VZCZCXRO3163
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHUM #0315/01 3020825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290825Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3086
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3813
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3460
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2626
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 0362
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0006
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0368
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0116
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0026
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0164
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0122
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0017
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ULAANBAATAR 000315 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR, USTDA, OPIC, AND EXIMBANK 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB/CBA 
USAID FOR ANE FOR D. WINSTON 
USDOC FOR ZHEN-GONG CROSS AND XIAOBING FENG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EINV PREL ETRD EMIN ENRG MG
SUBJECT: Key Mongolian Mining Deal Still On Track 
 
Ref: A) ULAANBAATAR 293, B) ULAANBAATAR 244 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000315  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified - Not for Internet Distribution. Contains 
proprietary and confidential business information 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Three weeks into the Oyu Tolgoi Investment 
Agreement (OTIA) all parties seem committed to satisfying its 
conditions precedent.  The companies have sent the first USD 100 
million of a USD 250 million cash advance as promised while the 
Government of Mongolia (GOM) has honored its initial commitment to 
provide essential mining licenses.  There is no indication that the 
parties will not fulfill other conditions of the agreement  by the 
April 6, 2010, deadline. Public and business community opinions 
remain positive, as all see the project leading to increased 
prosperity.  More problematically, it seems that  neither the 
companies nor the GOM are preparing to deal directly with the fact 
that rising expectations cannot be met and with the administrative 
load that the mine will impose on an already strained system. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On the foreign policy front, western countries continue to 
praise the agreement.  Russia has remained largely silent and has 
given no indication that it will seek to hinder OT's implementation. 
 China's response to OT remains unclear but no particular animus 
against it is perceived.  Finally, although the PM's departure has 
raised concerns, as he was a primary supporter, there is no 
indication that the GOM will not continue to honor its OTIA 
commitments. END SUMMARY. 
 
Three Happy Weeks 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Three weeks after the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement 
(OTIA) signing, all parties seem committed to satisfying the 
conditions precedent described in reftels.  The most important 
condition, at least from the Mongolian perspective, was delivery of 
the first tranche of the USD 250 million cash advance.  As reported 
in Post's SBU blog 
(see http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/mon golia), the 
companies, Ivanhoe Mines of Canada and Rio Tinto (RT) transferred 
USD 100 million to the GOM within the two-week deadline.  This 
money, the use of which remains undecided by the GOM, is not a grant 
but a financed advance, the principal and interest of which must be 
deducted from future government OT revenues.  Even though it is a 
loan, a cash-strapped GOM eagerly proclaimed the first tranche a 
revenue-plus for Mongolia's citizens, who might expect some pocket 
money in the near future.  The next tranche, USD 50 million, will 
come as soon as the GOM officially authorizes a 10 percent 
investment tax credit for the OT project.  The remaining USD 100 
million will arrive when construction of the mine complex begins, 
which is expected in August 2010. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ivanhoe and RT have expressed satisfaction with the pace of 
GOM fulfillment of the conditions precedent.  On October 26, the GOM 
formally approved the conversion of several exploration licenses to 
mining licenses, as required by the OTIA.  Canadian exploration 
company Entre Gold held these licenses, which surround the OT 
mining concession.  They will be rolled into the OT project in 2010. 
 They are crucial because the OT deposit extends into these mining 
concessions.  Without them, OT might have a mine life limited of 30 
years; with them the mine may last up to 100 years, if some Ivanhoe 
sources are to be believed.  Financing a long-life asset, especially 
one costing at least USD 7 billion to build, is easier than one of 
shorter duration, as the costs can be spread out over a longer 
period. The next step is for the GOM to extend the 10 percent 
investment tax credit to the OT project.  Ivanhoe and RT suggest 
that the GOM action will occur by year's end.  At this point none of 
the parties has signaled that this extension will be a problem. 
 
