VZCZCXRO4993
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBC #0060/01 3251326
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211326Z NOV 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0940
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0518
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0978

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/21/2019 
TAGS: SMIG SNAR ECON PGOV ETRD PTER KTFN KCOR PREL IR
IZ 
SUBJECT: BASRA PROVINCE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER POST: NO PROOF OF LETHAL 
AID, BUT CONCERNS REMAIN 
 
REF: A. A) BASRAH 052        B) BAGHDAD 366        C) BAGHDAD 343 
     ¶B. D) 08 BAGHDAD 2964   E) 08 BAGHDAD 3475 
 
BASRAH 00000060  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, Leader, PRT Basra, Dept of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d), (g) 
¶1. (U) This is a Basra PRT reporting cable. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Operations, equipment and procedures at the Shalamsha 
port of entry (POE) at the Iraq-Iran border are under-financed 
and inadequate for appropriate cargo and passenger screening. 
The POE lacks clear lines of authority as a dozen GOI agencies 
vie for control.  Border control authorities enter passengers 
through border control databases. They identify only a handful 
as "travelers of interest" to detain.  In response to these 
problems, the US civilian-military Point of Entry Training Team 
(POETT) has initiated and funded improvements and training. 
While GOI and USG officials agree that vulnerabilities to lethal 
aid exist at the POE, they have found no real evidence of it. 
Officials also suspect that other smuggling occurs along the 
lightly monitored border.  Other challenges include POE 
corruption, incompetence, under-resourcing, and enforcing basic 
rule of law.  Financial Systems Assessment Team officials 
identify the lack of bank branches and a viable national customs 
declaration policy as further vulnerabilities.  If the GOI 
expects to cement and build on USG initiatives to bring the POE 
up to international standards, it will have to match the efforts 
of POETT with much harder work and more good will.  End summary. 
 
 
Background on Shalamsha 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Basra Province has three POEs: Shalamsha; the Iraq-Kuwait 
overland border at Safwan; and the Port of Umm Qasr.  Shalamsha 
is 13 miles due east of Basra, and around 20 miles northwest of 
Khorramshahr, Iran.  On the Iraqi side, a two-lane highway leads 
to the POE flanked by vacant wasteland.  Like other Iraq-Iran 
POEs, Shalamsha was closed from the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
war in 1980 until 2003.  It reopened for passenger and 
commercial traffic in 2003.  The GOI closed it to cargo during 
the March 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign against 
Iranian-supported militias.  It reopened January 2009.  Since 
then, cargo and passenger throughput has increased.  The POE, 
which employs approximately 360 people, is open about 12 hours 
per day, seven days per week.  Passengers, but not cargo, cross 
on Fridays.  Typical traffic volumes can be seen in the week of 
October 29 to November 5, 2009.  During that time, the POE 
processed 3,985 travelers inbound to Iraq, 3,655 travelers 
outbound to Iran, and 761 cargo trucks.  Duties collected for 
that week totaled USD 74,600 and taxes equaled USD 13,500. 
POETT calculations project around USD 3.6 million in total 
tariffs, taxes, visa fees, and duties during 2009. 
 
Confused Lines of Authority 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Like the Port of Umm Qasr (ref A), the Shalamsha POE 
lacks any clear line of authority.  The POE is nominally headed 
by a representative from the GOI's Ports of Entry Directorate, 
under the Ministry of Interior, but Deputy Director Kareem told 
PRT EconOff that their control is more persuasive than legal or 
operational.  Over a dozen different ministries and agencies vie 
for control, including the ministries of Health, Interior, Civil 
Customs, Defense, Tourism, National Security, Agriculture, 
Finance, Transportation, and the Iraqi National Intelligence 
Service (INIS). 
 
USG Presence 
------------ 
 
¶5. (C) MNF-I forces and DHS contractors maintain a nearby POETT. 
 Operating since early 2009, it works to train, mentor and 
advise Iraqi border officials and inspectors, improve command 
and control, and help to clearly delineate roles and 
responsibilities among the various GOI entities. 
 
