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Viewing cable 09BASRAH59, C) BASRA: SOUTH OIL COMPANY DIRECTOR OPTIMISTIC ABOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BASRAH59 2009-11-05 12:58 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL REO Basrah
VZCZCXRO9867
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0059/01 3091258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051258Z NOV 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0937
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0515
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0073
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0004
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0003
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0001
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0975
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/5/2019 
TAGS: ECON EINV ENRG EPET ELAB PGOV IZ IR
SUBJECT: (C) BASRA: SOUTH OIL COMPANY DIRECTOR OPTIMISTIC ABOUT 
FUTURE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2204; BAGHDAD 2057; BASRAH 38 
 
BASRAH 00000059  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basra, US State 
Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (e) 
1. (C) Summary: South Oil Company (SOC) Director General Dheyaa 
Jaafar told Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team and visiting 
Embassy Baghdad officers that a "completely different point of 
view" existed at SOC compared to just a few months ago, and 
international oil companies (IOCs) are now welcome to partner on 
the several SOC-managed oil fields.  He said that the BP/China 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) joint venture (JV) developing 
the nearby Rumaila oil field could begin within a few weeks. 
Jaafar dismissed the possibility of any significant public or 
political opposition to this or any other SOC-IOC JVs.  At the 
same time, he said it was crucial for the public to see the 
benefits to these partnerships, in the form of more jobs and 
more prosperity.  He hailed the arrival of several U.S.-based 
oil and gas service companies now establishing a presence in the 
province, and encouraged more of them to come.  He reviewed the 
"excellent progress" of the major export capacity and pipeline 
infrastructure projects in the province.  He said that there 
were limited hopes for any early re-establishment of export 
pipeline links to Syria, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, due to the 
current political atmosphere.  On the oil and gas fields that 
border Iran and Kuwait, he said that while the GOI continues to 
have good initial talks with Iran on how to deal with such 
fields, Kuwait was not yet ready for any such cooperation. 
Jaafar's positive attitude about SOC's outlook was encouraging. 
At the same time, expectations regarding job creation and 
improvement in the lives of local citizens will be high - and 
these expectations will need to be managed carefully.  While 
IOCs will surely find doing business challenging in the months 
and years ahead, nonetheless, a palpable optimism exists today, 
one that was unimaginable even six months ago.  End summary. 
 
SOC now "on board" with IOCs 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Jaafar said there was a "completely different point of 
view and attitude" among SOC engineers and workers compared to 
just a few months ago, especially in the lead-up to the first 
oil/gas licensing round (ref C).  Back then, SOC's rank and file 
"was not encouraged to cooperate with IOCs," and they "only 
heard the bad point of view" about them.  He said that as a 
result of the Minister of Oil (MOO) Shahristani and Prime 
Minister (PM) Maliki's active promotion of these SOC-IOC 
partnerships, now "around 80% of workers are satisfied with the 
[IOC-SOC partnership] concept," and they all believe that this 
is the "right start for the oil sector."  More important, he 
said, "local society sees these partnerships as a good thing." 
He said that if the BP/CNPC deal moves forward well, it will 
cause the population to support still other companies who seek 
to work in other Basra oil fields, such as West Qurna, Az Zubair 
and Majnoon, and in the next two or three years, "big and 
positive changes" will continue.  He said a recent oil road show 
in Istanbul had attracted 42 companies, and all expressed 
confidence about the Iraqi oil sector.  Jaafar expressed 
optimism about the recently-initialed Az Zubair field project, 
to be developed by an Italy-based ENI, U.S.-based Occidental, 
and South Korea-based Kogas.  Jaafar said that the West Qurna 
(phase one) field could also soon be awarded to the Exxon-Shell 
partnership.  Jaafar half-jokingly said that, in fact, there is 
so much activity that could come on line that he hoped the 
second round did not bring any more IOCs-SOC partnerships: "This 
is enough!  We're not sure we can absorb any more [IOC JVs] 
right now.  It is too much work and capacity for SOC to handle." 
 
 
BP/CNPC activities to start soon 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Jaafar confirmed that "within the next two weeks," senior 
BP and CNPC representatives and SOC officials would begin the 
precise calculation of current ("baseline") SOC production at 
Rumaila field, an important step that will establish the 
baseline production numbers from which BP/CNPC will calculate 
its own subsequent production targets - and compensation.  He 
said that SOC's own preliminary figure was around 1,050,000 
barrels/day (b/d), while the Ministry of Oil's (in Baghdad) 
initial estimate was about 950,000 b/d.  Jaafar said that "we 
need to come to an agreement on how to measure our current 
production . . . we will have to negotiate . . .  this will be a 
team effort."  (Note: BP reps later told PRTOffs that the 
1,050,000 figure could have been an "initial guess," rather than 
a precise figure.  End note.)  He said that once a metering 
program establishes an agreed-upon production rate, which he 
said could occur within two weeks, a full ramp-up of activities 
could begin. 
 
 
BASRAH 00000059  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Downplays political opposition to IOC deals 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Jaafar dismissed the possibility of any significant 
public or political opposition to these SOC-IOC JVs.  He said 
that the public strongly supports them.  Noting that the Council 
of Ministers (COM) had already approved the BP/CNPC deal, he 
said that the Council of Representatives (COR) would not seek to 
vote on the issue, and the MOO's Petroleum Contract and 
Licensing Directorate's Legal Advisor had made a clear legal 
argument that this was strictly an executive branch role (i.e. 
COM), not one for the legislative branch (COR).  Jaafar, a 
former member of the Basra Provincial Council (PC) who resigned 
to take up his present post in July, said that "only around two 
or three [of the 35 total] PC members" are opposed to the 
BP/CNPC or other SOC-IOC JVs; "they want the project to go 
ahead."  He acknowledged that a few PC members are against it 
for political, rather than any technical or economic ones. 
(Note: While the PC has no legal role in approving these 
national contracts, any strong opposition could complicate IOCs' 
ease of doing business.  End note.) 
 
