VZCZCXRO5137
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0462/01 2810738
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080738Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0167
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0320
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0307
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0078

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2023 
TAGS: PREL IR AF PAK SNAR
SUBJECT: UNODC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN IRAN TOUGHER AFTER 
ELECTIONS 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000462  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C)  UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Tehran Program 
Head Antonino de Leo emphasized recently  that it is more 
difficult for him to carry out his job in Iran following the 
presidential elections.  In addition to the challenges posed 
by international wariness regarding continued funding for 
Iran given the human rights and democracy implications of the 
recent elections, de Leo has also been faced with Tehran's 
refusal to grant a UNODC German project coordinator entry 
into Iran, thus undermining de Leo's efforts to augment his 
staff. At the same time, de Leo is also concerned that 
keeping too high a profile will compromise UNODC's ability to 
implement programs in Iran.  De Leo planned to try to reach 
back out to contacts upon his return to Tehran in late 
September and was hoping that he would be able to expand his 
reach into the Office of the Supreme Leader.  De Leo also 
stressed that Pakistan's hesitancy in participating in the 
Triangular Initiative could inhibit what was becoming a 
successful regional program.  He asked the U.S. to encourage 
Pakistan to send appropriate representation to the October 
27-28 Triangular Initiative Ministerial meeting in Vienna. 
 
¶2.  (C)  De Leo, who was in Tehran for the presidential 
elections, called the post-election environment "complete 
madness."  He relayed that President Obama's letter to the 
Supreme Leader may have inadvertently resulted in the strong 
Iranian government response to the riots, which included a 
severe crackdown on former regime officials such as former 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Rezai.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Elections Force UNODC to Ground 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)   In a September 22 meeting, UNODC Tehran Program 
Head Antonino de Leo stressed that his job in Tehran had 
become much more difficult since the June presidential 
elections.  De Leo said that he was unable to talk to any of 
his contacts during the unrest for fear of making himself a 
target of the government.  De Leo said that he now avoids 
emailing or otherwise directly circulating stories on 
government drug control efforts (even good news stories) and 
asks that any such information be passed from UNODC 
headquarters in Vienna.  Noting that, in order to avoid 
drawing attention to himself and the office, he has taken 
steps to ensure that his work in Iran is "behind the scenes," 
de Leo strongly lamented that this new lower profile has 
reduced the effectiveness of the groundwork he laid over the 
previous three months in the job.  For example, he had to 
cancel a briefing for the Mini-Dublin Group ambassadors by 
the head of Iran's Judiciary scheduled for the week of 26 
June as a result of Iran blaming the UK and others for the 
election-related unrest.  Further, de Leo recounted how a BBC 
journalist who was planning to write "good news" stories on 
Iranian counternarcotics efforts was kicked out during the 
unrest, closing a possible avenue of raising public awareness 
on such efforts in Iran.  Nevertheless, the Celebration of 
World Drug Day in Iran went well, noted de Leo, and his 
speech was acknowledged and appreciated by both Iranian 
Permanent Representative to UN Organizations in Vienna 
Soltanieh and Head of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters 
Moghadam.  De Leo believed that the P5 1 talks in Geneva on 
October 1 would be the key to moving back toward a 
collaborative relationship on the ground.  He noted that 
there was a lot of interest in Tehran in the talks. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Currently, de Leo explained,  he is able to meet 
with his regular Judiciary contacts and even in the very 
tense time directly after the elections, he was still able to 
work with the Iranian government on its corruption 
self-assessment.  Thus, de Leo confirmed, in mid-September, 
the computer-based training module for anti-money laundering 
was installed and training has commenced.  Although the 
entire government is not supportive of either UNODC efforts 
or cooperation with UNODC programs, noted de Leo, pockets of 
"serious individuals" who want to tackle money laundering, 
organized crime, and corruption exist, so it is critical to 
reach out to these individuals to make progress on these 
issues.  Although he has not yet reached out to other 
contacts, de Leo explained he planned to do so in late 
September upon his return to Iran.  De Leo added that he is 
also trying to strengthen his contacts with the Office of the 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000462  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Supreme Leader, given the importance of those officials in 
decisionmaking circles.  Despite these positive steps, de Leo 
warned that his staffing level remains far too low, primarily 
because of funding constraints; if he loses his Italian 
project coordinator, de Leo stressed, he "won't be able to 
continue" his work in Iran.  His staffing posture was not 
enhanced, de Leo emphasized, when Iranian authorities refused 
to allow his newly-hired German project coordinator to enter 
Iran, claiming he was on a "black list."  De Leo stressed 
that although there is significant funding for 
Afghanistan--an issue on which Belgium is becoming a key 
funding partner--donor funding for Iran remains sparse.  He 
added that donors' concerns about human rights and democracy 
issues in Iran since the elections had further constrained 
funding for UNODC programs in Iran. On a positive note, with 
regard to regional efforts, de Leo reported that UNODC has 
1.25 million dollars available for  the Triangular 
Initiative's (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Joint Planning 
Cell as soon as Iran signs the agreement, but de Leo is 
waiting for "the dust to settle" before he approaches the 
government on the issue. 
 
