VZCZCXRO7128
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0251/01 3171138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 131138Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1086
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0237
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0340
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0353
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0252
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0191
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0181
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0541
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0525
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0173
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0514
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1371

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000251 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
NAIROBI  FOR AKARAS 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
INR FOR CNEARY 
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN PLACE, BUT ELECTIONS 
STILL FACE SIGNIFICANT HURDLES. 
 
REF: A Bangui 181, B Bangui 250 
 
BANGUI 00000251  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for 
the Central African (CAR) elections of 2010 was sworn into 
existence on October 8, 2009 and its president, Pastor Joseph 
Binguimale, voted into position shortly thereafter. To date, 
the IEC has been largely quiet, and the general consensus is 
that the Commission and its president have neither sufficient 
political weight to be a true force in the elections, nor the 
technical expertise to function effectively. The government 
(CARG) has asked for formal help from the UN Development Program 
(UNDP), which has just finished an assessment mission. The UNDP 
will recommend to the UN Secretary General that the elections be 
held in the constitutionally mandated period.  In a related 
development, on October 29, 2009 the National Assembly began 
debate on a formal extension of President's mandate. With only 
five months to go until the elections, Post believes that the 
elections will happen but that the condensed timeframe means 
that the results will be questionable. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) The newly sworn in IEC is comprised of 30 members from 
ruling and opposition parties, civil society, public sector 
workers and the political military groups. The 31st member, the 
president, was selected from four candidates controversially 
proposed by the Prime Minister and the President of the National 
Assembly (Ref A). The Electoral Commission is in charge of 
organizing and supervising presidential and general elections; 
including the establishment of electoral list and polling 
stations, the training election workers, and the procurement of 
election materials. Troublingly, despite promises, the IEC does 
not yet have any office space and no funding. (They are working 
out of space provided by the UNDP.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The President of the Commission, Pastor Joseph 
Binguimale, is also the subject of some controversy. Elected by 
a plurality, with 19 of the 25 votes (five members had yet to 
reach Bangui), Binguimale is thought to have won the votes of 
all the Presidential Majority and Public Sector Workers with 
Civil Society and Political Military groups voting in large part 
for him as well (NOTE: Four of the five Civil Society members 
are thought to be pro-Bozize and the Political Military groups 
likely understand their interests lay in supporting Bozize as he 
is the counter party of all lucrative peace deals with them. END 
NOTE). Yet Binguimale is not a well know figure nationally. 
Leaving the CAR in his youth, Binguimale was originally a 
chauffeur for the CAR embassy in Paris and held other menial 
jobs before finally becoming a pastor. Since then, he has spent 
the much of his time in France. As such, many observers feel he 
does not have the political strength or power base to make the 
IEC a force in the electoral process. Furthermore, the members 
of the IEC are largely unknowns nationally and few have election 
experience. While there is one former Minister and Deputy 
Minister, the rest include a relative of Bozize's, mid level 
functionaries, priests and teachers - with five rebels finishing 
the list. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The UNDP has been identified as the chief interlocutor 
with the CARG for the elections and though which all 
international funds will pass. Current capacity at the UNDP is 
very low. The office presently has five employees from its 
Democracy and Governance office working on elections as a part 
of their greater portfolio. Only one current UNDP employee 
worked for the organization during the elections of 2005 - he is 
now in the management section - and the office head admits that 
institutional memory is nonexistent.  Officials within the UN 
organization and other partner institutions have complained 
about the lack of professional capacity and preparation in the 
elections unit. With the new arrival of the UNDP Country 
 
BANGUI 00000251  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Director and Resident Representative their aptitude should 
improve, but this enhancement has come at a very late stage. 
 
¶5. (SBU) A UNDP Mission from New York has just concluded a two 
week visit to Bangui and will forma;;u recommend to the UN 
Secretary General that the elections happen in the scheduled 
timeframe. The Mission met with all of the major actors on the 
sociopolitical scene of the CAR and did a very solid job 
identifying the major challenges that the electoral process 
faces: 
 
-- Lack of political will by most of the major actors (with the 
notable expectation of President Bozize). 
 
-- No funding for the IEC and a complete lack of technical 
knowledge by its members. 
 
