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DE RUEHTC #0638/01 2990832
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260832Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3400
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1937
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2526
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000638 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC LY
SUBJECT: CWC: LIBYA'S REQUEST TO EXTEND THEIR DESTRUCTION 
DEADLINE AT EC-58 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 632 
     ¶B. STATE 100809 
 
Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
This is CWC-65-09 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The Libyan request to extend their 
intermediate and final deadlines for the 
destruction of their declared chemical weapons (CW) 
was approved by the Executive Council (EC) on 
October 16, but only after questions were raised 
privately by the U.S. and the UK, and publicly by 
the European Union (EU).  The Technical Secretariat 
(TS) expressed grave doubts to U.S. and UK 
delegates about Libya's commitment to destroy its 
chemical weapons, a clear indication that 
continuing scrutiny of Libya's actions will remain 
necessary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Details of the Council deliberations and 
sidebar meetings follow. 
 
---------------------------- 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DISCUSSION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Libyan request for extension of the 
intermediate and final deadlines for the 
destruction of its Category 1 CW (EC-58/NAT.5) was 
considered and approved during the Council's 58th 
Session (October 13-16) after scrutiny and 
discussion in the plenary session and on the 
margins.  The EU joint statement during general 
debate called for "clear and unambiguous 
information about Libyan plans, intentions and 
projections for CW destruction."  Upon introduction 
of the agenda item, Iran intervened to voice 
concern with the deadline extension request and 
demanded that this be the "final, final" extension. 
The Libyan delegation prepared an addendum to the 
original request which included additional 
information to satisfy the Council members' 
concerns.  The EC approved the deadline extension 
request following distribution of this additional 
paper. 
 
¶4. (C) DEL COMMENT:  Delrep Smith, UK Delegate 
Wolstenholme and Italian Delegate Cornacchia 
discussed the notion of an EU statement on the 
Libyan request on September 28, concluding that 
this approach would be more effective than verbal 
opposition from individual member states, 
particularly in light of limited attention from 
WEOG members on the topic in advance of the EC. 
The EU's public joint position forcibly 
strengthened the continuing private dialogue on 
transparency measures which the U.S. and the UK 
have had with Libyan representatives.  END COMMENT. 
 
------------------------ 
U.S.-UK-LIBYA TRILATERAL 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) On October 13, the Libyan, U.S. and UK 
delegations held a trilateral meeting on the 
margins of EC-58 to discuss the Libyan deadline 
extension request and attention to transparency 
measures called for in U.S. and UK non-papers on 
the subject (ref B).  Delreps Smith, Weekman and 
Peterson and UK Delegates Clive Rowland, James 
 
Harrison and James McGilly met with Libyan 
Delegates Ahmed Hassan Walid, Tajouri Sharradi from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ahmed El- 
Hesnawy and M. Tamtam Abulkasam of the National 
Committee for the CWC in Tripoli. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. and UK delegations stressed that 
they both would require continued transparency 
measures in return for supporting the Libyan 
extension request, such as releasing the 
destruction informals briefing, providing hardcopy 
reports including photos of the destruction 
facility progress and meeting with the U.S and the 
UK in advance of future OCPW meetings.  Delrep 
requested a copy of the narrative statement 
delivered at the destruction informals the previous 
afternoon which Hesnawy provided to meeting 
participants.  UK delegates further requested a 
national paper to be released during EC-58 
outlining the rationale and progress plans behind 
the specific deadline extension request.  Hesnawy 
agreed and produced a paper later in the week in 
the form of an addendum to the original deadline 
extension request (EC-58/NAT.5 Add.1).  Hesnawy 
also stated that Libya is open to TS site visits to 
the destruction facility and temporary holding area 
to provide transparency, but he expressed 
frustration with the TS and disparaged the TS's 
capability.  Hesnawy also mentioned the possibility 
of bilateral or trilateral visits by the U.S. 
and/or UK. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Hesnawy admitted that three EC members had 
asked him to extend Libya's deadline request to 
2012, but he insisted that consultations with 
contractors -- including the Italian firm SIPSA -- 
indicated that the requested deadline of mid-2011 
already includes 4.5 months of contingency time. 
Requesting an extension to 2012 at this point would 
"insult" the contractors. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On the deadline extension request, Hesnawy 
explained that Libya needed an extension to the 
destruction deadline because Libya had 
underestimated how long it would take to deal with 
local and environmental protests to the Rabta 
destruction facility.  However, as of September 25, 
the Libyan government had resolved the issues 
raised by protesters through a series of awareness 
workshops and negotiations on parameters for 
transporting the agent and precursors from the 
temporary holding area to the destruction facility. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Responding to a question on the temporary 
holding area and precursor destruction, Hesnawy 
stated that the corroded tanks which cannot be 
safely transported to Rabta destruction facility 
will be hydrolyzed on site either in a stainless 
steel reactor or in a holding basin. Libya may also 
begin destroying Category 2 precursors on site 
early next year. 
 
