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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000465 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019 
TAGS: NATO PGOV PREL MW BK YI GG UP
SUBJECT: MARCHING TOWARDS DECEMBER: NATO DISCUSSES THE 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
REF: E-MAIL CONTAINING FOUR-COUNTRIES NON-PAPER SENT 
     TO EUR/RPM ON OCTOBER 21 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: NATO Secretary General (SYG) Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen presided over an informal session of the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) on October 20 to discuss views on the 
Western Balkans in preparation for decisions to be taken at 
the December Foreign Ministerial, a discussion informed by a 
non-paper we drafted with the Greek, German and Polish 
delegations (see ref e-mail).  Although many capitals are 
still weighing the issues, there appeared to be an emerging 
consensus in favor of granting a positive decision in 
December on Montenegro's request to join the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP).  Allies were less certain about Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's (BiH) request, with many nations deferring 
their decisions pending the outcome of the joint 
U.S.-European Union (EU) proposal.  While many Allies 
welcomed positive steps in increasing NATO's relations with 
Serbia, nations understood that the pace of developing these 
relations would have to be determined by Serbia.  The SYG 
failed to respond to strong Allied support for a NAC trip to 
the Balkans.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------- 
Montenegro: On the doorstep 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Slovakia led a small group of PermReps (including 
Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, Spain and Turkey) which 
argued for positive decisions on both Montenegro's and BiH's 
requests to join MAP in December.  Norway, Greece, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Italy, Estonia, France, 
Belgium, Latvia, Luxembourg, Iceland and Denmark stated that 
Montenegro has essentially done everything NATO has asked of 
it in relation to reforms and leaned towards making a 
position decision in December.  Although Germany raised 
continuing concerns about freedom of the media, independence 
of the judiciary and the lack of checks and balances in 
Montenegro, it admitted that Montenegro's current situation 
is not unlike other former aspirant countries when they were 
granted MAP, and argued for a positive decision.  Romania 
supported Germany's remarks. 
 
¶3. (U) The UK stated that it supports granting MAP to both 
countries, but prefers to delay this decision after both 
countries conclude their Individual Partnership Action Plan 
reviews in Spring 2010.  The Netherlands proved to be the 
largest naysayer in the room, posturing that no decision 
should be made on NATO's enlargement until Allies discuss 
"the future of the Alliance" at their Fall 2010 Lisbon 
Summit.  Italy and Denmark immediately responded that 
enlargement decisions have nothing to do with any such 
potential discussion.  Canada also indicated that Ottawa was 
not yet ready to make a decision on MAP for either country. 
 
------------------------------- 
BiH: Still stuck on the landing 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Although no one seemed to doubt BiH's desire for 
Euro-Atlantic integration, plenty of Allies seemed wary of 
BiH's current trajectory.  France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Iceland and Latvia pushed a more prudent approach 
with BiH, wishing to see how the situation in Sarajevo 
evolves in the coming months before making a decision on 
BiH's request to join MAP.  Portugal and Romania pushed for 
the inclusion of strong language in the December Foreign 
Ministerial communique that would encourage BiH to make 
further reforms.  Norway stated that given the current 
political situation in BiH, NATO should keep all 
possibilities open. 
 
¶5. (U) In a line similar to the UK's argument to delay a 
decision until 2010, Germany -- who passionately argued that 
 
USNATO 00000465  002 OF 003 
 
 
"MAP can be granted only once" -- recommended denying MAP to 
BiH in December, with the caveat that if BiH makes 
significant forward progress in 2010, it can still join MAP 
in time to start the next MAP cycle in Fall 2010.  Italy 
backed Germany's recommendation.  Lithuania and Bulgaria 
stated that they could eventually support MAP for BiH. 
 
