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RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001947 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, EUR/RUS, EUR/UMB, EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OSCE RS KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN'S CSIS OSCE SEMINAR REINFORCES THE CHALLENGE OF 
THE 2010 CHAIRMANSHIP 
 
REF:  USOSCE 0241 
      USOSCE 2043 
 
ASTANA 00001947  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The U.S. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) and the Institute for New Democracies, as part of a 
year-long joint project with the government of Kazakhstan, brought 
together in Astana on October 28 U.S. and European NGO think-tank 
representatives with Kazakhstani government representatives for a 
day-long seminar, "Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship:  Challenges and 
Opportunities."  The seminar covered the OSCE's three dimensions, 
with multiple voices, both Kazakhstani and Euro-Atlantic, pressing 
their sometimes competing views.  The session of special interest 
was the Military and Security Dimension that occasionally criticized 
Russia and led the Russian Ambassador to be unusually blunt when he 
was invited to make the first response after the formal 
presentations.  Kazakhstan repeatedly tells us it will be an honest 
broker during its 2010 OSCE chairmanship.  This contentious seminar 
session suggests Astana will have its work cut out for it.  If it 
can maintain a progressive-leaning balance within the OSCE, we 
suggest that will represent a step forward in the long evolution of 
the OSCE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace opened the session with recommendations for what 
Kazakhstan should avoid as priorities during its 2010 OSCE 
chairmanship, including Russia's pressure for a New European 
Security Treaty.  Immediately following Olcott, Sergey Fedoseyev of 
Kazakhstan's Center for Military Strategic Studies advocated 
strongly for a new European security architecture with the OSCE 
overseeing coordination among NATO, the Commonwealth Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), and "other Eurasian bodies." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Kuralay Baizakova, Director of the European Information 
Center at Kazakh National University, noted that Kazakhstan can be a 
"bridge between the civilizations of the East and West," the honest 
broker to bring together NATO, CSTO, and the Shanghai Security 
Organization (SCO).  She also recommended that Kazakhstan might 
choose, as a priority, new forms of interaction with Afghanistan, 
e.g., training customs officials and combating corruption.  She 
further suggested that another priority Kazakhstan might consider 
would be to modernize the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 
as a way to begin to "reload" European security. 
 
HITTING A NERVE 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, noting 
Kazakhstan's interest in "protracted conflicts" as a priority, 
stated that "inter-communal conflicts have become inter-state, where 
borders are changed by force (i.e., Russia-Georgia), ethnic 
cleansing occurs, and one country's foreign troops (Russia's) are 
stationed by force."  Without explicitly naming the protracted 
conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, he scored "internationally illegal 
peace-keeping by a single country (Russia)."  Noting that Kazakhstan 
has already tentatively mentioned Bosnia and Kosovo as areas where 
new conflict-prevention modalities might be useful, Socor suggested 
that Kazakhstan might better focus its attention on Crimea and 
reaffirm the OSCE's Budapest Memorandum of 1994, "signed by all the 
great nuclear powers" (i.e., including Russia), that guarantees 
Ukraine's territorial integrity and the non-interference in 
Ukraine's internal political processes."  He called for Kazakhstan's 
OSCE chairmanship to protect the Geneva process in Abkhazia, as well 
as to review compliance with the OSCE's Istanbul Summit CFE 
Commitments of 1999.  Socor also asserted directly that Russia wants 
to "separate" its view of European security from the Corfu Process 
and "impose" Russian President Medvedev's vision of a new European 
security architecture. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Former U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Stephen Minikes advised 
Kazakhstan, "Keep your friends to the north (Russia) and the east 
(China), but don't pursue their goals - pursue your own." 
 
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR REACTS 
 
ASTANA 00001947  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) After the official presentations, the session's moderator 
invited Russian Ambassador Mikhail Bocharnikov to give the 
pre-arranged first response.  Clearly irritated, which is unusual 
for him, he asked, "Where are all these recommendations coming from? 
 From U.S. NGOs!  Kazakhstan is a respected sovereign country, and 
I'm surprised by the 'teaching tone' we've just heard, because 
Kazakhstan deserves the greatest respect.  Kazakhstan should not be 
associated with Russia or China?  If not, with whom - with the 
United States?  I note that this conference is dominated by 
Kazakhstan and the United States, but I represent Russia.  I'm 
surprised at the recommendations to move away from security and 
peacekeeping in Europe.  I'm surprised by the recommendation for the 
OSCE to involve itself in Afghanistan, which is clearly a U.S. 
opinion, certainly not ours!  We want the OSCE to emphasize a 
legally binding security treaty for Europe, not dabble in 
Afghanistan.  Russia fully agrees that NATO, CSTO, SCO, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the European Union all 
need to work together.  It's too bad that you rejected this worthy 
concept today, but Russia will organize a conference in 2010 to 
consider this proposal.  You NGOs from the United States need to 
understand that Europe doesn't always agree with you."  Bocharnikov 
concluded, "I am pleased that Kazakhstan supports consensus in the 
OSCE.  All opinions need to be heard, and consensus needs to be 
achieved."  With that, he got up and left the conference room. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Most foreign diplomats observing the seminar interpreted 
Bocharnikov leaving as a "walk-out."  In fact, we confirmed later 
that he was frustrated the seminar session had significantly run 
over its scheduled time, and he had to leave immediately for the 
airport to receive the visiting President of Ingushetia.  Even 
though Bocharnikov was not present, Olcott reminded everyone that 
the seminar was part of a U.S.-Kazakhstan working group, not a 
Russia-Kazakhstan working group -- "Russia is welcome to organize 
its own."  CSIS Senior Researcher Janusz Bugajski noted, "We are 
NGOs.  We don't represent the U.S. government.  I don't know how 
well that concept is understood in Russia.  We make recommendations, 
but no one has to accept them." 
 
¶9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  This year-long CSIS program to prepare 
Kazakhstan for its OSCE chairmanship was not just window-dressing; 
it has been an on-going forum that the government of Kazakhstan 
organized to hear a wide range of Euro-Atlantic views, a certain 
number of which we believe they are taking on board.  But Astana is 
also hearing, mostly through diplomatic channels, Russia's 
unvarnished advice -- and sometimes, we are told, quite insistently. 
 Kazakhstan continues to assert that it will be an "honest broker" 
as the 2010 OSCE chair, and we believe, by and large, it will be -- 
but that means neither side will be fully satisfied.  It is clear 
that Russia and a number of other former Soviet states will not 
fully adopt anytime soon the bulk of Western Euro-Atlantic world 
views and values.  If Kazakhstan can maintain a pragmatic balance 
between the OSCE's two blocks, and if the Euro-Atlantic states can 
resist letting perfection be the enemy of the good, we suggest that 
Kazakhstan's chairmanship will represent a step forward in the long 
evolution of the OSCE, not a "lost year," as reftels suggest.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND