VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0722/01 2741306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011306Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6825
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS TS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON TUNISIAN DEFENSE 
MINISTER MORJANE 
 
Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) During the Ambassador's 29 September introductory 
call with Tunisian Defense Minister Kamel Morjane, the 
Minister assured the Ambassador that the close cooperation 
between the U.S. and Tunisian militaries, and broader 
cooperation between the two governments, would make the 
Ambassador's job easy.  The Minister also spoke of Tunisia's 
support for the Maghreb Union and discussed his views on 
opportunities for multilateral engagement, which he saw as 
mainly limited to participation in peacekeeping operations. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Gray paid a September 29 introductory 
call on Defense Minister Kamel Morjane.  Also in attendance 
were on the Tunisian side, Colonel Major Mohamed Ghorbel, the 
Defense Ministry's Director of Cooperation and International 
Relations, and Captain Major Mohamed Khammassi, advisor to 
the Minister of Defense for International Relations, as well 
as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy,s Office of Security 
Cooperation (notetaker). 
 
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Bilateral Military Relations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Minister Morjane assured the Ambassador that the 
Tunisian military enjoyed excellent relations and cooperation 
with the U.S. military and that this was true of the two 
governments as well.  He pledged to continue the long history 
of cooperation and "make the Ambassador's life easy," 
emphasizing that any difficulties between the two countries 
were just "disagreements of the moment."  He said the 
attitude in Tunisia toward the U.S., both in the government 
and from the people, had improved substantially since the 
election of President Obama.  Morjane thanked the Ambassador 
for the recent delivery of 50 ground surveillance radars 
(GSRs), which would help address the mutual U.S.-Tunisian 
goals of providing border security, halting terrorism, and 
thwarting extremism in general. 
 
¶4. (C) Briefly addressing the terrorist threat in Tunisia, 
Morjane pointed out the transnational nature of the threats 
meant that threats could originate anywhere, saying it could 
"from Djerba or even Bangladesh!  Not just Libya and 
Algeria."  The Minister said the Tunisian military was 
particularly concerned about maintaining a presence in the 
desert and had to be constantly mobilized along the 1,400kms 
(870 miles) of borders with Algeria and Libya. 
 
¶5. (C) While the Ambassador agreed that Tunisia and the U.S. 
have a long history of cooperation, he told Morjane that in 
the current economic environment in the U.S., Congress would 
give increased scrutiny to all budget requests.  The Minister 
or his subordinates should take every opportunity to explain 
their needs to us, as it would help us explain the 
requirements to Congress.  As an example, the Ambassador 
praised the recent approval for the SDO/DATT to travel to 
Tunisia's southern desert, saying that the information 
gathered during this trip would help the OSC better 
understand Tunisia's requirements.  Morjane in turn, used 
this example to point out the unique relationship between the 
two countries, saying that the south is a sensitive area and 
approval of the U.S. SDO/DATT is an exception to normal 
Tunisian policy ) one granted to no other attache.  He 
highlighted this approval as indicative of the trust they 
placed not just in the US, but in the SDO/DATT personally. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador then asked Morjane to encourage his 
subordinates to take advantage of the many other 
opportunities offered by the U.S. Referring to the U.S. Chief 
of Naval Operations' (CNO) desire to expand relations with 
Tunisia, the Ambassador regretted that both the U.S. and 
Tunisia had lost out by Tunisia's decision to not send its 
CNO to the International Seapower Symposium in Washington. 
Morjane quickly replied that this decision was not an 
indication of lack of interest, but a question of 
decision-making protocol within the MoD.  For service 
commanders, their travel schedule and a schedule of whom they 
will invite for the entire year is determined before the year 
begins.  For example, he said that for next year, the 
decision had already been made that the Air Force Commander 
would attend the U.S. Joint Military Commission (JMC) in May, 
while the Army and Navy service chiefs would attend JMCs in 
France and Italy.  Stating that the President does not like 
 
to see his service chiefs travel too much, he said that the 
CNO invitation simply arrived too late.  (Comment: The 
invitation arrived early enough for over 100 other CNOs to 
agree to attend.  End comment.) The Ambassador assured him of 
a sustained U.S. commitment to engage and said that we would 
continue to send invitations to events and training 
opportunities in the hopes that the Tunisians would 
participate in the future. 
 
