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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000256 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT PATASSE CALLS ON THE AMBASSADOR 
 
BANGUI 00000256  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former President of the Central African 
Republic (CAR) Ange-Felix Patasse called on the Ambassador on 
Monday, November 16, 2009. In the course of an hour and half 
long visit Patasse affirmed his friendship with the United 
States, blamed the French for his downfall, and stressed his 
utility to U.S. foreign policy -- specifically concerning Libya. 
The Ambassador stressed that the United States supported 
institutions and processes, not individuals. He noted that the 
United States recognizes only one elected government in the CAR; 
that of Francois Bozize and was opposed to any attempt to change 
the government by non-constitutional means. He repeated our 
three main messages: Armed groups must cease hostilities and 
participate in the political process; the government must foster 
development and protect human rights, and the CAR must look to 
the private sector, not international assistance to finance its 
development. Patasse was effusive and flattering and said that 
he hoped that there could be future meetings. END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) On November 12, 2009, former CAR president Ange-Felix 
Patasse "convoked" the Ambassador to meet him at his residence. 
The Ambassador declined the convocation, but replied that he 
would be willing to meet the former president at the chancery. 
On November 16, Patasse came to the chancery with an escort of 
about ten troops from an international PKO force (MICOPAX) in 
full battle dress and body armor. He was accompanied by a large 
delegation. The Ambassador admitted only Patasee, his wife, his 
Foreign Minister, and three advisors to the office - all others 
were excluded. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Patasse began by affirming his friendship with the 
United States, naming all of the U.S. Presidents, Secretaries of 
State, and Assistant Secretaries for African Affairs with whom 
he had worked. He expressed great admiration for President Obama 
and took much credit for facilitating the U.S. rapprochement 
with Libya. He quoted the adage that one can choose one's 
friends, but not one's family. He then characterized Kaddafi as 
"African family" and the United States as a friend. Patasse was 
very proud of a meeting that he claimed to have organized in 
Bangui where he left the U.S. and Libyan negotiators in a room 
with the warning that they would not be allowed to leave until 
they had produced an agreement. One of the messages of his visit 
was that, if elected, he would be helpful to the United States 
in relations with Kaddafi, whom he referred to repeatedly as 
"The Guide." 
 
¶4. (SBU) He presented the Ambassador with hard copies of three 
position papers on the upcoming CAR elections: 
-- A project to use satellite telephones and computers to 
transmit polling results from 6,000 polling stations to Bangui; 
-- A call for a new census to establish new lists of voters; and 
-- A demand that all Central African refugees and internally 
displaced persons be allowed to vote. 
These color documents featured Patasse's portrait on the cover 
and were datelined Tripoli, 23 September, 2009 and Bangui, 6 
November. The first paper proposed a $10 million satellite 
telephone network to transmit election results to Bangui. 
(Note: Less than $7 million has been pledged in international 
assistance for the elections, and the government has committed a 
little more than $2 million.  End Note.) The second paper is a 
careful review of the current electoral situation and calls for 
a new census to establish a list of voters and various other 
reforms -- this is a serious issue since there are no viable 
lists remaining from the last elections. The third paper calls 
for the CARG and the international community to develop 
mechanisms to assure that internally displaced persons (IDP) and 
refugees can vote in the upcoming elections. This, too, is a 
serious issue as there are well over 200,000 Central African 
IDPs and refugees. It is not at all unreasonable for Patasse to 
assume that his supporters make up the majority of these people 
and want to be sure that they can vote. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Patasse blamed the French for his political troubles, 
claiming that they had sabotaged his government from the 
beginning, but he did not elaborate. This is nothing new and it 
 
BANGUI 00000256  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
is very clear that the French are not at all pleased to see him 
back in Bangui. Patasse said that he would be running as an 
independent, but did not spend any time attacking Martin 
Ziguele, the leader and official presidential candidate of the 
political party that Patasse founded (the MLPC). 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response, the Ambassador stressed that the United 
States supported institutions and processes, not individuals. 
This point is especially important as Patasse and his partisans 
have always made much of U.S. Ambassador Daniel Simpson's 
energetic (and successful) efforts to force then-President 
Kolingba to hold elections in 1992. (Patasse was elected 
president in 1993, after Kolingba's efforts to corrupt the first 
elections were exposed.) Because these elections would never 
have taken place without Ambassador Simpson's intense personal 
efforts, the MLPC has sometimes tried to present itself as the 
party of the United States and has, on occasion, offered implied 
criticism of the current U.S. ambassador for not giving them 
public support. The Ambassador went on to stress that the United 
States recognizes only one elected government in the CAR -- that 
of Francois Bozize -- and is opposed to any attempt to change 
the government by any non-constitutional means. The Ambassador 
repeated our three main messages: Armed groups must cease 
hostilities and participate in the political process; the 
government must foster development and protect human rights, and 
the CAR must look to the private sector, not international 
assistance to finance its development. The first of these 
messages is especially important as Patasse is widely seen as 
the inspiration for, if not actually connected with, the Popular 
Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), the major rebel 
group in the northwest of the country. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: Patasse was confident, charming, and 
flattering in the extreme. It is clear that despite years of 
exile, Patasse still feels very presidential as witnessed by his 
initial "convocation" of the Ambassador. During the course of 
the conversation, he said that he would be "convoking" the other 
ambassadors in Bangui. Indeed, the Chinese ambassador went to 
meet Patasse at Patasse's residence, where, as might be 
expected, Patasse stressed his long abiding friendship for 
China. The Special Representative of the Secretary General of 
the United Nations received Patasse at her office, not his. The 
French Ambassador, Dean of the Corps, has not decided whether to 
meet Patasse at all. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Patasse attached great importance to his relationship 
with Kaddafi and seemed rather oblivious to the possibility that 
the U.S. might not/not be entirely favorably inclined towards a 
Central African head of state who was close to Libya. Similarly, 
he did not seem consider the possibility that it was this very 
closeness to the Libyans (and Bemba's Congolese rebels) that 
made his overthrow popular with many Central Africans. One of 
his initial demands as a condition of his return to Bangui was a 
security detail from CEN-SAD; Kaddafi's new African organization 
(http://www.cen-sad.org/new/index.php?option= com_content&ta 
sk=view&id=33&Itemid=76).  The Central African government is very 
aware of the Patasse/Kadaffi connection and quite ready blame 
many of its problems with rebel groups on "foreign" money and 
influence. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Patasse's return to Bangui is the subject of great 
interest and speculation in the media and in the street. As 
reported previously, popular theories include: 
¶A. He really thinks that he can win the election as an 
independent. 
¶B. He has cut a deal with Bozize -- he spoils Martin Ziguele's 
chances and Bozize will let him reclaim his lost properties. 
¶C. He cut a deal with Ziguele - we just don't know what it is 
yet. 
Following the rule that one should always look for the simplest 
answer, we would have to rank the probability of these theories 
in the order presented, even if the second seems the most 
reasonable. END COMMENT. 
COOK