One Way Trade: Iran Exports to Iraq 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) US and GOI authorities confirm that POE trade is 100 
percent one-way, with all goods going from Iran into Iraq.  A 
daily average of 120 empty Iraqi trucks enters Iranian territory 
to load up Iranian goods.  Iranian goods are largely comprised 
of construction materials (cement, bricks, re-bar, ceramic 
tiles, and Styrofoam panels), some agricultural produce 
 
BASRAH 00000060  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
(tomatoes, watermelon, potatoes, apples, cucumber, onions, and 
green peppers), dry grocery goods (fish and packaged cookies), 
refrigerated dairy products, and automobiles (around 300 per 
week).  It is difficult to obtain any accurate provincial trade 
statistics on this aspect of Iran-Iraq trade as Iraq's 
statistics agency, COSIT, does not gather or disseminate across 
provinces.  The inadequate customs procedures and equipment make 
it difficult to accurately gauge the scope of trade at the POE. 
 
Passenger Traffic: Largely Elderly Iranian Pilgrims 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (C) The isolated clutch of ramshackle containers in the 
middle of the desert seems an unlikely place for a busy border 
crossing that processes over one-half million passengers per 
year.  According to POETT data, an average of 1,640 passengers 
enter or exit the POE daily.  POE officials report that around 
90 percent of Iranian travelers are mostly older Iranian 
religious pilgrims visiting Iraqi Shi'a holy sites of Najaf and 
Karbala.  Once Iranian passengers enter the Iraqi side, they 
board one of the many buses and minivans waiting to take them to 
Basra city.  In recent months, the U.S. military constructed an 
extensive overhead passageway system, providing relief from the 
intense sun and heat.  Other construction has improved what was 
a passenger bottleneck. 
 
¶8. (S) GOI officials process incoming passengers via the PISCES 
(Personnel Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation 
System) border control database.  Iranian males between 14 and 
65 years of age are taken aside to be fingerprinted and 
photographed by USG officials using the biometric BATS 
(Biometric Automated Toolset) system.  According to USG and GOI 
officials, only a handful of "travelers of interest" have been 
found and detained at this POE in 2009.  However, they caution 
that this is not a watertight system.  It is possible to enter 
Iraq overland along the vast and largely unmonitored border. 
Baggage and passenger screening is done by x-ray baggage 
scanners, bomb-sniffing dogs, and/or walk-through metal 
detectors.  Officials caution that these machines are not always 
functioning.  A shortage of female Iraqi border guards means 
that women travelers are sometimes not searched.  According to 
POETT officials, no lethal aid has been detected at the POE 
during the time it has been present.  Other than the equipment 
mentioned, the POE lacks explosive- or drug-detecting devices. 
 
Cargo Screening Procedures 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Iraqi trucks wait to cross to a transfer loading dock on 
the Iranian side to pick up cargo out of the sight of GOI 
inspectors.  When the trucks return, customs inspectors scan 
them with a single back-scatter x-ray.  Two are necessary for a 
full view of cargo trucks but only one of the three units on 
site is currently operational.  Health inspectors have the 
rarely exercised discretion to send samples of food to Basra for 
testing.  Inspectors weigh cargo on a single, rickety scale. 
POETT officials cite the need for a secondary inspection area, 
which would relieve the pressure on the inspectors to conduct 
inspections quickly to keep the traffic moving. 
 
Operations, Equipment, and Procedural Shortfalls; US POETT 
Provides Limited Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Iraqi and USG officials at the POE contend that 
operations, equipment, and procedures are under-financed and 
inadequate for appropriate cargo screening.  POETT officials 
deem POE leadership to be inefficient and possibly corrupt. 
Buildings, equipment, and housing are old.  Electricity supply 
and connections are haphazard and hazardous.  There is no Iraqi 
grid connection to the site and Iran provides a weak and 
sometimes intermittent supply.  Occasional blackouts occur 
during which time Iraqi and US officials have no knowledge of 
what is going on.  The POE lacks a dedicated phone landline to 
Basra.  There is no Iraqi surveillance system.  The POE lacks a 
formal trash collection or cleaning arrangement.  There is 
insufficient potable water for staff or travelers, and raw 
sewage collects next to administrative buildings.  There is 
little to no lighting during the night.  Workers come for a 
one-week period and sleep in dilapidated accommodations or 
outdoors. 
 
