VZCZCXRO1130
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0725/01 3101137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061137Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0868
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0015
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0595
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0003
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 0292

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000725 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP IAN GRAY 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO SARAH WELLBORNE 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
BRAZAVILLE FOR CONSULAR SECTION 
OUAGADOUGOU FOR CONSULAR SECTION 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC ML
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - BAMAKO 
 
REF: (A) 08 STATE 074840, (B) STATE 097431, (C) BAMAKO 00367 
 
BAMAKO 00000725  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Following is Embassy Bamako's fraud report for the second half of FY 
¶2009.  Responses are keyed to paragraph 7 of Reftel A. 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Bamako is a high fraud post. 
 
Mali is the second largest country in West Africa in terms of 
territory, and is one of the world's poorest nations with a per 
capita income of around USD 250.  Unemployment is high.  Fraud 
investigations are hampered by the fact that most Malians cannot 
read and write, and therefore rely on others to fill out 
applications.  Further, due to the lack of education and 
documentation, many applicants do not know their own dates of birth 
and other general facts or circumstances about their own lives. 
Limited infrastructure makes travel and outreach difficult.  There 
are concentrations of expatriate Malians living in the Washington, 
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore metro areas and most business 
and tourist visa applicants intend to travel to these locations. 
There is a steady stream of tourist, commercial trader, and student 
applicants.  Apparently bucking the worldwide trend, during FY09 NIV 
applications were up six percent with appointments booked at the end 
of the fiscal year through mid November representing a potential 
increase in FY09 workload of 18 percent over FY08. 
 
¶B. NIV FRAUD:  The primary type of NIV fraud encountered in Bamako 
involves fraudulent documents of all kinds, including civil, 
financial and school documents.  These practices touch close to 90 
percent of NIV fraud cases.  The consular section encounters 
fraudulent documents on a daily basis. Fortunately, most fraud is 
unsophisticated and applicants attempting to make use of false 
documents are refused under INA section 214b before FPU resources 
are required. 
 
Although wide-spread, the fraud encountered in Bamako does not 
appear to be systematic.  To combat document fraud, the consular 
office relies on a network of local government, school, and private 
bank officials to verify documents regarded as suspicious.  Some 
documents cannot be verified because they are from regions outside 
of Bamako.  The daily volume of questionable documents accompanying 
NIV applications means the consular section can only verify selected 
items. 
 
In general, there appear to be three primary reasons for NIV fraud: 
legitimate travelers attempting to bolster what they fear might be 
viewed as a questionable case; those wishing to stay and work in the 
United States; and those wishing to reunited with family who have 
overstayed in the United States.  The vast majority of children seen 
with false birth certificates fall into this latter category. 
 
The use of false feeder documents is a trend observed at post.  In 
nearly all cases of this type, the "parents" were either 
well-qualified or already had a visa, and came with their "children" 
to apply for trips, usually to visit family or friends in the United 
States.  After several revocations and findings of ineligibilities 
under section 212(a)(6)(E), the pattern seems to abate for a while 
but then returns again after some months. 
 
Thanks to our proactive colleagues at Embassy Brazzaville, Post was 
made aware of a Brazzaville-based fraud scheme to generate false 
passport entry stamps for the United Arab Emirates.  An arrest was 
made in this case in mid September in Brazzaville and the Congolese 
police investigation indicated significant numbers of Malian 
nationals were included in this scam.  Based on the detailed fraud 
indicators provided by Embassy Brazzaville for these particular 
stamps, in less than a month's time, post was able to intercept 
upwards of a dozen applicants with these fraudulent stamps.  All of 
these individuals were merchants attempting to bolster their weak 
travel history by purporting trips to Dubai for their purchases. 
All of these individuals were refused under INA 214b. 
 
In August 2009, two very poor quality fraudulent U.S. Lincoln Visas 
in Malian passports were intercepted by the immigration police at 
the Bamako Senou International Airport.  While post was neither able 
to examine the actual documents nor interview the imposters, the 
Malian immigration authorities provided photocopies of the 
fraudulent visas to the Embassy.  A review of the photocopies 
suggests one visa to be a washed Lincoln foil with a low quality 
printer and unsophisticated attempt to print data.  The other foil 
appears to be a poor quality scan and color print of the same foil. 
This information was turned over to the RSO. 
 
¶C. IV FRAUD: Embassy Bamako does not issue immigrant visas but 
 
BAMAKO 00000725  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
accepts immigrant visa petitions for the immediate relatives of U.S. 
citizens filed by U.S. citizens who have resided in Mali for six 
months or more.  All petitions at post are family based petitions 
and are usually filed by Peace Corps volunteers, international NGO 
employees, or other long term residents planning to return to the 
United States after serving abroad.  Post routinely conducts 
immigrant visa-related antifraud investigations for Embassy Dakar 
(our IV processing post), Embassy Abidjan, and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). 
 