¶6. (U) Greece and Bulgaria said they would not object to 
granting MAP in December, but acknowledged they have concerns 
about BiH's future.  Spain also admitted lingering doubts, 
but argued for making a positive decision in December. 
Slovenia and Croatia admitted that the political situation in 
BiH could be better than it is now, but argued that NATO 
should grant MAP in December on the basis that BiH is a 
"special case" and that MAP could prove a catalyst for reform. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
To link or not to link, that is the question 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) A side issue that has emerged in the discussions on 
Montenegro and BiH is whether a MAP decision on these 
countries should be linked together.  Norway, Slovenia, 
Germany, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Canada, 
France, Spain and Iceland all stated that aspirant countries 
should be judged on their own merits individually, and that 
decisions on Montenegro's and BiH's MAP requests should not 
be linked together.  The UK wanted to link -- and delay -- a 
decision on both aspirant countries together.  Furthermore, 
Croatia, Bulgaria. Lithuania, Romania, Hungary, Albania, 
Canada, Estonia and Poland argued that MAP decisions for 
Montenegro and BiH should not be linked to any issues 
regarding Georgia and Ukraine's path to the Alliance, and 
pushed for the inclusion of strong language in the December 
Foreign Ministerial communique to assure Georgia and Ukraine 
of their forward path to membership. 
 
------------------------ 
Serbia: Inching forward? 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (U) In regards to NATO's growing relationship with Serbia, 
the SYG informed Allies that modification of the Military 
Technical Agreement (MTA) is Serbia's paramount concern, but 
stated that Serbia should suggest specific proposals on 
modification of the agreement before NATO moves forward. 
Norway and France said that Serbia needed to make extra 
efforts to "provide traction" for increasing relations with 
NATO, and that modification of the MTA is one way to 
accomplish this goal.  Greece made a plea for increasing 
NATO's relations with Serbia in the "right" way, not the 
"quick" way. 
 
------------------------ 
NAC trip to the Balkans? 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) Germany pressed the SYG, who so far has been resistant 
to travel with the NAC to the Western Balkans, to reverse 
course and visit Montenegro and BiH before the December 
Foreign Ministerial.  Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary, Albania, 
Italy and the UK all echoed Germany's plea.  Latvia stated it 
had no objections to making such a trip.  Even Spain, who 
thus far has been resistant to travel to the region, said it 
would not stand in the way of a NAC visit to Montenegro and 
BiH if all other Allies agreed, but argued that the timing of 
such a visit should be carefully considered.  Luxembourg 
supported making a NAC visit to the region, but also backed 
Spain's point on timing. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C/NF) Seeking to sum up Allies' comments, the SYG got it 
right on most issues -- Montenegro (which requested MAP in 
 
USNATO 00000465  003 OF 003 
 
 
November 2008) deserves an answer this December, and strong 
communique language will be needed to assure Georgia and 
Ukraine that they are firmly on the membership path -- but he 
made one large misstep in characterizing MAP as "NATO's 
preferred option" to join the Alliance, which is not an 
official position.  He also stated that in referring to 
enlargement, he prefers to use the term "Open Door" policy 
because of the negative connotation that "enlargement" means 
expansion directed at a third party.  Furthermore, he 
appeared unswayed by Allies' calls for a NAC trip to the 
Western Balkans, and his lack of reference to this issue was 
a glaring omission from his concluding remarks.  Ambassador 
subsequently inquired of the Private Office what the status 
of the trip was, and was informed that the fact that some 
large countries (U.S., France) had said nothing was taken as 
the absence of consensus.  However, Ambassador informed the 
SYG the day before that he now believed that Spain would not 
oppose a trip, and that there was indeed a consensus.  Absent 
a change of heart by the SYG, nations will press for a vote 
at the next NAC to underscore the lack of opposition to a NAC 
trip to BiH and Montenegro before the December Ministerial. 
Despite the relief most Allies felt finally engaging in this 
long overdue discussion, any positive momentum gained was 
squandered with frustration directed at the SYG and his 
selective hearing. 
DAALDER