But "public needs to see the benefits [of IOCs' work]" 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
5. (C) Jaafar confirmed recent press reports of recent SOC 
hirings, and said that about 1600 mostly engineering and 
technical positions had recently been filed.  (Note: SOC has an 
estimated workforce of around 16,000.  End note.)  He said that 
this was the first time in recent memory that so many people had 
been hired.  He said that it was necessary to "start training 
new workers to be ready for increased demand," and also so that 
"locals can see the benefits [of the BP/CNPC deal]."  He said 
that for every SOC job, around four to five indirect jobs are 
created.  Jaafar said that he expected similar new hiring for 
the West Qurna (phase one) and Az Zubair JV projects. 
 
U.S. and other service companies are welcome to Basra 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6. (SBU) Jaafar expressed optimism about the several 
international oil and gas-related service companies now 
establishing a presence in the province, including U.S.-based 
Baker Hughes and U.S.-based Halliburton, and said that he 
"encourages any such company to come here and form a JV." 
(Note: U.S.-based Weatherford has already been in Iraq for a few 
years.  End note.)  He said that he had regular meetings with 
Baker Hughes about their plans to set up a large facility on SOC 
grounds.  "For these service companies, now is the right time to 
be here: they are good for Basra, they employ a lot of people, 
and bring training programs for workers."  He said that the 
recent Washington investment conference on Iraq had showcased 
Baker Hughes's work here, and was a "good example." 
 
Other infrastructure improvements moving forward 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7. (C) Jaafar said that the South Export Redundancy Project, 
(SERP, which will replace Iraq's offshore fueling points and the 
feeder pipelines; refs A, B) was on schedule and fully funded, 
to be completed by around 2013, "which will give us the ability 
to export around 4.5 million b/d."  He said that still other, 
subsequent expansion plans could increase export capacity more 
("six to eight 8 million b/d"), with possible IOC assistance. 
He said that all these projects had the full support MOO 
Shahristani and PM Maliki.  He said that work to find any 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) within the paths of these pipelines 
was also progressing well.  Jaafar said that two SOC pipeline 
projects to run from Az Zubair and Safwan to Al Faw were also 
progressing.  He also noted the progress of other infrastructure 
work (tanks, pumps) at Al Faw.  In response to a question 
whether the planned production increases might be crimped by the 
still-limited export capacity, he acknowledged that some IOCs 
have voiced this concern, but was confident that capacity 
increases would come on line in time.  Jaafar said that apart 
from these improvements, SOC itself will be increasing its own 
production in the coming year by about 250,000 b/d, by 
rehabilitating or drilling new wells at Az Zubair, West Qurna 
and North Rumaila. 
 
Neighboring states: export pipelines, shared fields 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (C) Presently, Iraq's oil exports pass though Persian Gulf 
off-shore oil terminals and overland via Turkey.  In response to 
questions about future additional routes, Jaafar said that in 
 
BASRAH 00000059  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
principle, PM Maliki and MOO Shahristani were supportive of this 
concept, and that "we want good relations with all our 
neighbors."  But he acknowledged that present relations with 
some of its neighbors complicated this idea for now.  He said 
that the Iraq-Syria pipeline, presently not in use still 
"technically feasible," was complicated by the current state of 
Iraq-Syria relations.  He similarly discounted any early 
restoration of long-dormant pipelines to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. 
 In response to questions about oil and gas fields shared by 
neighboring states (particularly Iran and Kuwait), Jaafar said 
that Iraq and Iran have held initial and "constructive" talks on 
how such fields could be handled.  He was less optimistic about 
Kuwait, noting that the latter was "not ready at this time" for 
such discussions. 
 
Bio 
--- 
 
9. (C) Prior to becoming DG in July 2009, Dheyaa Jaafar, a 
petroleum engineer by training, had for many years worked his 
way up the ranks of SOC, most recently as Operations Director. 
He was elected to the PC in January 2009, as a member of the PM 
Maliki's Da'wa Islamiya party.  (He is said to be very close to 
Maliki.)  He held this office only for a few weeks.  Local 
contacts have told us that during this time in office, PM Maliki 
assured him that he would soon be named SOC DG.  Jaafar became 
SOC DG in July 2009 in the wake of former SOC DG Numa's firing 
after publicly opposing the first oil round (ref C).  Jaafar is 
a long time contact of the former Basra U.S. Regional Embassy 
Office, now PRT, and is understood to be favorably disposed 
toward the United States in general, and U.S. oil firms in 
particular.  Jaafar is originally from Basra, and is married 
with several children.  He speaks broken but adequate English. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) Dheyaa Jaafar's positive attitude about SOC's near and 
medium term outlook, particularly about working with IOCs, was 
encouraging.  His comments clearly reflect a sea change in SOC's 
attitude from just a few months ago.  At the same time, 
expectations regarding job creation and improvement in the lives 
of local citizens will be high - and these expectations will 
need to be managed carefully.  And while IOCs will find doing 
business challenging in the coming months and years - training 
and certifying workers, a glacial GOI bureaucracy, shortage of 
suitable sub-contractors to utilize, shortage of office and 
hotel space, and the always-worrying security situation - 
nevertheless, a palpable optimism exists, one that was 
unimaginable even six months ago. 
NALAND