VZCZCXRO0987
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1655/01 3291607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 251606Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1127
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 001655 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/25 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OSCE KPIR GR MK TU IR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DROUTSAS DISCUSS MACEDONIA, IRAN, TURKEY, 
MORE 
 
REF: STATE 120288 
 
ATHENS 00001655  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Ambassador Speckhard called on Alternate FM 
Droutsas November 23 for a tour d' horizon prior to the December 
1-2 Athens OSCE Ministerial, focusing on Macedonia, Iran, and 
Turkey. The Ambassador urged Droutsas to stay engaged and push for 
a solution to the Macedonia name issue in light of the December EU 
Council meeting.  Droutsas was upset at UN negotiator Nimetz' 
handling of his recent meeting with Greek Macedonia name negotiator 
Vassilakis that led to press leaks by the Macedonians, but 
underscored the Greek commitment to negotiations.  The Ambassador 
raised U.S. concerns with Iran, and Droutsas offered that PM 
Papandreou's position as Socialist International president could 
serve as an additional channel of communication.  On Turkey, 
Droutsas took a positive approach, and noted a reply from PM 
Papandreou to PM Erdogan's note earlier in the month is 
forthcoming.  Droutsas also stated that as OSCE Chairman, Greece 
would not stand in the way of Kazakhstan's desire to host a Summit 
during its upcoming tenure as CiO.  On Cyprus, he said the EU acqui 
communitaire should be used more in the negotiations as a reference 
point for solutions, which favor neither one side nor the other. 
Ambassador Speckhard also urged Droutsas to take a positive step in 
the counter-piracy framework by adding Greece's signature to the 
New York Declaration, and to continue pushing the MFA to grant the 
necessary permission that will allow construction of a $32 million 
fuel pipeline at the U.S. naval facility at Souda Bay.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
Macedonia 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Following up on the disappointing results of the recent 
Nimetz-Vassilakis meeting , the Ambassador asked Droutsas for an 
update on Greek efforts to work on a solution for the name issue 
with Skopje.  The Ambassador urged him to stay engaged and push 
forward for a resolution on the name issue and pay particular 
attention to managing the upcoming EU Council meeting in a way that 
contributed to a successful outcome.  Alternate FM Droutsas relayed 
that he was upset with the way Nimetz had handled the meeting with 
Vassilakis and the way Skopje had played to the public the results 
of the Nimetz meetings.   Greece had reluctantly sent Vassilakis to 
New York, having been summoned by Nimetz without talking to Athens 
first.  Droutsas informed the Ambassador that Vassilakis had told 
Nimetz to deliver the strategic message that Papandreou and he had 
been saying since the October 4 elections:  Greece was committed to 
working to find a mutually satisfactory and lasting solution to the 
name dispute.  When the Ambassador noted that the reports of the 
meeting had left the exact opposite impression, Droutsas blamed 
Nimetz, stating that Nimetz had pushed for details and as a result 
was given the long-standing existing official position.  The way 
Nimetz then shared this with the Macedonians only made matters 
worse, with Macedonian leaks to the press compounding problems in 
Skopje and Athens.  Droutsas was visibly upset with the way the 
first interaction on these negotiations was handled and felt it was 
undermining rather than contributing to their success. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Droutsas was careful to reiterate the Greek commitment to 
the U.N. framework for negotiations and said that they were not 
opening an alternative with the Kappo-Proteger consultations.  He 
reiterated the Prime Minister's approach of building more positive 
relations between the two countries.  He foreshadowed to the 
Ambassador a forthcoming announcement, as part of their broader 
effort to change the dynamic with Skopje, that Papandreou was 
inviting the leaders of Albania and Macedonia to a Summit on 
environmental issues in the Prespa region in northwestern Greece 
where the three nations' borders come together. 
 
