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P 251021Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3058
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
CJTF HOA PRIORITY
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
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NGA NAVY YARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000811 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV KPIR MA IR
SUBJECT: COMOROS STILL VERY FRAGILE AS ELECTIONS APPROACH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.5 D and E. 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  During a three-day visit to Grande Comore, 
only my second visit to the country in 2009, I found the 
country busily if somewhat tensely preparing for December 
legislative elections.  President Sambi was typically upbeat 
in his assessment and asked again for the USG to increase its 
presence and engagement in the Comoros.  The French 
Ambassador predicts trouble ahead whatever the outcome of the 
upcoming elections, as Sambi continues his manoeuvering to 
extend his mandate beyond its normal end in 2010.  If he wins 
a legislative majority which then votes to extend him beyond 
2010, that is likely to  provoke separatist tendencies, 
especially in Moheli, whose people will resent the delay in 
getting (and fear eventually losing altogether) "their turn" 
at the rotating presidency; if he fails to get that majority, 
Sambi may resort to other means to accomplish his goals, with 
unpredicatable but surely negative repercussions for island 
stability.  The French envoy also sees an increasingly heavy 
Iranian hand at play there, including as a surreptitious, 
illegal weapons provider.  An unseemly confrontation between 
Sambi and CHOD BG Salimou is generating coup jitters, most 
likely unfounded -- a greater worry is that Sambi will 
misstep and fire Salimou for perceived insubordination; 
Salimou, for his part, claims to be protecting the military 
from attempts at politization by Sambi.  The first major 
incidence of maritime piracy in Comoros waters -- a recent 
but unsuccessful attack twenty miles off Moroni against an 
Italian vessel -- has added another challenge to the Comoros' 
already daunting list.  The inauguration of a major 
CJTF-HOA-funded primary school south of Moroni, attended by 
Sambi and his entire government, provided a wonderfully 
hopeful bilateral focal point to the visit.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU).  I visited Grande Comore island (Ngazidja) 
November 21-23, primarily to inaugurate with President Sambi 
the new, CJTF-HOA-funded primary school at Nioumamilima 90 
minutes south of Moroni on the slopes of the Karthala 
volcano.  Given the press of events in Madagascar, this was 
only my second visit to the Comoros in 2009 (as against six 
or seven visits there in 2008), and the first time I had seen 
Sambi since last December.  (He travels abroad more than he 
stays at home, and was absent when I last visited in July. 
He had been abroad for the past two weeks -- in Egypt for the 
China-Africa Summit, in Rome for the FAO food security 
summit, and in Turkey for a bilateral visit -- when he 
returned to Moroni late on November 21.)  During the visit I 
also had contact with both Vice Presidents, several other 
members of the Union government, CHOD BG Mohamed Salimou, the 
French, AU, and South African ambassadors, and the UNDP 
representative.  With political campaigning already under way 
in preparation for legislative elections on December 6 and 
20, I found Moroni atypically animated with large crowds 
meeting to hear candidates, convoys of cars circling the city 
and island blasting campaign messages, many political 
billboards and posters visible, and a general atmosphere of 
heightened civic engagement.   Sambi marked the first-ever 
visit to the Comoros of the World Cup (i.e. the trophy 
itself), en route eventually to South Africa, with a festive 
buffet on Sunday night at his palace which seemed to be 
attended by everyone but the increasingly estranged Ngazidja 
opposition.  Clearly in campaign mode, Sambi again made an 
appearance at a soccer game organized on Monday at which he 
again was widely photographed with the Cup hoisted high above 
his head. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Before driving up to the school event together, I 
met for 30 minutes with Sambi on Monday morning, first 
introducing to him the Mission's relatively new Comoros 
officer, who I said was on his fourth trip to Comoros since 
September.  Sambi's advisor Nakchami was also present.  Sambi 
pled for more US engagement, thanking us for the various 
school projects being realized by CJTF/HOA teams throughout 
the archipelago.  Sambi noted that he has no investment 
budget at all and thus needs such assistance if he is to 
build any new schools.  With reference to a recent piracy 
attempt in Comoran waters, he inquired about the delivery 
date of the Arch Angel patrol boat purchased with FMF; I said 
delivery now is expected in February, 2010.  Sambi explained 
that there even had been a recent attempt by Congolese 
migrants to traverse Comoron waters en route to Mayotte -- 
another mission for the new vessel will be interdiction of 
such clandestine efforts, Sambi said.  He asked about the 
embassy office project in Moroni and the proposal to bring 
back the Peace Corps; I told him that we are discussing these 
proposals with the new teams at State and PC. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Turning to the upcoming legislative elections, I 
informed him that although the USG is not providing funding, 
we will have a seven-person embassy observer team, covering 
each of the three islands, for each of the two rounds.  I 
observed that the situation in Comoros remains fragile and 
expressed our concern for free and fair elections as a 
necessary part of the way forward.  He welcomed this 
engagement and said he is working on creating a "culture of 
democracy" in his country.  He said that (unnamed) "others 
have not kept their promises, but we are pushing ahead.  I, 
personally, am a democrat," he asserted.  I explained briefly 
our shock and dismay at how a supposed democracy in 
Madagascar had come part so quickly and suddenly, and 
suggested that it offers a cautionary example for his country 
to consider.  I stressed the importance of strengthening 
democratic institutions, and of listening carefully to what 
the people say.  He agreed and noted the existence of freedom 
of speech in Comoros.  I asked what had recently happened 
with opposition leader Larifou, briefly detained last week 
for insulting Sambi.  Sambi described Larifou as a lawer from 
Reunion who only comes to Comoros around elections; "I am not 
even a candidate and still he insults me!"  I explained that 
democratic leaders must develop a tolerance for such speech. 
Sambi closed the meeting by quickly recounting with obvious, 
deep pride his recent encounters in New York with President 
Obama. 
 
¶5.  (C)  At the school inauguration, I was seated on the dias 
between Sambi and BG Salimou, who had not seen one another 
since Sambi's return from abroad.  Their body language was 
tense because Salimou had sent, during Sambi's absence and 
with multiple cc addressees, a very blunt letter to the 
Moheli commander who had just been appointed directly by 
Sambi, apparently without Salimou's prior knowledge, let 
alone assent.  The letter directed the commander to ignore 
the appointment by Sambi, which Salimou said, obviously 
correctly, was not in conformity with the usual command 
structure.  Sambi leaned over me to crisply direct Salimou to 
report to his office at 1900 that evening (Nov. 23).  Later, 
while Sambi was speaking, Salimou confided to me that he is 
concerned that Sambi may dismiss him because of the letter 
and his resistance to the appointment.  He explained that his 
intent was to protect the military from politicization by 
Sambi, of which this improper appointment was not the only 
example.  I asked him to remain in touch with us as this saga 
unfolds. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Over lunch later on Monday, French Ambassador Luc 
Hallade, now at post well over one year, freely shared his 
concerns with me and Comoros Officer about the elections and 
particularly about what will follow them.  He noted that 
funds are in short supply for candidates to run, which gives 
the advantage to Sambi's supporters.  Promised payments by 
the EU and AU are delayed, although he does not expect the 
elections to be compromised as a result.  He is frustrated by 
the EU's inefficiencies in running programs in the Comoros, 
including electoral support, from distant Mauritius.  He also 
described a recent fiasco in Brussels where opposition 
leaders had asked the EU not to finance the elections -- 
after having delivered the opposite message in Moroni; that 
snafu was worked out, not without difficulty, after Sambi 
convened a meeting with opposition resulting in a written 
request for EU funding.  An elections oversight committee 
composed of local diplomats was to meet for the first time on 
November 24. Hallade predicts trouble ahead whatever the 
outcome of those elections, as Sambi continues his 
manoeuvering to extend his mandate beyond its normal end in 
¶2010.  If he wins a legislative majority that then extends 
him beyond 2010, that is likely again to provoke separatist 
tendencies, especially in Moheli, whose people will resent 
the delay in getting (and fear eventually losing altogether) 
"their turn" at the rotating presidency.  If he fails to get 
that majority, Sambi may resort to other means to accomplish 
his goal, with unpredicatable but surely negative 
repercussions for Union stability and cohesion.  Hallade 
noted that Vice President Ikililou, the senior-most Mohelian 
in the GOUC, had turned out to be a strong performer since 
taking over the finance portfolio several months ago. 