-- Rampant insecurity outside of Bangui. 
 
-- The stalled DDR process. 
 
-- A total lack of voter registration lists. 
 
-- 138,200 Central African refugees outside of the country and 
162,300 internally displaced people. 
 
-- Logistical difficulties of getting voting materials into and 
around the country. 
 
-- Weak institutional capacity of the governmental bodies that 
will be key to the elections like the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Constitutional Court. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The UNDP Mission also identified funding for the 
elections as a worry. They believe the elections will cost USD 
16.5 million, of which currently USD 11 million has been found: 
 
-- Despite a constitutional mandate to hold elections every five 
years, the CARG, did not appropriate money for elections until 
late September 2009 when they set aside CFA 1 billion (USD 2.26 
million) in a budget addendum. The CARG promised the UNDP 
Mission that it would set aside another CFA 1 billion in the 
2010 budget for the elections. 
 
-- The European Community set aside 4 million Euros (USD 5.88 
million) for the elections last year and as soon as the UNDP 
becomes officially engaged, they will release the money into a 
basket of funds. 
 
-- So far, the USG has pledged about USD 1.7 million in 
USAID/DCHA and DRL funds for civic education, election 
monitoring, and civil society work, but none of this money will 
be used to fund the elections themselves. 
 
-- The French Ambassador recently intimated that his government, 
which has remained conspicuously silent on election funding, 
would contribute a ``significant'' sum in the coming months. He 
did not elucidate further, and the French may also be waiting 
for the recommendation of the UNDP.  The French DCM, however, 
earlier mentioned that France may contribute up to 500,000 Euros 
to the UNDP trust fund. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In its concluding meeting with the international 
community, the UNDP Mission cited that the CARG's stated will to 
hold the elections gave the Mission sufficient confidence to 
recommend to the Secretary General that the elections be held on 
time and that the UNDP be the chief technical advisor to the 
 
BANGUI 00000251  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
process. They will send three technical advisors in the coming 
weeks to help with capacity building of the IEC and logistics 
planning for start of the electoral list compilation. They also 
gave a preliminary timetable: 
 
-- Dec 2009 - Start of the electoral list compilation 
 
-- Feb 2010 - Identification of voting locations 
 
-- Around April 25, 2010 - First round of the elections 
 
-- Around May 6, 2010 - Second round of the elections if needed. 
 
¶8. (SBU) According to a credible source, President Bozize's son, 
Deputy Minister of Defense Francis Bozize recently told the 
Director General of the Organisation Internationale de la 
Francophonie that election preparations were well underway and 
the electoral lists were in good shape. Considering that it is 
the IEC's job to draw up the lists, his statement may lend 
credence to the rumors circulating Bangui that the government 
has been engaging village chiefs and mayors to clandestinely 
prepare electoral lists favorable to Bozize. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: With the UNDP advising the Secretary General 
that the international community should support the elections, 
great care will have to be taken to ensure that the quality of 
the elections remains the responsibility of the CARG. The very 
real possibility exists that the international community will be 
blamed for irregularities if it does not face the process with a 
unified voice calling for CARG accountability. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Francis Bozize's statement, true or not, displays a 
justified confidence on the President's part that he is well 
positioned for the elections. With the opposition fractured and 
lacking a coherent message - and with the recent arrival of 
controversial former President Ange Felix Patasse (Ref B), which 
may further split the opposition - Bozize stands in prime 
position for another five-year term. The possibility of a 
mandate extension has some potential to postpone the elections, 
but it seems more likely that the President would use this as a 
last resort if an opposition figure was able to separate himself 
from the fray and have a reasonable chance at defeating the 
President. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Fundamentally, the CAR is a top down political system 
where the incumbent's advantage is institutionally significant. 
The President nominates Governors, Deputy Governors and Mayors 
in all towns of consequence, allowing him to shape the political 
climate. Therefore, it is most probable that Bozize will seek to 
push through elections that will meet minimum requirements using 
his built in advantages of incumbency and a weak opposition. It 
is worth noting that while the UNDP in Bangui may have no 
experience in running an election in the CAR, Bozize is well 
experienced, having won election in 2005. END COMMENT. 
COOK