence or technical problems have not been 
major issues in most parts of Colombia in recent elections. 
However, ensuring that voting in rural or post-conflict areas goes 
smoothly and without criminal threats is a concern.  The ability of 
citizens to participate freely in elections in consolidation zones 
will be an important step in building confidence in the state and 
democratic institutions.  The GOC has requested an OAS observation 
mission, and the Embassy plans on participating in OAS and local 
efforts.  USAID is also working with political parties and civil 
society election bodies to improve transparency (ref G). 
Fortunately, there are several well-established local and 
international NGOs already working on election issues, including 
identification of the riskiest polling locations. 
BROWNFIELD