Hallade said the French had not yet done much analysis of 
which Mohelian candidates might be strongest if and when 
Moheli gets "its turn" at the rotating presidency, but saw 
Ikililou as a bit of a rising star.  The problem, he said, is 
that he doesn't have much popularity on Moheli -- a problem 
for any candidate as the first round will be a vote only 
among Mohelians to select the three strongest candidates to 
be voted on across the Union in the second round. 
 
¶7. (C)  The French envoy also sees an increasingly heavy 
Iranian hand at play there, including as a surreptitious, 
illegal weapons provider to the Presidential Guard and to the 
army (AND) as well.  He said he has informed Paris but cannot 
prove it.  He also blamed the local Iranian intelligence 
service for spreading false rumors of an impending coup 
attempt by Salimou against Sambi.  (Those rumors were much in 
evidence across Moroni during the short visit.)    Obviously, 
Hallade said, if Salimou intended to unseat Sambi by force, 
he would not have sent that letter around to everyone in 
town!  The Iranians, he suggested, are trying to discredit 
Salimou to make it easier for Sambi to replace him with a new 
CHOD from Sambi's home island of Anjouan.  The recent return 
from training in Morocco of a certain Anjouanese colonel as 
the new presidential military advisor, and the recent 
reinstatement in the AND of the former (and also Anjouanese) 
Comoran Ambassador to Madagascar -- and former foreign 
minister -- are both suspiciously indicative of Sambi's 
possible intentions to replace Salimou with an Anjouanese, he 
said.  Firing Salimou, in Hallade's view, would be a major 
error on Sambi's part, but is not to be excluded as a 
possibility. 
 
8 (C)  Hallade, like Sambi, expresssed concern about the 
recent, failed piracy attempt just off Moroni against an 
Italian freighter (septel to follow with more detail).  This 
marked the not-unexpected arrival of Indian Ocean piracy in 
Comoran waters. The GOUC was sufficiently alarmed by the 
event to have convened three ministerial meetings since it 
occurred, to discuss their response options.  Hallade said 
they really have no response capability, other than calling 
France.  When the Arch Angel arrives, they may become more 
capable.  For their part, the French have deployed the 
majority of their maritime assets in Reunion, east of 
Madagascar and thus too far away to be much use, in real 
time, in the Mozambique Channel. He said there are several 
patrol boats in nearby Mayotte, but nothing of the size 
available in Reunion.  He was unaware of any internal GOF 
discussion about possibly moving assets to Mayotte from 
either Reunion or the Seychelles.  Clearly, he said, the 
alarm has been sounded on the piracy issue.  Noting the 
extreme porosity of Comoran borders, Hallade said he would 
not be surprised if foreign pirates even set up land bases on 
Comoran islands to support their operations at sea.  "Nothing 
here will stop them," he concluded. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Bio note on Luc Hallade:  Hallade arrived here in 
July 2008 with a background in development across Africa.  He 
is an AFD (French USAID-equivalent) official with prior 
senior embassy experience in DROC, Cameroon, and elsewhere in 
Africa.  With a young Cameroonian wife and small children, he 
cuts a distinctly different -- and much more welcome -- 
profile from his unapologetically neo-colonialist 
predecessor, Christian Job.  Job's linen suits, public 
rantings, and haughty prescriptions to the Comorans were 
little appreciated and helped fuel an enduring and unhelpful 
image of the French as unchanged since before independence. 
Hallade, for his part, is out and about the island of 
Ngazidja visiting development projects and dialoging with 
village notables.  Without overt reference to Job, he admits 
that the task of improving and modernizing France's image in 
a country where they are blamed for everything that goes 
wrong will require as much of this approach as he can find 
time for.  He regrets, at the same time, that here is no time 
for him to engage in much such personal outreach on the other 
two islands. 
 
 
MARQUARDT