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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000449 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
BELGRADE PASS TO PODGORICA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 
TAGS: NATO PREL BK MW GG UP
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO AND BOSNIA MAP: A SNAPSHOT OF ALLIED 
OPINION 
 
Classified By: DCM John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: With the December 2-3 NATO Foreign 
Ministerial quickly approaching, Allies are beginning to 
seriously discuss whether and how to respond to the 
applications of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
to join the Membership Action Plan process.  While most 
Allies do not believe that BiH is ready for MAP, there are 
mixed views about how to handle Montenegro's application.  Of 
particular concern for some Allies is how a positive decision 
on MAP for Montenegro could impact Ukraine and Georgia.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) In recent weeks, we have had a series of 
discussions with Allies about how the Alliance should respond 
at the December Foreign Ministerial to the Membership Action 
Plan applications of Montenegro and Bosnia.  While most 
Allies acknowledged that their capitals were still reviewing 
the questions involved, the following provides an initial 
snapshot of Allied opinion on the subject. 
 
--------------------------- 
What to do with Montenegro? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Allies generally acknowledge that Montenegro has 
been heading in the right direction in its reforms, but have 
not yet formed a common opinion on how they should respond to 
Podgorica's November 2008 application to join the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP).  While most countries still do not yet 
have a national position, several main camps have emerged. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Germany, which as little as six months ago sought 
to downplay Montenegro's successes during its Individual 
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) assessment, recently said it 
was "quite positive" about granting Montenegro's MAP 
application at the December Foreign Ministerial.  Canada, 
Hungary, and Slovenia also appear ready to make a positive 
decision on Montenegro's MAP application in December. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania and the 
Czech Republic -- while not opposed in principle to granting 
MAP to Montenegro -- are concerned about the impact such a 
decision could have on Georgia and Ukraine, countries that 
sought unsuccessfully for years to join MAP.  They fear that 
the two countries would feel like they are being 
"leap-frogged" by countries that have been on the NATO reform 
path for a much shorter time.  They also fear that it could 
send the wrong signal to Moscow, leading it to conclude 
(despite NATO summit assurances to the contrary) that it had 
been successful in pressuring Allies to set aside the 
possibility of a NATO future for these two countries.  As a 
result, supporters of Ukraine and Georgia might try to link 
MAP for Montenegro with more forward leaning language for 
Ukraine and Georgia.  In other words, they would want to make 
clear that Ukraine and Georgia would not still have to 
through the MAP process at a later stage.  We have urged 
against this approach, which would reopen the divisive MAP 
debates of the last two years.  Similarly, we have urged 
Germany to refrain from divisive language from their side. 
 
¶6. (C/NF) France had wanted to hold off on Montenegro at 
least until the spring to forestall the old debates over 
Ukraine and Georgia.  The French delegation has since told us 
that it might agree to Montenegro MAP in December, if/if 
France can be convinced that this can be accomplished without 
reopening the old debates.  Similarly, the Netherlands told 
us that it had not received updated instructions from the 
ones they had at NATO's Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April -- 
which was to avoid the enlargement debate. 
 
¶7. (C/NF) The UK would also like to hold off on Montenegro 
until the spring, but for different reasons.  London admits 
that Montenegro is ready for MAP, but hopes to leverage a 
 
USNATO 00000449  002 OF 003 
 
 
linkage with Bosnia to force BiH to make needed reforms.  The 
UK plan would call for language in the December ministerial 
communique noting that the two countries will have the 
implementation of their Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(IPAP) assessed in the spring.  According to the UK, the 
December communique could state that "with a good IPAP 
assessment" the two countries could then be invited to join 
MAP.  Poland has expressed some sympathy with the UK 
position, but has noted that it would not block any emerging 
consensus to offer MAP to Montenegro in December.  (Note: 
Although Germany has acknowledged that the completion of the 
IPAP cycle is not a prerequisite for MAP, it has also said 
that the UK suggestion is "not unreasonable." End Note) 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
The easier case - Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8. (C/NF) BiH, which only applied to join MAP on October 2, 
presents a far easier case.  Few Allies are willing to 
consider a positive decision for Bosnia at this time.  While 
Allies generally want to see BiH integrate into Euro-Atlantic 
structures, they believe that the country is currently 
trending in the wrong direction.  Not only do they doubt the 
current government's ability to carry out the reforms 
necessary to be successful in MAP, they worry that the 
country is too politically unstable.  As a result, most 
Allies will be reluctant to grant MAP until they see evidence 
that the BiH is emerging from its latest political crisis. 
Norway, for example, has said that it would want to see 
visible progress in the implementation of reforms and not 
just the passage of legislation before agreeing to grant MAP 
status. 
 
¶9. (C/NF)  There are a few exceptions to this general trend, 
however.  Croatia wants to press for Bosnian MAP in December, 
although its Mission to NATO is more realistic about Zagreb's 
limited chance of success to push this issue through to a 
positive answer.   Although Madrid has said it has not 
reached a final decision, the Spanish Mission told us that it 
has historically favored a "regional approach" and therefore 
might support MAP for both countries in December.  Hungary 
and Slovenia have informally said there is some merit in 
rewarding what positive behavior BiH has demonstrated by 
supporting its application for MAP.  These countries, 
however, are clearly in the minority. 
 
¶10. (C/NF) Even if these issues were resolved, the problems 
already identified in the case of Montenegro -- particularly 
how to handle the related issue of Georgia and Ukraine -- 
would also apply to Bosnia. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C/NF) Getting consensus to grant MAP for Montenegro in 
December will require that we press Allies on both sides of 
the Ukraine/Georgia debate to stick to the hard-fought 
compromises that have already been reached.  Attempts by 
supporters of those countries to press for more forward 
leaning language could not only derail Montenegro MAP, it 
could also lead to a refighting of the bloody battles Allies 
fought over the last several years.  Not only is it likely 
that Ukraine/Georgia supporters would be unsuccessful in 
achieving their goals, it might actually prove to be 
counter-productive.  Getting them to back off will require us 
to make clear that we will continue to support Ukraine and 
Georgia in their aspirations via their new Commission/ANP 
mechanism.  Similarly, we must push back against any efforts 
by Germany or others to claim that our decision to pursue MAP 
for Montenegro means that MAP must therefore also be the 
ultimate path for Ukraine and Georgia.  Only if both sides 
abide by the agreed truce can we successfully put NATO 
 
USNATO 00000449  003 OF 003 
 
 
enlargement back on track in the Balkans. 
DAALDER