¶D. DV FRAUD: Embassy Bamako does not issue diversity visas; however, 
shortly after the reporting period post has plans to conduct an 
information campaign in order to educate potential applicants about 
the DV program.  As in the case of IVs, post also routinely conducts 
DV-related anti-fraud investigations for the Embassy Dakar. 
 
¶E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: The biggest challenge to post's passport 
operations is the fact that the vast majority of passport applicants 
are made on behalf of children with only one or no U.S. citizen 
parent.  Most of the cases are presented to officers by a third 
party -- a relative or guardian -- rather than the child's 
biological parents, who are usually residing, often illegally, in 
the United States.  The biggest obstacle in these cases comes in 
verifying the identity of the child presented at the window. 
Confirming that the child at the consular window is the same as the 
infant pictured in a passport is a serious challenge because many of 
the parents and/or guardians of these children have allowed their 
child's passport to expire. 
 
Post regularly requires additional documentation such as age 
progression photos, passports of parents showing their travel to the 
United States, and hospital records when adjudicating cases. 
Further complicating the issue is obtaining verification of parental 
consent.  Parents frequently provide consent forms, notarized in the 
United States, but there is no way to determine if the person who 
signed the consent is the actual parent, as thousands may have that 
same name.  Although there have been no cases of imposters using 
U.S. passports to travel to the United States, post continues to 
remind Malian authorities that we are available for consultation and 
training when fraud is suspected. 
 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD: Post has spent a considerable amount of time 
during the reporting period attempting to verify Mali's compliance 
with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoptions.  This has been 
prompted by the receipt of post's first Hague adoption case.  A 
cursory review of the petition has revealed several fraud 
indicators.  As post does not issue immigrant visas, all of this 
information has been shared with Embassy Dakar. 
 
¶G. DNA TESTING:  Post routinely requests DNA testing in connection 
with Visas 92/93 cases and CRBA applications where the relationships 
of beneficiaries to petitioners are in serious doubt.  CRBA cases 
involving DNA usually involve Americans males with dual nationality 
who come to make a CRBA application several years after the birth of 
child or for multiple children with different mothers.  Visas 92/93 
cases requiring DNA usually involve applicants with no civil 
documents and/or proof of relationship. 
 
Post has enthusiastically welcomed the new DNA testing procedures 
detailed in Reftel B as post has long harbored doubts as to the 
efficacy of its DNA testing procedures due to the virtual absence of 
any negative DNA results (Reftel C).  Post has not yet been able to 
implement the procedures spelled out in State 097431 but is working 
to do so.  In the interim post has frozen all DNA testing. 
 
¶H. ASYLUM AND DHS BENEFITS FRAUD:  Post continues to process a 
significant number of Visas 92/93 cases and has observed a more than 
doubling of cases during FY09 versus FY08.  These cases include 
beneficiaries from Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Mali, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Congo-Brazzaville.  Post finds it difficult to 
identify fraud in these cases because the majority of follow-to-join 
beneficiaries have either no identification documents at all or 
certificates from areas where verification is impossible.  In 
addition, many of these cases involve individuals who cannot read or 
write.  They often cannot provide specific dates or timelines and 
are confused about other details of their experiences.  As reported 
in paragraph G, after consultations with DHS, post routinely 
suggests DNA testing in cases where the relationship of 
beneficiaries to petitioners is in doubt. 
 
Post's greatest concern in Visas 92 cases are the ever growing 
number of cases involving Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).  This 
trend was first observed in FY08 and has continued to grow over this 
 
BAMAKO 00000725  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
reporting period.  In a typical FGM-related case the asylum 
petitioner is a woman petitioning for her family to join her in the 
United States.  The basis on which asylum was granted was the fact 
that the woman had undergone FGM and feared returning to her native 
country for reasons related to FGM.  Post notes that many of the 
petitioners in these cases had been present in the United States for 
many years before making their FGM-based asylum claim.  We further 
note that many of these petitions have been filed by immigration 
attorneys and appear strikingly similar, suggesting a pattern. 
 
FGM is a practice that has been recognized under international law 
as a violation of human rights and post is not questioning its 
grounds for asylum claims but is only raising the fact that a 
potentially legitimate basis for an asylum claim appears as if it is 
being exploited.  Post has made its concerns known to the regional 
DHS Office and per 9 FAM Appendix O, 1208.2-5(A) has reported on 
suspected fraudulent use of FGM-based asylum claims to USCIS' Asylum 
Branch. 
 
¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST 
TRAVEL: As discussed in paragraph B, post has seen an increase in 
child trafficking cases with otherwise well-qualified adults 
facilitating.  Post is unaware of any cases relating to terrorism, 
organized crime or organized trafficking in the reporting period. 
 
¶J.  DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  Bamako's consular and RSO 
sections enjoy a professional relationship.  Consular employees are 
quick to bring to RSO's attention any cases involving fraud. 
However, as noted above, Malian authorities are reluctant to 
prosecute or investigate cases of alleged document fraud and 
smuggling. 
 