ATHENS 00001655  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
----- 
 
Iran 
 
----- 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Ambassador raised Iran points in reftel, stressing the 
USG's desire to consult on next steps, given Iran's unwillingness 
to work with the international community, particularly  Iran's 
disappointing follow-up to its commitments with the P5+1 in Geneva 
on October 1.  Droutsas was non-committal, but agreed that the news 
is not good.  He also noted that Greece has had a long relationship 
with Iran and the Prime Minister himself has channels of 
communications due to his position as president of the Socialist 
International.  As in the past, he urged the U.S. to consider using 
the PM as an effective interlocutor in advancing the international 
community's objectives on sensitive issues. 
 
 
 
---------- 
 
Turkey 
 
---------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) On Turkey, Droutsas reviewed recent overtures by the Prime 
Minister.  He said that Erdogan, whom the PM knows well, appears to 
be in agreement to refresh the relationship, and that Papandreou 
would be responding soon to the Erdogan's letter.  In Droutsas' 
view, this process had to proceed in a step-by-step manner. 
Droutsas said the regular, high-level, close-hold bilateral 
consultations would continue, though perhaps with greater impetus. 
Ambassador Speckhard raised the need for confidence building 
measures in the Aegean, pointing to the informal discussions 
between Alternate MOD Beglitis and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
on the margins of the November 16 High Level Consultative Committee 
on a possible role for NATO in creating "rules of the road" for all 
of NATO's airspace that would be equally applicable to the Aegean. 
Droutsas reiterated that the Prime Minister would be moving forward 
on Turkey in continuance of what had been started when Papandreou 
was Foreign Minister in the last PASOK government (1999-2004), that 
both sides know each other very well, and that the GOG feels that 
things are moving in the right direction. 
 
 
 
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OSCE 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Turning briefly to the OSCE in light of the upcoming Athens 
Ministerial December 1-2, Droutsas said that Greece's main 
objective was to embody the Corfu process so that the necessary 
work would continue.  He said it remained to be seen whether there 
would be a political declaration at the conclusion of the 
Ministerial, and that Greece would not stand in the way of 
Kazakhstan's desire for an OSCE Summit during its upcoming tenure 
as Chairman-in-Office, but that consensus of all members was 
necessary for this idea to move forward. 
 
 
 
--------- 
 
ATHENS 00001655  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Cyprus 
 
--------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Droutsas told the Ambassador that the key was for both 
sides to be free to negotiate and not have positions dictated by 
others on the outside.   In his personal opinion, the negotiations 
could be aided by using more effectively the EU's acqui 
communitaire.  The EU acqui should not be seen as favoring one 
community, but rather the principles on which the EU is based and 
on which a united Cyprus must abide by.  Solutions to many of the 
issues being discussed could be found if this were used as the 
basis of agreement. 
 
 
 
------------------- 
 
Counter-piracy 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Following up on the conversation started during PM A/S 
Shapiro's October visit, the Ambassador handed Droutsas a copy of 
the New York Declaration on best practices for merchant vessel self 
protection, and urged Greece to join the U.S. and others as a 
signee at the upcoming meeting of the Contact Group in January. 
The Ambassador noted that the shippers with whom we had met with 
here and in Washington seem now to understand that there is no 
obligatory requirement to use armed guards and that the statement 
is declaratory, not an international legally binding agreement. 
Droutsas said he would take the request on board. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
Souda Bay Fuel Pipeline 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador asked if the Greek government was still on 
track for giving the U.S. the go-ahead soon to proceed with the 
construction of a new fuel pipeline and fuel storage tanks for the 
U.S. Naval Support Activity at Souda Bay, Crete.  (Comment: Greek 
interlocutors had assured ASD Vershbow on November 16 that the 
permission could be granted before the end of 2009.)  Droutsas did 
not seem familiar with the issue.  North America Officer Director 
Chrisoula Alyferi reassured the Ambassador, however, and stated 
they hoped to share a proposal very soon.  The Ambassador 
emphasized that the Alternate Minister of Defense and Assistant 
Secretary Vershbow agreed to work to resolve all outstanding issues 
by the end of this year. 
Speckhard