¶7. (C) Apparently having hit a nerve, the Defense Minister 
defended Tunisia,s cooperation with the U.S., saying that 
Tunisia participates in 12 JMCs each year, putting a real 
strain on its ability to support every event.  However, 
Morjane did concede there were other issues with cooperating 
with the U.S., saying that Tunisia must balance 
"contradictory positions."  He explained to the Ambassador 
that while Tunisia wants to please its friends (the U.S.), it 
didn,t want other "friends or brothers," to misinterpret 
things.  He seemed particularly concerned with President 
Qadhafi, stating that the unpredictability of the Libyan 
leader made normal relations difficult.  Morjane recalled 
that while President Ben Ali has had some success in 
influencing Qadhafi in his 22 years in power, things were 
completely different under President Bourguiba, when 
relations were "a continuous war." 
 
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The Arab Maghreb Union 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Defense Minister also discussed the Arab Maghreb 
Union, bluntly acknowledging that it is not really unified, 
but stressing "it is not our fault," and crediting President 
Ben Ali with making every effort to make the Union succeed. 
He rued that a successful union would be better for the 
Maghreb's economies, particularly by increasing bargaining 
power with the European Union, as well as improving the 
region,s security.  He had even hoped the Arab Maghreb Union 
would provide the framework of discussion and political 
discourse that could bring a solution to the Western Sahara 
question.  Instead, the current situation between Algeria and 
Morocco makes unification unlikely.  At one point he seemed 
almost nostalgic for the French colonial period as he 
reflected on how residents used to be able to take a train 
from Tunis to Casablanca without passports.  The Ambassador 
said that Undersecretary Burns had hoped to meet with Arab 
Maghreb Union foreign ministers on the margins of the United 
Nations General Assembly meeting last week, but this had not 
been possible due to the departure plans to attend the 
African-American summit in Venezuela. 
 
---------------------- 
Multilateral Relations 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador then asked Minister Morjane how he saw 
Tunisia engaging in multilateral relations.  Morjane said 
that while they agree with multilateral approaches in 
principal, in reality, it was a question of means for the 
small military.  He also pointed out that Tunisians thought 
differently than Arabs in the Middle East and President Ben 
Ali would not engage in diplomacy for diplomacy's sake, but 
only when tangible results could be achieved.  As an example, 
he said that President Ben Ali had cancelled the 2004 Arab 
League meeting in Tunis after becoming convinced that the 
meeting would accomplish nothing. 
 
¶10. (C) Morjane then turned the conversation on 
multilateralism to peacekeeping.  Even here, though, he made 
clear Tunisia's concerns with international involvement, 
particularly in any operation in which Tunisia might be seen 
as biased.  It was this fear of appearing biased that led to 
Tunisia's decision to not support peacekeeping operations in 
Darfur or Lebanon.  While Tunisia did get involved in 
MINURSO, it later regretted it, as it found itself caught 
between Moroccan and Algerian interests. He did point out 
Tunisia's support for operations in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Briefly turning to relations with Israel, the 
Minister pointed out that in 1965 under President Bourguiba, 
Tunisia became the first Arab country to advocate for a 
two-state solution and relations with Israel.  This fact 
gives Tunisia the right to look Israel in the eye when it 
comes to building relations.  However, this issue, as with 
the Western Sahara issue, is broader than just two countries 
and requires a global solution. 
 
¶12. (SBU) As the meeting came to a close, the Ambassador 
raised the issue of Secretary Gates'Senior Defense Official 
 
(SDO) initiative.  While the Ambassador acknowledged that the 
initiative, which places both the Defense Attache Office 
(DAO) and the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) under one 
officer, was primarily an internal U.S. matter, he pointed 
out that it would make things easier for the Minister, by 
giving him one point of contact who could address any U.S. 
military issues.  The Ambassador also pointed out that it was 
a testimony to the strong U.S.-Tunisian relations that 
Tunisia was selected to be one of the first countries for 
implementation of this initiative.  After the Ambassador 
explained to Morjane that the DAO and OSC were still two 
separate offices and that the SDO was still under Chief of 
Mission authority, the OSC Deputy Chief explained that the 
biggest change for the Tunisians was that the SDO would now 
be addressing issues for both offices, instead of just the 
DAO.  Morjane then said that he would have no problem working 
with the SDO in any capacity.  However, he did request that 
the Ambassador send a diplomatic note to the Foreign Ministry 
to explain the change in status. 
 
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Comment 
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¶13. (C) Defense Minister Morjane was generally pleasant, and 
jovial at times, during the meeting and said all the right 
things about military-to-military cooperation.  However, we 
have heard this line from him before and it is unlikely that 
we will see any immediate effort toward expanding relations 
with the U.S.  End comment. 
GRAY