¶10. (SBU) After reloading the sulfur mustard, there 
is 2200 kg of heel left in plastic 20L containers. 
Libya intends to incinerate the entire containers 
in a rotating solid waste furnace rather than 
remove the heel. 
 
¶11. (SBU) On the construction of the Rabta 
destruction facility, the Libyan delegation stated 
Qdestruction facility, the Libyan delegation stated 
that the construction schedule outlined in the 
destruction informals allows for a delay of 1-2 
weeks. Destruction must start in November 2010, 
however, according to Hesnawy.  Ninety-five percent 
of the units for the destruction facility are 
 
coming from Italy and will be pre-assembled.  The 
incinerator, which has yet to be ordered from 
Germany, will be assembled on site.  The 
incinerator will take 6 months to be delivered from 
the time of order. Hesnawy said that he had spent 
considerable time reviewing shipping options, 
stating that the vast majority of items will be 
shipped from Italy to Tripoli, but that 
arrangements at an alternative harbor were already 
completed as a back-up option. 
 
¶12. (SBU) As to the conversion of the production 
facility, Hesnawy stated that the Rabta conversion 
project is on time, and he expects the TS to verify 
conversion in late December. 
 
-------------- 
TS IMPRESSIONS 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) On October 15, the U.S. and UK 
delegations met with TS representatives to discuss 
the state of Libyan efforts to destroy its CW 
destruction stockpile.  Delreps Smith, Weekman and 
Peterson and UK Delegate McGilly met with Horst 
Reeps (Director of Verification), Dominique Anelli 
(Head of Chemical Demilitarization Branch), Yaugen 
Ryzhyka (Senior Chem-Demil Officer) and Susan Atego 
(Senior Policy Officer). 
 
¶14. (C) Reeps showed pictures from the TS visits to 
Rabta in April and July 2009.  He clearly was 
concerned about Libya's lack of serious effort to 
destroy its CW stockpile and was unsure whether 
Libya will be able to meet the self-imposed 
deadline of November 1, 2010, for starting CW 
destruction.  According to the TS, currently there 
is no infrastructure or equipment yet in place at 
the CW destruction facility. 
 
¶15. (C) Anelli reported that every time TS 
representatives meet with Libyan officials -- in 
contrast to Libyan meetings with U.S. and UK 
officials -- they begin with a political statement 
along the lines of "Libya agreed to give up its WMD 
program in December 2003 and received absolutely 
nothing in return from the U.S. and the UK; why do 
we need to disarm?"  The statements imply, but stop 
short of saying, that Libya will retain its CW 
stockpile.  In a January 2009 statement to the TS, 
the Head of the Libyan National Authority stated 
that only Libya is sticking up for the 
Palestinians.  He accused the Europeans in the room 
of doing nothing to help the Palestinians and said 
that there is a lack of interest in Libya to 
destroy its CW stockpile on time.  Delreps asked 
for a copy of the Libyan statements, but TS 
officials replied that there are no written copies 
as the Libyans only deliver verbal statements. 
 
¶16. (C) Reeps suggested that the German and Italian 
delegations might be able to work with local 
commercial contractors employed on the Libyan 
destruction activity, who could potentially provide 
contractual data, procurement records and shipping 
transactions.  This would allow for greater 
transparency into prospects for Libya meeting their 
new deadline. 
 
----------- 
DEL COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶17. (C) Libya may have hoped that in the 
distraction  of the Executive Council's selection 
 
of a new Director-General, consideration of the 
OPCW's budget and other issues (ref A), and by 
sending the fast-talking Dr. Hesnawy to make the 
case, they might get a pass on their extension 
request.  They did not.  Most Council members 
considered that Libya is not yet at the final 
deadline (April 2012) set in the Convention and 
were willing to allow more time for the completion 
of destruction.  However, the European Union's 
skeptical stand provided a reality check in the 
Council, and reinforced private efforts by the U.S. 
and the UK to insist on transparency and progress 
on the ground.  Del hopes that the Libyan 
government will begin to live up to its promises. 
 
¶18. (U) BEIK SENDS. 
 
LEVIN