¶4. (SBU) One area of contention remains: evaluating the amount of 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000315  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
pre-deal costs that the firms can write-off under loss-carry forward 
provisions.  The companies want to apply approximately USD 1 billion 
in expenses incurred to explore the mine and develop the mine site 
as business expenses against future taxes, while the GOM, already 
facing the fact that it will not be receiving revenues for many 
years, is loathe to delay receiving revenues from profits further 
trimmed by allowing a USD billion deduction.  RT and Ivanhoe reps 
report that negotiations continue. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The broad public response and that of the foreign and 
domestic business communities continues to be positive.  Media 
sources and anecdotal evidence suggest that the Mongolian public 
sees the USD 100 million as proof  that the OT deal will yield 
tangible benefits.  For the business community, the entire  temper 
of the Mongolian investment climate has improved dramatically. 
Although none reports an uptick in actual business (nor expects one 
within a few short weeks), foreign and domestic businesses are 
actively seeking contacts with the GOM and the private companies for 
business opportunities involved with OT. 
 
¶6. (U) One local business association has developed an on-line 
"Mongolian Suppliers" resource featuring over 1150 local suppliers. 
On October 28, a supply chain fair sponsored by Ivanhoe, RT, and 
local business organizations hosted primarily local companies 
seeking to supply OT.  Mining firms attending the event told us that 
they did not think most of the companies exhibiting were ready to 
supply OT quite yet.  However, the event allowed RT and Ivanhoe to 
identify potential prospects and to explain their needs to potential 
suppliers more precisely.  The GOM was satisfied as it actively 
seeks local value-added. 
 
Reality Wake Up Call 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) While conceding these events as unambiguously positive, 
most GOM and company observers privately admit they are only just 
coming to terms with acute and chronic challenges imposed by the OT 
project.  Among these are managing public expectations, dealing with 
the potentially overwhelming burden that OT will place on Mongolia's 
regulatory apparatus, and the impact on foreign relations with 
Mongolia's immediate neighbors.  The Mongolian public has been led 
by media statements of both the GOM and the firms to believe that 
the mine will start paying immense dividends immediately.  Certainly 
the USD 100 million gives rise to such views. 
However, Ivanhoe and RT reps have said that the mine will not begin 
operations until summer 2013 at earliest, with early 2014 being the 
likely start up date; and even then the GOM will receive little 
revenue from operations, as profits will go to pay off the GOM debt 
incurred to buy its share of the OT project. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The GOM will receive royalty payments and other fees, taxes 
on salaries, and imposts on imports aimed at supporting the mine; 
however, RT and Ivanhoe sources privately suggest that mine profits 
may well be committed to debt payments until at least 2023. 
However, both GOM and company sources indicate that they anticipate 
public discontent with the slowness of returns to surface long 
before then,, perhaps as early as 2012 with the next parliamentary 
elections.  As of yet, it is not clear if the public understands the 
situation, and there seems no formal or informal plan among the 
parties to reconcile public expectations with revenue realities. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Senior RT and Ivanhoe executives also express exasperation 
with Mongolian misinterpretation of their inter-corporate battle 
over the price that RT will pay Ivanhoe for its shares.  RT expects 
to buy out Ivanhoe; and so, RT is busy trying to drive down the 
price of Ivanhoe shares while Ivanhoe is busy trying to drive share 
value up.  While the strategies and tactics of these battles are 
familiar to western observers, the GOM and Mongolian public have no 
experience with such inter-corporate wars.  For example, one of 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000315  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Ivanhoe's strategies is to bring in third party investors from 
wherever they can, including Chinese sovereign wealth funds.  The 
aim here is to create a cadre of investors with a vested interest in 
maximizing share return.  However, bringing in a Chinese buyer 
frenzies the Mongolian public and GOM, who, fearing that their two 
partners are preparing to sell out Mongolia to China, may slow down 
the OT project implementation.  While acknowledging the existence of 
Mongolian concerns, the companies, who have expressed disdain to 
Post over what they consider Mongolia's lack of worldliness, have 
yet to craft an approach to mitigate Mongolian concerns. 
 
