VZCZCXRO5607
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2916/01 3050922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010922Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5304
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REVIEWS ELECTION LAW OPTIONS WITH PM, 
OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary R. Grappo, for reasons 
 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  After expressing condolences for the 
October 25 bombings, the Ambassador engaged in a sustained 
conversation with PM Maliki October 26 about possible 
compromises to break the impasse over the election law.  The 
two agreed, with the concurrence of CG MNF-I, who also 
attended, that it was critical to hold the elections on time 
and also to signal publicly that the rules adopted for this 
election would not set a precedent for deciding the political 
status of Kirkuk.  Also on October 26, the Ambassador met 
with VP Adil Abd al-Mahdi, VP Tariq Hashimi, Speaker Ayad 
Samarra'i, and Da'wa parliamentary bloc leader Ali al-Adeeb. 
Abd al-Mahdi reported that consensus had formed among members 
of the Presidency Councils around a single proposal for 
Kirkuk voting that involved using both the 2009 and the 2004 
voter lists.  An initial sounding with UNAMI by Pol M/C 
October 27 indicated that the SRSG and his elections 
assistance team had questions about whether the proposal 
could be implemented.  Following the Ambassador's further 
consultations with elections experts October 28 that 
identified problematic political implications with the way 
the proposal would function when actually implemented, the 
Ambassador and SRSG Ad Melkert agreed to put aside the Abd 
al-Mahdi proposal and pursue other possibilities.   A revised 
UNAMI-Embassy proposal began to get more traction November 1 
(reported septel).  End Summary. 
 
POSTPONED ELECTIONS WOULD BE A DISASTER 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) At an October 26 meeting with Iraqi PM Maliki, the 
Ambassador conveyed his condolences for the bombings the 
previous day that targeted the Ministries of Justice and 
Planning and the Provincial Council Building.  Maliki and the 
Ambassador agreed that holding elections on time in January 
is critical.  Maliki said that any delay would be a victory 
for those who wanted to derail Iraq's democratic process. 
The Ambassador concurred, and underlined that he and the 
Embassy, with CG MNF-I, were heavily engaged in pressing for 
rapid passage of an election law.  "The elections will happen 
in January; it would be a huge mistake to allow them to be 
postponed," the Ambassador noted. 
 
THIS ELECTION NOT A PRECEDENT FOR KIRKUK 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador conveyed his understanding that later 
that afternoon, the Prime Minister, the DPM, and the 
Presidency Council would take up some 6-7 different proposals 
that the Political Council for National Security (PCNS) had 
recommended for consideration the previous night.  He noted 
that the Embassy is working closely with UNAMI on the issue 
and was ready to get behind any workable solution the small 
group referred back to the PCNS, for eventual Council of 
Representatives (COR) action, as long a UNAMI found it 
feasible.  Maliki and the Ambassador agreed that it should be 
made clear that the rules established for this election would 
not set a precedent for any future political decisions about 
Kirkuk.  The Ambassador offered to issue a statement along 
those lines if the PM thought it would be helpful.  Maliki 
concurred with the suggestion.  The Ambassador also noted the 
importance of making clear that the issue of Kirkuk would 
need to be decided by political consensus, not by a census 
politics fueled by deliberate efforts to shift the 
demographic playing field. 
 
PM PROPOSES GOING BACK TO 2004 VOTER LIST 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) PM Maliki proposed using the 2004 voter registry, 
Q4.  (C) PM Maliki proposed using the 2004 voter registry, 
rather than the current list, to determine voter eligibility 
in Kirkuk and possibly Mosul.  The Ambassador and CG MNF-I 
both made the point that the proposal could disenfranchise up 
to several hundred thousand (Kurdish) voters.  General 
Odierno highlighted that it would be worrisome -- and 
potentially pose security implications -- to set up a system 
in which on voting day large numbers of mostly young voters 
(who would have been registered since 2004) would not be 
allowed to vote. 
 
VP LAYS OUT A COMPROMISE WITH LOTS OF BUY-IN 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador, CG-MNF-I and Pol M/C met Vice 
President Adil Abd al-Mahdi later October 26.  He reported 
that an agreement has been reached among Iraqi leaders on an 
election law proposal that should satisfy the Kurdish and 
Arab-Turkomen sides regarding Kirkuk.  He said the members of 
the three Presidency Councils -- President Talabani, Vice 
Presidents Hashimi and Abd al-Mahdi, Prime Minister Maliki, 
 
BAGHDAD 00002916  002 OF 002 
 
 
Speakers Samarra'i Attiyah and Tayfour -- had just adjourned 
and settled on a single proposal that would allow all Iraqis 
to vote at the same time on January 16 and settled the 
stalemate between Kurds and Arab-Turkomen from Kirkuk on the 
voter list in that province. 
 
¶6.  (C) Abd al-Mahdi explained the proposal as follows: IHEC 
would distinguish between the 2004 and 2009 voter lists and 
offer two ballot boxes in Kirkuk -- one for voters who appear 
on the 2004 list and one for voters who were added since. 
The results of the 2004 voter list would be counted as in 
every other province.  The results of the 2009 list would 
count towards national compensatory seats until a committee 
could verify the newly added voters.  If the committee 
verified the names, then those COR seats would represent 
Kirkuk; if not, then the votes would still remain be valid 
but the COR member would remain a national compensatory COR 
seat.  In this way, the committee could check the voter list 
without disenfranchising anyone or delaying the election in 
Iraq or in Kirkuk.  Abd al-Mahdi predicted that the 
difference between the 2009 and 2004 list was about 360,000 
names; therefore, three to four seats would be impacted by 
this committee, based on one COR seat per 100,000 Iraqis. 
 
SPEAKER ELABORATES ON THE CONSENSUS PROPOSAL 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Speaker Ayad Samarra'i told the Ambassador October 26 
that he would convene a COR bloc leader meeting October 27 
and hoped to bring the proposal up for a vote soon 
afterwards.  When asked how the proposal got around 
specifically mentioning Kirkuk, Samarra'i explained two 
requirements would need to be met before a province would 
come under the two-ballot-box idea.  First, the province must 
have experienced an increase in population greater than 5 
percent per year between 2004 and 2009. Second, a given 
number of COR members must submit a request for the review 
committee and split ballot box.  Samarra'i said he wanted 
that number to be 25 COR members while the Kurds wanted that 
number to be 50.  These two conditions would probably only 
apply to Kirkuk, and possibly Ninewa, Samarra'i said.  He 
said what is key to the agreed proposal is that that the 
review committee would not hinder the electoral timeline and 
that all Iraqis would get to vote on January 16. 
 
¶8.  (C) Vice President Tariq al Hashimi told Ambassador, CG 
MNF-I, and Pol M/C on October 26 that the use of the 
Political Council for National Security (PCNS) to address 
election law deadlock was "encouraging" and that a "stumbling 
block had been removed."  He repeated his commitment to 
holding elections on time. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  On October 27, UNAMI expressed considerable 
unease about the Abd al-Mahdi proposal, questioning whether 
it was technically feasible to implement.  Following the 
Ambassador's further consultations with elections experts 
from UNAMI and IFES October 28 that identified problematic 
political implications with the way the proposal would 
function when actually implemented, the Ambassador and SRSG 
Ad Melkert agreed to put aside the Abd al-Mahdi proposal and 
pursue other possibilities.  They further agreed that these 
options would be presented as "jointly" supported by the U.S. 
and UNAMI to the relevant Iraqi leadership beginning October 
¶28.  A revised UNAMI-Embassy proposal began to get more 
traction November 1 (reported septel). 
 
 
 
 
HILL