¶11. (S) The POETT has initiated and funded improvements. 
Construction of a new Iraqi Police station is about to begin. 
Contractors are running electrical wiring throughout the POE. 
 
BASRAH 00000060  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Water and septic work is also in progress.  A new ramp is under 
construction to facilitate faster cargo transfer.  POETT staff 
has conducted training in the areas of basic POE operations like 
search procedures, technology, and professionalism.  POETT 
officials contend that while the Iraqi staff largely understands 
these issues, they apply them only selectively.  POETT officials 
have also offered to provide two electricity generators, but as 
the POE has no budget for fuel, this option might not be 
exercised.  Other possible purchases include hand-held wands and 
a baggage scanner. 
 
Despite Vulnerabilities, No Evidence of Lethal Aid or Militias 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶12. (S) GOI and USG officials agree that potential 
vulnerabilities relating to criminal or even lethal nature exist 
at the POE. Despite the vulnerabilities, they emphasize that 
they have found no evidence of exploitation of the weaknesses. 
At the same time, they concede that this assertion does not mean 
that there is no lethal aid or militia members coming in; they 
have just not seen it.  (Note: Some observers and GOI officials 
have speculated that some Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militants who 
fled Basra to Iran after the March 2008 Charge of the Knights 
campaign could be slipping back.  POE officials claim that they 
have not been detected.  End note).  In addition, given the 
roughly 100 miles of lightly monitored Iran-Basra Province 
border alone, such activities might not be observed at the POE. 
 
Significant Challenges 
---------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) POETT officials strongly suspect that away from the 
limits of the POE, smuggling exists, chiefly of oil.  FSAT 
officials identified the lack of a bank branch as another 
vulnerability.  Transactions are all done in cash, and according 
to FSAT and USG military officials, this increases the risk of 
corruption and various types of illicit money flows, including 
terrorism financing.  While there have been discussions about 
installing a bank, there is none yet.  Another vulnerability is 
the absence of a viable customs declaration policy at the 
national level.  The policy should include documented procedures 
and controls, and a mechanism to share information with other 
GOI entities.  POETT officials suspect that bulk and counterfeit 
cash has been detected, but not reported, by POE officials. 
Another concern, voiced in the past by GOI provincial and 
national officials, including former Basra Governor Wa'eli (ref 
E) regards possible Iranian efforts to influence the January 
2010 Iraqi national elections by smuggling in fraudulent 
ballots, ballot boxes, or false identification cards. 
 
Comment: Shalamsha Faces Challenges in Maturing as a POE 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶14. (S) Despite improvement, there are legitimate concerns. 
Inadequate screening, equipment, and training at Shalamsha 
create vulnerabilities for lethal aid or militia members, as 
well as smuggling of drugs, cash, and other contraband.  This is 
of particular concern given the coming year's drawdown of US 
military presence and involvement.  POETT officials expect 
infrastructure improvements to continue during and after the 
drawdown, but at a much slower pace.  Without a USG presence, 
however, they fear that oversight may fall victim to endemic 
corruption unless the GOI acts quickly to improve port 
officials' pay and living conditions.  The USG's options are 
limited to providing the infrastructure and human resource 
training and assistance in the remaining months.  If the GOI 
expects to cement and build on USG initiatives, it will have to 
match the efforts of POETT with much harder work and more good 
will.  Though the GOI has recently initiated some small projects 
and improvements at the POE, it will have to step up its efforts 
significantly if it hopes to quickly bring the POE up to 
international standards.  End comment. 
NALAND