¶5.  (C)   According to de Leo, the Triangular Initiative was 
going well from the Iranian perspective, but Pakistan viewed 
it less favorably.  Tehran was pushing to do a third joint 
operation, this one with Pakistan, but Pakistan remained 
hesitant.  In addition, de Leo added, Islamabad had agreed to 
post a full-time drug liaison officer (DLO) to the Joint 
Planning Cell, but no officer has yet arrived.  The Pakistani 
government asked UNODC to fund the DLO position, de Leo 
noted, but de Leo told Islamabad that this officer should be 
funded by Pakistan as a permanent position.  De Leo believed 
that Pakistan was slow to cooperate because there was a sense 
in Islamabad that such cooperation only benefits "some" in 
the government; he did not think Islamabad was worried about 
recent Iranian activities along the border.  De Leo called 
the proposed Triangular Initiative ministerial meeting to be 
held on October 27-28 a decisive occasion, but noted that if 
Pakistan is not willing to send an official at the 
ministerial level, Iran would downgrade its own 
representation from its current plan to send Moghadam.  De 
Leo asked for U.S. help in encouraging Pakistan to send the 
appropriate-level officials.  (Comment:  UNVIE can raise this 
issue with Pakistani counterparts in Vienna but also 
recommends Washington consider raising in Washington or 
Islamabad.  End Comment.)  De Leo added that there will be a 
one-hour extra session with Major Donors at the ministerial. 
 
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Post-Election Atmospherics 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)   De Leo further elaborated on the post-election 
environment in Iran, calling the fallout "complete madness." 
He said that the Russians were the only ones who predicted 
riots following the elections and that the regime had become 
even more militarized in the aftermath.  According to de Leo, 
one of his contacts inside the Iranian government told him 
President Obama's letter to the Supreme Leader may have 
provoked in part the tough government response to the riots. 
The contact, who leaned toward the moderate, explained "we 
don't need this letter."  De Leo also noted that it has 
become even harder to "check sources" in Iran since the 
elections, citing a war of information in which everyone is 
afraid to take a side.  In any other country, stressed de 
Leo, former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander and 
presidential candidate Rezai would be a "big shot," but in 
Iran he was suffering the fate of the regime.  De Leo 
recounted how one of Rezai's advisers' sons had disappeared 
and no one knew what had happened to him; finally, the dead 
body  was delivered to the family and family members it were 
informed that any mourning would have to be done in private. 
Other Iranians have noted, added de Leo, that the family was 
"lucky" that the son was dead because at least family members 
now know where he is, unlike so many others who have 
disappeared after the elections.  Now, de Leo argued, it is 
clear who is in charge in Iran and that additional sanctions 
will strengthen the regime. 
 
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Comment 
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7  (C)  UNODC officials based in Tehran continue to provide 
valuable first-hand information about the situation on the 
ground in Iran.  Despite the negative implications of the 
Iranian elections, UNODC continues to try to work with Iran 
on narcotics and crime programs, particularly those related 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000462  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
to Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts.  The Triangular 
Initiative is a symbolically important step towards regional 
counternarcotics cooperation, and we should consider 
encouraging Pakistan to participate more fully.  End Comment. 
DAVIES