VZCZCXRO4399
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #2980/01 3141324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101324Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5402
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 
TAGS: EAGR ECON IZ PBTS SENV TNGD TPHY
SUBJECT: IRAQI WATER RESOURCES NEGOTIATOR DESCRIBES WATER 
TALKS WITH IRAN 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2800 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 2899 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 2930 
 
Classified By: Classified by EMIN John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 b and 
d 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During Iraq-Iran bilateral negotiations on 
water resources held October 23-25, Iraqi negotiators 
confronted their Iranian interlocutors with unclassified 
photographs of Iranian river blockages and diversions 
provided to the GOI by Embassy Baghdad, Ministry of Water 
Resources General Director of Planning and Followups Salar 
Bakr Sami told USG personnel November 2.  Over Iraqi 
objections, the Iranian negotiators insisted that resolution 
of water issues between the two countries follow the 
provisions spelled out in the 1975 &Treaty Concerning the 
State Frontier and Neighborly Relations between Iran and 
Iraq8 that calls for an equal splitting of flows from three 
rivers and a sharing of four others based on previous 
agreements and custom.  The negotiations did not result in 
any agreements from the Iranian side to increase water flows. 
 The GOI has requested USG aid in contracting with and 
funding an international water expert to assist in developing 
the GOI negotiating strategy for the next round of 
discussions with Iran.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy ESTH Officer, ITAO senior consultant for 
water, and military liaison (CJ-9) met GD Salar Bakr Sami in 
early November to discuss recent water talks with Iran that 
occurred from October 23-25.  Salar described the trip as a 
successful step in continuing negotiations with Iran over 
water issues that have become more critical in the last 
several months.  Salar stated that that he was Iraq's primary 
negotiator with Iran's General Director of Water and Dams, 
who noted that his Iranian interlocutor did not have the same 
latitude that he (Salar) had been authorized and had to 
obtain continuous guidance from higher authorities to 
determine negotiating positions and responses.  Salar also 
stated that acting Iranian Energy Minister Namjou -- 
reportedly an old friend of Iraqi Minister of Water Resources 
Rashid -- was not in a position to finalize binding bilateral 
agreements.  According to Salar, the Iranians were unhappy 
with recent negative press stories on water, and Minister 
Namjou accused Iraq of trying to deflect the blame for water 
shortages from Turkey and Syria to Iran. 
 
¶3. (C) Salar stated that during the negotiations, Iraq would 
identify areas in dispute and the Iranians would respond with 
expressions of surprise and denial.  Salar said he brought up 
flow reductions in the Karun, Karkh, Galal Badrah, and Sirwan 
Rivers, and specifically accused the Iranians of diverting 
the Karun.  When the Iranians denied the charge, Salar said, 
he showed them photographs showing diversion canals on the 
Iranian side of the border, low water conditions at the mouth 
of the Karun River as it emptied into the Shatt Al Arab, and 
low water levels near the Abadan refinery.  He stated that he 
requested that Iran immediately release 200 cm/s into the 
Karun River as an emgergency measure.  Salar also said he 
accused the Iranians of blocking the Karkh River with a sand 
berm, which the Iranians also denied.  Salar said he again 
produced photographs, this time showing a sand berm 
constructed along the Iranian border and the resultant 
devastation of Iraq's Al Hawaza marsh.  He stated that he 
also raised the 1971 Ramsar Treaty for the preservation of 
wetlands of international importance for water fowl to 
bolster his argument for more water.  According to Salar, he 
requested that 120 cm/s be immediately released into the 
Qrequested that 120 cm/s be immediately released into the 
Karkh River for Iraq's use.  Salar also said he accused the 
Iranians of blocking or diverting rivers flowing into the 
north of Iraq, which normally feed into the Iraqi Dokan and 
Derbendikahn Dams located in Kurdistan near the Iranian 
border.  When the Iranians denied blocking the rivers, Salar 
said he presented daily dam inflow data showing drastic 
reductions in flow.  He requested that the Iranians 
immediately release six cm/s for the Galal Badrah River and 2 
cm/s for the Sirwan River (a tributary of the Diyala River 
that flows into the Derbendikahn Dam). Salar told us that 
while the Iranians did not specifically agree to any 
increases in river water flows, they had been surprised at 
the Iraqi's level of knowledge on bilateral water issues. 
 
¶4. (C) According to Salar,  Iran,s chief negotiating 
position was to propose the resolution of water disputes and 
issues based on provisions contained in the 1975 Treaty 
Concerning the State Frontier and Neighborly Relations 
between Iran and Iraq.  (Note: The 1975 treaty designates 
rivers whose flow will be shared equally between Iran and 
Iraq and other rivers whose flows will be divided based upon 
the 1914 Commission on the Delimitation of the 
Iranian-Ottoman frontier and in accordance with custom. End 
 
BAGHDAD 00002980  002 OF 002 
 
 
note.)  Salar told us that this treaty was negotiated during 
the time of Saddam Hussein and that the treaty was 
deliberately slanted towards punishing Kurdistan.  Salar told 
the Iranians that the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources did 
not accept the 1975 treaty as a basis for future water 
negotiations, but would be open to forming a technical 
committee to discuss water issues.  (Comment:  Ironically, 
the 1975 treaty specifically calls for the creation of a 
permanent joint technical commission composed of an equal 
number of experts from both States to conduct technical 
studies and to supervise matters relating to contiguous and 
successive watercourses. End comment) 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT:  The GOI has requested USG assistance in 
contracting with and funding an internationally recognized 
water expert, Dr. Jon Martin Trondalen of the Compass 
Foundation in Geneva, to help prepare Iraq's position for the 
next round of water negotiations.  Post is exploring ways to 
support the GOI request.  END COMMENT 
HILL