During the second half of FY09 Post was part of an investigation 
opened by Diplomatic Security's New York Field Office 
(VF-2009-00834) regarding a business in New York City which was 
believed to be selling invitation letters to electronics merchants 
in various West African nations, including Mali.  This investigation 
was opened at the initiation of Embassy Ouagadougou in cooperation 
with CA/FPP.  Embassy Bamako was able to track down several recent 
applicants using these invitation letters and re-interview them and 
provide scans of the invitation letters and associated 
documentation.  After investigation, the case was ultimately closed 
by Diplomatic Security with no action taken against the New York 
business. 
 
¶K.  HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
Passports, birth certificates, marriage certificates and other 
official documents are easily obtained in Mali.  In February 2007, 
with funding from the Canadian government, Mali came out with a new 
machine readable passport.  The new book contains several security 
features including microprinting, UV features, and a full color 
digital photo.  A Malian passport may be obtained by presenting a 
valid birth certificate and, for adult applicants, a photo ID. 
Passport errors such as alternate name spellings and birth date 
changes are common. Mali does not currently have an agreement with 
the United States to extend passport validity six months beyond the 
expiration date, so consular officers frequently have to request 
that visa applicants obtain a new passport before a visa can be 
issued. 
 
As an example of how quickly a Malian passport can be obtained Post 
refused a qualified B1/B2 applicant under INA 221g and asked him to 
obtain a new passport at 8:00 a.mm (less than 6 months validity 
remaining) and the individual returned before 3:00 p.m. with the new 
document. 
 
Due to the number of offices and individuals authorized to issue 
birth and marriage certificates, the variety of different official 
formats for these documents, and the prevalence of blank official 
forms and seals on the open market, it is often impossible to 
differentiate between authentic and false certificates.  Individuals 
who do not have a valid birth certificate or birth records only need 
two witnesses to certify to a clerk of court their birth date and a 
certificate will be issued.  In almost every circumstance, all such 
documents must be verified. 
 
Since obtaining Malian passports and civil documents is so easy, 
post has seen NIV applicants with valid Malian passports who would 
not seem to be Malian.  Their inability to speak one of the local 
languages and unfamiliarity with Malian cultural and historic 
traditions are often indicators that they are not bona fide 
applicants.  Post has received reports that Nigerians have been 
issued Malian passports. 
 
BAMAKO 00000725  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  Cooperation with 
Malian government officials on fraud matters is low.  The Embassy 
maintains close contacts with several of the local authorities 
responsible for verifying official documents though unfortunately, 
the response of law enforcement officials when provided with 
evidence of fraud and likely criminal activity, still remains 
anemic, in large part due to capacity constraints. 
 
¶M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Post's main concern is its inability 
to pay as much attention to fraud prevention matters as it would 
like given current staffing (refer to paragraph N for further 
details) This situation has lead to an over-reliance on the senior 
FSN visa assistant who has also been doubling as the 
fraud-prevention FSN.  Post is looking forward to encumbering both 
the full-time fraud prevention FSN position as well as the A/EFM 
Consular Associate position during the first quarter of FY10. With 
the addition of these extra resources, post will be well positioned 
to improve its attention to fraud prevention. 
 
A secondary concern is that during the reporting period post has 
transitioned from a contracted NIV appointment call center to CA's 
online NIV appointment system.  This action was taken mostly due to 
the call center's poor service but additionally due to indications 
of occasional malfeasance.  While post is satisfied with the on-line 
system, there may be vulnerabilities due to its lack of experience 
and familiarity with the new system.  Post has conferred with other 
regional posts using the online system and implemented several of 
their best practices. 
 
¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING:  The consular section has one full-time 
and one part-time officer position.  The incumbent part-time officer 
departed post in April. Post is confident that the officer staffing 
situation will improve during FY10.  On the LE staffing front, post 
is welcoming a new A/EFM consular associate after a 17 month gap at 
that position and will be encumbering the new full-time fraud 
associate position in the first quarter of FY10. 
 
The consular section chief has taken the Fraud Prevention course for 
Managers.  Post will send the part-time consular officer to this 
course as soon as possible.  As detailed in paragraph M, until the 
full-time fraud prevention FSN position is encumbered, Bamako's visa 
assistant will continue to handle the fraud-prevention portfolio. 
He has attended the fraud prevention course for LE staff and also 
attended the consular regional workshop at FSI.  He additionally 
completed the FSI online correspondence courses including Detecting 
Imposters, Detecting Fraudulent Documents, Immigration Law and Visa 
Operations, Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, Overseas Citizens 
Services.  We expect there to be a period of transition when the 
full-time fraud prevention FSN gets up to speed, but this should not 
last beyond the second quarter of FY10. 
 
MILOVANOVIC