¶10. (SBU) On the regulatory front, it has become increasingly clear 
that the GOM is not ready to administer OT's buildup, let alone its 
operation, and that this lack of capacity may well slow down 
development unless dealt with immediately.  For example, the General 
Specialized Inspection Agency (GSIA) will have to approve up to 6000 
thousand licenses and permits.  However, it certainly lacks any 
expertise to assess the quality of the technology and work 
environment being created at OT, let alone the entire 
infrastructural platform that will support the project.  In 
addition, the GSIA is staffed via a patronage system that allows for 
the firing of at least 60 percent of its staff every time it gets a 
new General Director, and it just so happens that a new General 
Director is set to be appointed this month.  The lack of skill and a 
highly politicized employment scheme that values rewarding clientele 
more than serving public interest will impose real, ongoing 
bottlenecks on OT, just when smooth, professional permitting is 
essential.  Short of the GOM allowing the companies to 
self-regulate, and being accused of ignoring its regulatory 
obligations, neither the GOM nor the companies have proffered a 
solution to this and other looming regulatory problems. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The OT investment agreement does offer a solution that 
might ameliorate these problems to some extent.  The deal requires 
the establishment of a council to mediate disputes among the 
parties.  The GOM must nominate its members and a head of this body 
- one Ivanhoe exec called this person the OT Czar - within the next 
six months.  The initial intention was for the council to serve as a 
dispute resolution entity dealing with permit and license delays. 
However, it has been suggested by company executives that the body 
might well expand its mandate to be the vehicle to deal with other 
problems arising from the OT project.  So far there has been no 
discussion of this possibility outside the companies; nor have 
either the GOM or the firms moved to staff and operate the OT 
Council. 
 
Foreign Relations: Happiness, Indifference, Silence 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) Regarding the current impact of OT on Mongolia's foreign 
relations, three weeks have continued the parade of praise from 
western countries and relative silence from China and Russia.  Other 
missions have been clear and consistent that the deal proves that 
Mongolia is a place where western firms can do business, even if in 
some investment climate areas, such as the lack of administrative 
transparency, Mongolia continues to fall short. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Russia seems to have remained largely indifferent to OT, 
rumors to the contrary notwithstanding. In run up to the signing, 
newspapers reported that the Russians were furious with the GOM for 
signing the deal and would take vengeance on Mongolia.  None of the 
articles explained why the Russians would be so miffed about OT.  In 
the post-signing environment, we have heard little from official or 
unofficial sources suggesting any particular Russian animus against 
OT.  Mongolian officials and company executives bluntly state the 
Russians have said and done nothing to hinder OT.  Having received 
some commitments from the GOM regarding rail rights on the Tavan 
Tolgoi project, the Russians have taken no punitive action against 
Mongolia or any Mongolian politician or official - up to and 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000315  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
including the lately resigned Prime Minister Bayar. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Chinese attitude remains opaque.  China certainly 
desires access to Mongolia copper and seems no unopposed to having 
western firms intermediate between Mongolia and China.  However, 
both the GOM and the companies are concerned that the Chinese will 
inhibit shipment of the mine's output in and through China, or use 
the state's monopoly control of smelters to force down Mongolia's 
price for OT's output.  For their parts both RT and Ivanhoe state 
that they will have to come to some terms with the Chinese to ensure 
that the output can transit through China without undue state 
interference.  RT and Ivanhoe are particularly concerned that RT's 
failed joint investment with the Chinese state-owned aluminum 
company Chinalco might prejudice the Chinese government against the 
OT project. Recent articles in the international press suggest that 
RT has begun a rapprochement with Chinalco and the Chinese 
government by offering such concessions as exclusive rights to 
market or to smelt the OT copper concentrate in China in return for 
ending outstanding disputes. 
 
Bayar's Resignation and OT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The PM's resignation seems to have caught RT and Ivanhoe 
by surprise, as their local government affairs officials told them 
--and us -- categorically that the PM would remain in place.  Our 
own review of the evidence led us to believe otherwise, and we 
conveyed our different view to the firms late last week, at least 
giving them a chance to start thinking about the post-Bayar era. 
RT, Ivanhoe, and other business sources expressed concern over 
Bayar's departure, because they believe that it was his commitment 
to push OT through the rough political waters that made the deal 
possible.  Even though they -- and we -- believe the cabinet and 
whoever succeeds Bayar will remain committed to the OT project, the 
companies and other members of the domestic and foreign business 
communities worry that in the delicate period leading up to mine 
construction, Bayar's absence from the scene may allow adventurers 
in both political camps to play political hob with the project. 
They do take some solace from the fact that Bayar may remain as MPRP 
party chief and a Member of Parliament -- and so, would be available 
to enforce discipline on the coalition, assuming he is not too 
distracted by the medical condition that led to his resignation. In 
any case, the so-far smooth transition of power to a new PM, nominee 
Su. Batbold, along with the apparent stability of the coalition 
government, has dispelled initial fears for time being. 
 
HILL